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The last two or three decades have been characterized by a strong phenomenon of
¯nancial globalization that has a®ected the sources and the transmission of busi-
ness cycles around the world. First, there is overwhelming evidence that along
this period global ¯nancial factors have played a key role in shaping macroe-
conomic °uctuation for several economies. The high volatility of capital °ows
towards emerging economies is a clear example. For instance, global ¯nancial
factors played a key role in the reversal of capital °ows to Latin America after
a long cycle of indiscriminate in°ows from the end of the 1980's to mid-1998: A
partial debt default of a small country practically unconnected to the region as
Russia resulted, via its e®ect on the balance sheet of international ¯nancial in-
termediaries, in a synchronized and widespread Sudden Stop in capital °ows to
the region, despite ample di®erences in economic performance and macroeconomic
policies across countries (Calvo and Talvi 2005). The 1997 Asian crisis and the
events related to the global ¯nancial crisis that hit the world in 2008 revealed that
sudden shifts in ¯nancial conditions can also a®ect countries with an impeccable
record of high growth and savings and countries with a highly developed domestic
¯nancial system: ¯nancial globalization has rendered virtually any economy vul-
nerable to systemic shocks originating in international ¯nancial markets. Second,
it has became apparent that changes in ¯nancial conditions often entail a rare dis-
aster pattern, in the spirit of Barro (2006). Episodes as the sudden stop associated
with the Russian default or the liquidity crunch in the interbank market at the
onset of the recent global ¯nancial crisis represent infrequent but extremely severe
deteriorations in ¯nancial conditions.
This thesis attempts to shed light on the role of ¯nancial factors and vulnera-
bilities in shaping macroeconomic °uctuations. It contributes to the literature
ix
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DOI: 10.2870/21960that integrates ¯nancial factors into the real business cycle paradigm by intro-
ducing asymmetries and disaster risk in ¯nancial conditions, re°ecting the low
probability of sharp worsening in ¯nancial conditions that is found in data. The
introduction of disaster risk in this thesis is done within a small open economy
modeling framework. In this sense, while the trigger of disaster events is not
endogenized, the emphasis is on exploring the role of ¯nancial frictions (such as
working capital requirements or time-varying leverage) and of modeling features
(e.g. variable capital utilization, the use of imported intermediate inputs, etc.)
in a®ecting the propagation mechanisms when external conditions show a rare
disaster pattern. In this sense, Chapter 1 analyzes the empirical pattern of ex-
ternal ¯nancial conditions for a sample of emerging economies and argues that
a de¯ning characteristic is the occasional disruption in access to foreign lending.
The chapter presents evidence suggesting that these rare events in ¯nancial con-
ditions relate to special features of their business °uctuations. It also shows that
introducing these rare diasters in ¯nancial conditions in a canonical small open
economy model has quantitatively important implications and makes emphasis
on a careful speci¯cation of the exogenous processes in dynamic models for these
economies. Chapter 2 assesses the contribution of the rare breakdowns in ¯nan-
cial trade to macroeconomic °uctuations and shows that, indeed, Sudden Stops
can account for the key empirical regularities of emerging market business cycles.
This chapter also contributes to the literature by exploring the role of ¯nancial
frictions and of modeling features, such as intermediate inputs and variable capital
utilization, in the propagation mechanism of rare disaster shocks. Chapter 3 shifts
the focus from the previous chapters to the speci¯cation of the ¯nancial friction.
It explores the impact of cyclical swings in the tightness of ¯nancial frictions on
asset prices and real variables. The chapter introduces a simple modi¯cation in
a collateral constraint speci¯cation widely used in the literature. The modi¯ed
friction, which is interpreted as the result of market imperfections at both ends of
¯nancial intermediation, reinforces the overreaction of asset prices to fundamental
shocks and results in higher macroeconomic volatility, suggesting eventual gains
from macro-prudential policies aimed at smoothing cyclical °uctuations in lever-
age requirements.
In more detail, Chapter 1 analyzes data on real interest rates from a sample of
emerging economies and argues that the high volatility of their external ¯nancial
conditions can be attributed to disaster events: infrequent but severe disruptions
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DOI: 10.2870/21960in their access to foreign lending. The chapter proposes a regime switching model
to capture the main characteristics of these rare events, including their severity,
frequency and duration, and makes two distinctive points. First, Chapter 1 shows
that introducing empirically motivated asymmetries in the process driving inter-
est rates in a canonical small open economy model has quantitatively important
implications for the probability distribution of its endogenous variables which, if
ignored, can be quite consequential for calibration exercises. Also, the e®ects on
the model's endogenous variables suggest that the regime switching nature of the
shock leads to a weaker precautionary motive for savings which, to my knowl-
edge, is a novel result. The quantitative exercises in this chapter highlight the
relevance of a careful speci¯cation of the exogenous processes in dynamic models
for emerging economies, taking due account of the nonlinearities they may face in
their external conditions. Second, the chapter shows that the features captured by
a nonlinear model for interest rates relate to well known stylized facts of business
cycles in emerging markets. In particular, business °uctuations in countries dis-
playing a clear asymmetric pattern in the distribution of their real interest rates
show many of the characteristics that have been pointed out in the literature as
typical of emerging economies.
Chapter 2 pursues the latter point further and relying on counterfactual exer-
cises from a carefully calibrated extended model it shows that disaster events in
¯nancial trade can account for the empirical regularities of business °uctuations
in emerging economies. Indeed, many emerging economies have experienced rare
current account reversals followed by large declines in economic activity. These
sudden stops are re°ected in their real interest rates, which alternate between tran-
quil times, when the level is relatively low and stable, and crises, during which
interest rates are higher and more volatile. In this chapter an estimated regime
switching process of interest rates is embedded into a small open economy model
with ¯nancial frictions. The model nests infrequent dramatic crises within regular
business cycles, successfully matches the key second and higher order moments of
the macroeconomic aggregates and produces plausible endogenous dynamics dur-
ing crises. The chapter shows that the occurrence of sudden stops can account for
the empirical regularities of emerging market business cycles: in counterfactual
experiments in which sudden stops do not occur, business cycles resemble those of
developed small open economies. Financial frictions are found to be essential for
explaining emerging market °uctuations, but almost exclusively because of their
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Chapter 3 uses a dynamic small open economy model of business cycles with
¯nancial frictions to explore how macroeconomic °uctuations are ampli¯ed and
transmitted across borders when frictions in ¯nancial intermediation entail pro-
cyclicality in credit conditions. I ¯nd that the procyclical behavior of lending
standards ampli¯es shocks to fundamentals beyond the e®ect attributable to the
¯nancial accelerator mechanism. I interpret this extra ampli¯cation in the model
as resulting from the interaction of ¯nancial constraints in the lending and in the
borrowing side of ¯nancial intermediation. Asset prices play a crucial role in the
propagation mechanism as procyclical lending standards reinforce their \overreac-
tion" to shocks signaled by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999). Simulation results suggest
the potential for sizeable stabilization gains from \macro-prudential" regulation
aimed at containing the procyclical behavior of credit conditions.




Rare Disasters in Emerging
Market Financial Conditions
Abstract
Analyzing data on real interest rates from a sample of emerging economies this
chapter argues that the high volatility of their external ¯nancial conditions can be
attributed to disaster events: infrequent but severe disruptions in their access to
foreign lending. I propose a regime switching model to capture the main charac-
teristics of these rare events, including their severity, frequency and duration, and
¯nd that many features identi¯ed by this nonlinear model relate to key charac-
teristics of business cycles in emerging markets. Finally, I show that introducing
empirically motivated asymmetries in the process driving interest rates in a canon-
ical small open economy model has quantitatively important implications for the
probability distribution of its endogenous variables which, if ignored, can be quite
consequential for calibration exercises. Overall, the results in this chapter high-
light the relevance of a careful speci¯cation of the exogenous processes in dynamic
models for emerging economies, taking due account of the nonlinearities they may
face in their external conditions.
1
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1.1 Introduction
Emerging economies and developing countries in general show higher macroeco-
nomic volatility than developed economies, partly because they face large swings
in external conditions, such as °uctuations in their terms of trade or in the cost
of borrowing in international markets. As their export earnings typically rely on
a narrow range of primary commodities or related manufacturing industries while
they heavily depend on imported capital goods and intermediate inputs, they are
vulnerable to high volatility in commodity prices. As they typically have a signif-
icant stock of foreign debt and rely on access to foreign credit to ¯nance imports
of intermediate inputs and capital goods, they are vulnerable to swings in the real
interest rate they face in international markets. Many of these economies have
opened signi¯cantly their capital accounts before developing their domestic ¯nan-
cial sector. This makes them especially vulnerable to ¯nancial shocks resulting in
large swings in capital in°ows, driven by exogenous events that a®ect advanced
economies, like changes in the world interest rate and shifts in international in-
vestors appetite towards risky assets in general{or towards emerging markets debt
in particular. However, a notable feature of emerging economies is that an impor-
tant fraction of the volatility in the external conditions faced by these countries is
due to infrequent but extreme adverse realizations of shocks rather than repeated
normal cyclical °uctuations. That is, they face \disaster" volatility in external
conditions. Despite the extensive literature on the e®ects of the volatility of exter-
nal conditions on emerging and developing economies, the rare disaster nature of
these shocks has been largely unexplored. This chapter focuses on the rare disas-
ter pattern displayed by one of the most relevant external conditions for emerging
markets: ¯nancial conditions.
This chapter is structured in two parts. First, I analyze the time series of real
interest rates in emerging economies showing that their high volatility can be at-
tributed to disaster events: infrequent but severe disruptions in access to foreign
lending. The inspection of higher order moments of interest rates series shows that
occasional and large adverse realizations produce an asymmetric pattern for exter-
nal conditions. I propose an empirical model to capture the main characteristics
of these rare events, including their severity, frequency and duration, emphasiz-
ing the need to use nonlinear speci¯cations. In particular, I provide evidence
of regime-switching behavior of real interest rates suggesting that the access by
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emerging economies to international borrowing is best characterized by a process
alternating between a low level/low volatility regime and a high level/high volatil-
ity regime, the latter being a low-probability event in the line of a peso problem
or a rare disaster as discussed in Barro (2006). I also show evidence suggesting
that the features captured by a nonlinear model for interest rates are related to
well known stylized facts of business cycles in emerging markets. In particular,
the countries displaying a clear asymmetric pattern in the distribution of their real
interest rates are also characterized by a high volatility of consumption relative
to output and the real interest rate being strongly countercyclical and positively
correlated with the trade balance. Likewise, the countries in the sample that do
not show rare disaster risk in their ¯nancial conditions do not show either many
of the characteristics that have been pointed out in the literature as typical of
°uctuations in emerging economies.
In the second part of the chapter, I show that introducing empirically motivated
nonlinearities in ¯nancial conditions in a canonical dynamic model of a small open
economy can have important implications for model predictions. Interest rate
shocks have been often treated as a source of °uctuations in dynamic models of
small open economies (e.g. Mendoza 1991; Correia et al. 1995), in particular to
address issues speci¯c to emerging markets (examples include Neumeyer and Perri
2005; Uribe and Yue 2006; Mendoza 2010). However, little attention has been
devoted to the speci¯cation of the stochastic process: the usual assumption is
that the real interest rate the economy faces in international markets (or its log)
follows a symmetric AR(1) process. In this chapter I show that the asymmetric
probability distribution of interest rates found in data has quantitatively impor-
tant implications for the predictions of the canonical small open economy model.
The e®ects on the ¯rst moment of some endogenous variables suggest that the
regime switching nature of the shock leads to a weaker precautionary motive for
savings which, to my knowledge, is a novel result. The shift in their probability
distribution is signi¯cant and can have serious implications for model calibration
exercises. These results highlight the relevance of a careful speci¯cation of the
shock processes in dynamic models for emerging economies, taking due account of
the nonlinearities in their external conditions. The evidence in this chapter also
motivates the use of global methods to solve models involving emerging economies:
relying on linear approximations can involve sizeable errors.
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The aim of the quantitative exercise in the second part of this chapter is to compare
the equilibrium outcome of the model under mean-volatility preserving changes in
the distribution of the interest rate an emerging market economy faces in inter-
national markets. The scope of the exercise is not to match data from any given
country. Rather the goal is to show that fat tails in the distribution of the ex-
ogenous process can have signi¯cant implications even in the simplest neoclassical
model. For this reason, the model speci¯cation is then as parsimonious as possi-
ble, and parameterized to a \typical" emerging country. In Chapter 2, instead, an
extended model is carefully calibrated to Argentinean data.
The comparison of model outcomes undertaken in this chapter goes beyond second
moments of the equilibrium distributions as traditionally done in the business cy-
cle literature: The regime-switching properties of interest rates gets re°ected also
in lower as well as in higher moments of the distributions of endogenous variables
such as output, debt, consumption and capital accumulation. The implications
in terms of higher moments are important since they relate to empirical patterns
of macro-aggregates from emerging countries, such as asymmetric probability dis-
tributions, and hence can help bringing standard models closer to the data. The
implication in terms of the ¯rst moment has straightforward consequences for the
empirical implementation of models: The presence of asymmetry in the distri-
bution of interest rates shocks is found to shift the ergodic distribution of some
endogenous variables. Consequently, the quantitative exercises in this chapter sug-
gest that in the presence of such asymmetries model calibration should be done
according to that ergodic distribution and not to non-stochastic steady state val-
ues.
The focus of this chapter on the ¯nancial conditions emerging markets face in
international capital markets is justi¯ed by the relevance of changes in external
¯nancial conditions for these economies. For example, using a large panel of coun-
tries Becker and Mauro (2006) study how output drops are related to various
external shocks and ¯nd that, for emerging countries, ¯nancial shocks entail the
highest costs. They estimate the expected cost of each shock by computing the
relative frequency of shocks, the occurrence of output collapses conditional on each
shock and the size of output drops during those episodes. The authors ¯nd that,
for emerging markets, the largest expected output costs relate to ¯nancial shocks
that include currency crises, banking crises, debt crises and, especially, sudden
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stops in capital in°ows.1 Other relevant external conditions for emerging markets
such as terms of trade also display important asymmetries. A careful speci¯cation
of the shocks to the terms of trade or commodity prices in dynamic models for
small open economies represents a fruitful avenue for future research.
This chapter is related to the literature on \disasters" or rare events, pioneered
by Rietz (1988) and more recently developed by Barro (2006) and Gabaix (2008),
among others. Most of that literature explores the role of diasters, understood as
the potential for infrequent large declines in aggregate output and consumption, in
explaining asset pricing puzzles, and explores ways to estimate the probability and
magnitude of disasters. In this line, Backus et al. (2009) use high-order moments
such as skewness and kurtosis to measure the impact of disasters on the price of
equity options. Ranciµ ere et al. (2008) place emphasis on asymmetries in ¯nancial
variables to capture systemic risk. They use the skewness of real credit growth as a
measure of systemic risk, and document the relationship between this measure and
output growth for a sample of countries. In this chapter I will also inspect higher
order moments of ¯nancial variables but to identify disaster events in emerging
economies' access to ¯nancial markets. In particular, the focus is on specifying a
stochastic process that can capture the disaster pattern of their real interest rate
series and on exploring what is the e®ect of tail risk in dynamic models for small
open economies. This chapter is also related to the work by Fern¶ andez-Villaverde
et al. (2009) who analyze the role of changes in volatility of real interest rates in
a®ecting real variables. They document that the volatility of real interest rates
in emerging markets is not constant over time and propose a stochastic volatility
model to capture this phenomenon. Then they introduce such a process into a
small open economy model and show that shocks to volatility of interest rates can
have distinctive e®ects on real variables such as consumption. The main di®erence
with Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al. (2009) is the focus in this chapter on the asym-
metric pattern of ¯nancial conditions. I argue that what characterizes emerging
markets' access to foreign lending is rather the potential for rare disasters: the
infrequent occurrence of large and abrupt adverse realizations, partly responsible
for the evidence on time-varying volatility.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the interest rate data
1Besides the ones mentioned, the shocks considered in Becker and Mauro (2006) are natural
disasters, terms of trade, war and political turbulence, large increases in international interest
rates and oil prices.
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used, presents the regime-switching empirical model and shows evidence that this
provides a better characterization of interest rates in emerging markets than lin-
ear models and stochastic volatility models. It also relates the regime switching
estimation results to business cycle regularities in emerging markets. Section 1.3
presents the dynamic small open economy model used for the quantitative exer-
cises, describes the nature of the exercises and presents the results for di®erent
model speci¯cations and parameterizations. Finally, Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Emerging Market Interest Rates
In this section I provide evidence of the regime switching nature of real interest
rates in a sample of eight emerging economies and estimate a nonlinear model to
characterize the dynamics of these time series. I show that a Markov switching
autoregressive model does a better job in characterizing these interest rates than a
linear representation. I also show evidence suggesting that an alternative stochas-
tic volatility process, as the one proposed by Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al. (2009),
can have counterfactual predictions in terms of the probability distribution of in-
terest rates. Finally, I relate the properties of interest rates and the estimation
results from the Markov switching model with data on macro aggregates from these
economies. The empirical evidence suggests that some characteristics of business
cycles °uctuations in emerging markets are related to the occasional disruptions
in access to foreign lending that these economies have experienced.
1.2.1 Data
The sample of emerging economies includes Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mex-
ico, Peru, Philippines, Russia and Turkey. Following the standard convention in
the literature, the domestic rate for each country is constructed as the sum of a
measure of the international risk free rate and a country sovereign bond spread
(see Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006; Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al.,
2009).2 The choice of countries is mainly due to spreads data availability.
2Although the country spread data refers to sovereign bonds, several empirical studies ¯nd
evidence that sovereign interest rates and rates faced by private agents in emerging economies
are closely related. For example, Mendoza and Yue (2008) report that the median correlation
between sovereign interest rates and ¯rms' ¯nancing costs for a sample of emerging economies is
0.7. Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008) also report a high correlation between country sovereign
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Figure 1.1: Real interest rates in selected emerging markets (monthly average
expressed in annual basis).
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The international risk free real rate is obtained by subtracting the U.S. GDP
De°ator expected in°ation from the annual yield on 3-month U.S. Treasury bills.
Quarterly expected in°ation is computed as the average of the actual GDP De°a-
tor in°ation in that quarter and in the three preceding ones. Monthly expected
in°ation is obtained by linearly interpolating the quarterly rate.
Country spreads series are constructed using J.P. Morgan EMBI+ Stripped Spread
daily data. The EMBI+ tracks secondary market prices of emerging market bonds
denominated in US dollars that satisfy given secondary market trading liquidity
conditions. These indexes have been reported since December 1993, but individ-
ual countries coverage di®ers substantially. The sample coverage for the selected
economies used in this study is reported in Table 1.1.
The real interest rate series are constructed at a monthly frequency. Since data
on country spreads is available at most since December 1993, using monthly fre-
quency allows to obtain a reasonable number of observation for many countries.
Also, monthly frequency should help to identify better the shifts in mean and
volatility in interest rates that might get averaged out using lower frequency data.
However, the analysis on Argentinean quarterly interest rate in Section 2.2 of
Chapter 2 reveals that the main qualitative features identi¯ed on the monthly
sample still show up in the quarterly counterpart.3
1.2.2 Empirical Evidence of Regime Switching
I begin by presenting descriptive evidence on the regime switching behavior of in-
terest rates for the sample of selected emerging economies. Figure 1.1 depicts the
average monthly real interest rate (expressed in annual terms) for each country
and Table 1.1 reports sample coverage and statistics. The ¯rst observation is that
the sample volatility of interest rates is very high for these economies: the coef-
¯cient of variation (c.v. hereafter) ranges from 0.5 to 1.4 and the average across
countries is 0.7.
spreads and a measure of perceived probability of default of domestic private borrowers in emerg-
ing markets; the median correlation in their sample is 0.43.
3For the case of Argentina, it is possible to extend the series backwards, at a quarterly
frequency, until 1983Q1, relying on quarterly bond return data used by Neumeyer and Perri
(2005).
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The second observation is that for most of the countries in the sample one or
more episodes stand out in which the interest rate jumps to a much higher level
and remains °uctuating at that level for some periods. Distinctive episodes in the
sample include the periods following the Mexican Tequila crisis of 1994, the Rus-
sian default of 1998, the 1998 ¯nancial crisis in Ecuador, the repercussions of the
1997-1998 Asian crisis, the 1999 and 2002 crises in Brazil, the 2000-2001 crisis in
Turkey and the 2001 Argentinean crisis. Several of these episodes, e.g. the Tequila
crisis or the Russian default, can be simultaneously identi¯ed in the time series of
di®erent countries. Moreover, during those level shift episodes the process seems
also more volatile than in tranquil times. Figure 1.2 depicts eleven-month rolling-
window average and standard deviation of the real interest rate for each country.4
The inspection of the plots reveals that periods of higher volatility coincide with
periods of level shift. Indeed, the correlation between the two lines in each plot
is 0.61 on average. In sum: i) there is evidence of changes in the volatility of the
process over time; ii) the shifts in volatility coincide with level shifts; and iii) the
overall high sample volatility of interest rates is due both to shifts in the volatility
of the process but also to the fact that these coincide with shifts in its level.
The third observation is that the episodes of level and volatility shift in inter-
est rates seem to be relatively infrequent. This impinges an important degree of
asymmetry on interest rate distributions: The sample mean is bigger than the
sample median for all the countries in the sample with the exception of Brazil (see
Table 1.1). The ratio of the sample mean over the median ranges from almost 1
to 3.5 and the average ratio across countries is 1.6. The sample skewness, which
captures the presence of a fat tail in a probability distribution, is positive in all
the cases, ranging from 0.3 to 2.1.5 Figure 1.10 show ¯tted densities of interest
rates that con¯rm this asymmetric pattern for most of the economies in the sam-
ple. However, there is some heterogeneity in the sample. In particular, Brazil and
Peru are in the lower end in term of the skewness of interest rates. Also their plots
4For each month, the rolling-window moment includes the current observation, the 5 preceding
and the 5 subsequent months.
5The presence of tails in interest rate distributions associated with crisis events shows up
in positive skewness. An alternative moment that would signal the presence of fat tails in the
sample is excess kurtosis. However, excess kurtosis would also show up due to peakedness of the
distribution in comparison to a normal distribution, that is, due to the clustering of observations
around the sample mean, and then excess kurtosis provides a less clear link with rare crisis events
(see Ranciµ ere et al. 2008).
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Figure 1.2: Real Interest Rates: Time varying level and volatility.
The dashed line represents the rolling window sample average of the real interest
rate; the solid line corresponds to the rolling window standard deviation of the
series. The width of the window is 11 months: For each observation the sample
statistic includes the preceding and subsequent 5 months.
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in Figure 1.10 show no clear pattern of asymmetry in the probability distribution
if real interest rates.
1.2.3 Empirical Model
Based on the descriptive evidence presented before, simple linear models seem
unlikely to be the best approximation of the interest rate dynamics faced by these
economies. Instead, it motivates the use of a nonlinear process that would allow
alternating between states associated with di®erent levels and volatilities of the
process, but also for the frequencies of the di®erent states to be asymmetric. In
this section I postulate the following Markov switching autoregressive model to
approximate real interest rates in emerging economies:
rt = º(st) + ½rrt¡1 + ¾(st)²t , ²t s i.i.d N(0;1) (1.1)
where rt is the real interest rate and ²t is white noise. The state st is assumed
to follow an irreducible ergodic two-state Markov process with transition matrix
¦. This speci¯cation allows the intercept, º(st), and the standard deviations
of the statistical innovation, ¾(st), to be regime dependent, but assumes that the
persistence parameter 0 · ½r < 1 is the same across regimes.6 More precisely, º(st)
and ¾(st) are parameter shift functions stating the dependence of the parameters






fºT;¾Tg if st = T
fºC;¾Cg if st = C
There are therefore seven parameters to be estimated: ºT, ºC, ½r, ¾T, ¾C and two
out of the four elements in the transition matrix ¦.7
6I also considered a speci¯cation with regime switching ½r. However, the gain in terms of
model ¯t was null or limited for many countries and it bears the cost of estimating an extra
parameter so, for the sake of parsimoniousness, the estimated model is the same across countries
and has a unique autoregressive parameter.
7To be more precise, there is an additional parameter to estimate: the starting period state
probability, which we estimate with the smooth probability for period one; see Hamilton (1990).
The estimation procedure relies on the expectation-maximization algorithm as described in
Hamilton (1990). For more general references on the estimation of Markov switching models
see Hamilton (1994) and Krolzig (1997).
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Table 1.1: Real Interest Rate for a Sample of Emerging Economies, Data
Statistics and Markov-Switching Model Estimates (Monthly Data).
Argentina Brazil Ecuador Mexico
Summary Statistics:
Sample 12/1993-11/2008 04/1994-11/2008 02/1995-11/2008 12/1993-11/2008
Range (%) 3.8 67.9 1.4 20.2 4.9 49.6 0.4 22.8
Mean (%) 19.7 8.6 14.4 5.6
Median (%) 10.7 8.9 11.0 4.3
Skewness 1.2 0.3 1.8 0.9
Std. dev. (%) 19.4 4.6 9.5 4.3
Coe®. of Variation 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.8
Markov Switching AR Estimation:
Parameters: st = T st = C st = T st = C st = T st = C st = T st = C
Intercept 0.26 1.25 0.08 0.46 0.57 2.69 0.04 0.68
Autoregressive 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.97
Unconditional Mean 10.18 49.66 1.99 11.36 7.79 36.50 1.35 24.32
Standard Deviation 0.75 7.28 0.28 1.46 0.83 5.47 0.36 2.20
Transition Matrix 0.94 0.06 0.94 0.06 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.03
0.13 0.87 0.05 0.95 0.08 0.92 0.15 0.85
Ergodic Probabilities 68% 32% 45% 55% 77% 23% 84% 16%
Linearity Test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Peru Philippines Russia Turkey
Summary Statistics:
Sample 03/1997-11/2008 04/1999-11/2008 08/1997-11/2008 07/1999-11/2008
Range (%) 0.8 13.1 1.3 10.7 0.7 63.9 1.7 11.9
Mean (%) 5.4 4.7 10.8 5.4
Median (%) 4.1 3.8 3.1 4.0
Skewness 0.4 1.1 2.1 0.6
Std. dev. (%) 3.2 2.2 15.4 3.0
Coe®. of Variation 0.6 0.5 1.4 0.6
Markov Switching AR Estimation:
Parameters: st = T st = C st = T st = C st = T st = C st = T st = C
Intercept 0.22 1.07 0.26 0.84 0.12 2.50 0.36 1.33
Autoregressive 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.86
Unconditional Mean 1.89 9.06 3.00 9.65 1.62 33.72 2.53 9.41
Standard Deviation 0.29 0.80 0.31 0.64 0.33 5.87 0.32 0.91
Transition Matrix 0.96 0.04 0.99 0.01 0.96 0.04 0.95 0.05
0.06 0.94 0.05 0.95 0.11 0.89 0.09 0.91
Ergodic Probabilities 57% 43% 81% 19% 70% 30% 64% 36%
Linearity Test (p-value) 0.0022 0.0062 0.0000 0.0036
The unconditional mean corresponds to b º(st)=(1 ¡ b ½). The p-values of the likelihood ratio statis-
tics are obtained by Monte Carlo simulations (5,000 repetitions).
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Table 1.1 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of the Markov switching model
for the sample of emerging economies. The estimation identi¯es a crisis regime
characterized by both a higher average interest rate (from 3 to 20 times higher
than in the tranquil regime) and higher standard deviation of the shocks (ranging
from 2 to 17 times higher). This result is consistent with the estimation results in
Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al. 2009: when they allow innovations to the level and the
volatility of country spreads to be correlated, the estimated correlation coe±cient
is always highly positive.
An important advantage of the Markov switching model in this context is that
it allows to capture the high degree of asymmetry in the time series. In fact,
the estimated parameters associated to the transition matrix reveal important
asymmetries across regimes. Except for Brazil, the tranquil regime occurs more
frequently than the crisis regime. For Peru the crisis regime is almost as frequent as
the tranquil regime. For the remaining countries the estimated ergodic probability
for the tranquil regime ranges from 64% to 84%. Conditional on being on the tran-
quil regime, the estimated probability of moving to the crisis regime ranges from
1% per month in the case of Philippines, to 6% per month in the case of Argentina.
An interesting by-product of the maximum likelihood estimation is the smooth
probabilities of each regime, that is, the estimated probability of having been in
any given regime for each point in time. The estimated smooth probabilities of
the crisis regime are shown as grey areas in Figure 1.4. The model estimates as-
sign high crisis probability to clear turbulent periods in emerging markets as, for
example, the Mexican Tequila crisis, the Russian default, the 1998 ¯nancial crisis
in Ecuador, the Asian crisis, the 1999 and 2002 crises in Brazil, the 2000-2001
crisis in Turkey and the 2001 Argentinean crisis. In the same vein, the estimates
of crisis probabilities are consistent with several crisis indices in the literature.8
Calvo et al. (2004) use data until 2001 and identify sudden stops in: Argentina in
1994, 1999 and 2001; Ecuador in 1999; Mexico in 1994; Peru in 1997; and Turkey
2001. The model for interest rate assigns a high crisis probability around all of
these episodes (see Figure 1.4). The only di®erence with the dating in Calvo et al.
(2004) for the periods in which the samples overlap is that the regime switching
8Several of the studies that compute sudden stops or currency crisis indices report crisis
dummies on an annual basis (although some of these studies use higher frequency data to identify
a crisis year) and include data until 2001 or 2002 at most. The regime switching estimation refers
instead to monthly data until end of 2008. Still, the comparison with the crisis indices dates can
help to ratify the choice of a regime switching model for interest rates to identify systemic crises.
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model also assigns a high crisis probability for the Mexican series around the time
of the Russian default and the Long Term Capital Management debacle. Guidotti
et al. (2004) also identify a sudden stop for Russia in 1998-1999 and for Philippines
in 2000, all of them re°ected in the crisis probabilities from the regime switching
model. For the case of Brazil and based on crises indices from other studies,
Ranciµ ere et al. (2008) report currency crises in 1995 and 1996 and banking crises
from 1995 throughout 1999.9 An advantage of the regime switching estimation
vis-µ a-vis the crisis indices is that it also captures the severity of the rare crises in
access to foreign lending.
Speci¯cation Tests. To support the choice of a nonlinear process to approxi-
mate the dynamics of interest rates in emerging markets, I test the Markov switch-
ing speci¯cation in Equation (1.1) against the null hypothesis that the interest rate
is driven by an AR(1) process. More precisely, I construct the likelihood ratio test
statistic LR = LMSAR ¡ LAR where LMSAR and LAR denote the log-likelihood
of the Markov switching and the AR(1) model respectively. As pointed out by
Hansen (1992), the test statistic has a nonstandard distribution in this context
due to a nuisance parameters problem, so to compute critical values and p-values
for the test I perform Monte Carlo simulations.10
The p-values for the test are reported in Table 1.1. In all cases it is possible
to reject the null hypothesis at the 1% signi¯cance level, supporting the choice of
a Markov switching autoregressive model as a better characterization of interest
rates than a symmetric AR(1) model.
Alternative Speci¯cations. Would a model with time varying volatility of
innovations be enough to capture the main regularities of real interest rates in
emerging markets? Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al. (2009) provide evidence of time
varying volatility in the interest rates that emerging markets face and postulate a
law of motion for the interest rates in which the standard deviation of the shocks
is not constant but displays stochastic volatility. More precisely, the standard
9Regarding the extended quarterly sample for Argentina (1983Q1:2008Q4) that is used in
Chapter 2, the mentioned studies identify crises (sudden stops, currency crises and/or banking
crises) in 1983-1984, 1989-1990, 1994-1995, 1999 and 2001. All of them are picked up by the
crisis probability estimates from the regime switching model.
10The number of repetitions in the Monte Carlo simulations to compute critical values was
5,000. Increasing the number of repetitions did not change the results.
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deviation of the shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. This process can
capture some features of real interest rate data in emerging markets, such as the
time varying volatility reported in Figure 1.2. However, this speci¯cation is, by
construction, symmetric: extreme negative deviations from the sample average are
equally probable than positive ones, which is at odds with evidence shown in the
previous section. To visualize the symmetric implication of this process, Figure 1.3
plots the ¯tted densities from simulating the process in Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al.
(2009) using their estimated parameters (posterior medians) for the Argentinean
interest rate. The ¯gure also shows the ¯tted density to Argentinean monthly
interest rates from 1993M12 to 2008M11. The ¯rst observation is that the proba-
bility distribution of the simulated series is symmetric.11 Second, the tails of this
distribution are much more fat that in data. Indeed, the 1% and 99% quantiles
of the simulated series using the stochastic volatility model are -91% and 978%
respectively and in annual terms; the corresponding quantiles in data are 0.04%
and 66.4%. The Markov switching model is a natural alternative to cope both
with asymmetry and the level shifts that seem to characterize interest rate time
series from emerging markets.12
1.2.4 Tails in Interest Rates and Business Cycles
This section relates the conditions that emerging economies face in international
¯nancial markets previously documented to their business cycles. The data on
macroeconomic aggregates used for this purpose includes output, consumption
and trade balance data. The sample coverage is: Argentina 1990Q1:2008Q2,
Brazil 1991Q1:2008Q3, Ecuador 1991Q3:2008Q3, Mexico 1990Q1:2008Q2, Peru
1990Q1:2008Q2, Philippines 1990Q1:2008Q2, Russia 1995Q1:2008Q2 and Turkey
1990Q1:2008Q2. All macro aggregates have been seasonally adjusted. GDP and
consumption series have been linearly detrended, unless otherwise mentioned.
Monthly data is computed by linearly interpolating quarterly data.
A ¯rst observation is that the presence of tail events in interest rates is related to
some of the peculiar features of business cycles in emerging markets. The literature
11I also simulated 3,000 samples of 200 observations each using the process in Fern¶ andez-
Villaverde et al. (2009) and computed the average skewness across samples. The average skewness
is not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
12Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2 shows this point by displaying the distribution of the Argentinean
quarterly real interest rate and the one implied by the Markov switching estimates for Argentina.
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Figure 1.3: Stochastic Volatility Model.
The ¯gure shows the probability distribution of the Argentinean monthly real inter-
est rate (1993M12-2008M11) and the one implied by the stochastic volatility model
according to the speci¯cation and parameter values in Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al.
(2009).
Table 1.2: Business Cycle Moments, Sample of Emerging Markets
Relative Volatility Cross-correlation with
of Consumption Real Interest Rates
std(^ c)=std(^ y) GDP Trade Balance
Brazil 1.72 0.17 -0.48
Ecuador 1.07 -0.65 0.70
Mexico 1.74 -0.31 0.48
Peru 0.71 -0.01 -0.77
Philippines 0.95 -0.58 0.52
Russia 1.66 -0.74 0.63
Turkey 1.01 -0.49 0.68
Argentina 1.08 -0.86 0.80
Average: 1.24 -0.43 0.32
Monthly Consumption, GDP and trade balance data is constructing by linear interpolation of
quarterly data. Trade balance refers to the trade balance to GDP ratio. The original quarterly
series for Consumption and GDP are in logs and linearly detrended. The trade balance to GDP
and Real Interest Rate series are not ¯ltered nor detrended.
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Figure 1.4: Real Interest Rates, linearly detrended GDP and consumption
(lines) and estimated smooth probabilities for the Crisis regime (shaded area),
monthly data.
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Figure 1.5: Real Interest Rate and linearly detrended GDP.
The solid dots indicate observations for which the estimated smooth probability for
being in the Crisis regime for interest rates is less than 50%.
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Table 1.3: Skewness of Macroeconomic Aggregates in the Data
GDP Investment Consumption Trade Balance
Average Emerging -0.18 - -0.40 +0.40
Average Emerging (AG) +0.03 -0.08 -0.24 +0.35
Average Developed (AG) +0.01 -0.04 +0.16 -0.07
The ¯rst line corresponds to the data used for Table 1.2. The second and third lines use data
from Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), which includes 13 emerging and 13 developed small open
economies. GDP, consumption and investment series have been linearly detrended. The trade
balance corresponds to the trade balance to GDP ratio.
on °uctuations in emerging economies has documented signi¯cant di®erences be-
tween traditional business cycle moments in these countries and in more advanced
small open economies (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006; Aguiar
and Gopinath, 2007). Besides higher volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and
real interest rates, the most salient characteristics documented in the literature
include: consumption volatility exceeds output volatility (sometimes referred to
as the \volatility of consumption puzzle"), the real interest rate is strongly coun-
tercyclical, leads the cycle and is positively correlated with the trade balance.
Table 1.2 reports a selection of business cycle moments for the eight economies in
the sample. The averages of these moments across countries con¯rm indeed those
stylized facts. However, there is some heterogeneity in this sample. Notably, Peru
and Brazil show to be exceptions for some of these facts. Peru stands out as having
a very low relative consumption volatility (it is 0.71, while the sample average is
1.24). Besides, the interest rate is practically acyclical (while the average correla-
tion between GDP and interest rates in the sample is -0.43) and the trade balance
to GDP shows a strongly negative correlation with interest rates (it is -0.77 while
the average correlation is 0.32). In the case of Brazil, while the relative volatility
of consumption is even higher than the sample average, it also shows a negative
correlation between the interest rate and the trade balance to GDP (-0.48) and
the interest rate is even procyclical (+0.17). Interestingly, these are precisely the
countries for which there was a less clear asymmetric pattern in the distribution
of interest rates (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.10): they display the lowest skewness
values in the sample and the estimation of the Markov switching model for these
two economies attributes almost the same ergodic probability of being in the Crisis
state than in the Tranquil one|while for the rest of the sample the Crisis state is
a relatively rare event.
Gruss, Bertrand (2010), Financial Factors, Rare Disasters and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/21960Chapter 1. Rare Disasters in Emerging Market Financial Conditions 20
Figure 1.4 shows the time series of GDP, consumption and real interest rates
as well as the estimated probability of being in the Crisis regime (shown as shaded
area) for the eight emerging economies. There is a clear negative comovement
between output and consumption on one side and real interest rates on the other
side, and unusually large deviations from trend of macro aggregates coincide with
periods of high estimated crisis probability. The average sample cross correlation
between GDP and interest rates depicted in Figure 1.6 shows that interest rates
are not only countercyclical but also lead the cycle in these economies, as was
noted by Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The ¯gure also depicts the cross correlation
with the estimated probability of the Crisis state: a rise in the estimated crisis
probability tends to be followed by a drop in activity.














Figure 1.6: Cross-correlation between GDP and Real Interest Rates.
The line with crosses plots the average cross-correlation between GDP and Real
Interest Rates for the sample of countries, at di®erent leads and lags. The line with
circles corresponds to the average sample cross-correlation between GDP and the
estimated smooth probability of being in the Crisis regime, at di®erent leads and
lags.
Figures 1.5 and Figures 1.11 to 1.12 (these two at the end of the chapter) ex-
plore further the relationship between macro aggregates and real interest rates,
distinguishing between tranquil and turbulent times according to the estimations
in section 1.2.3. They show scatter plots of output (Figure 1.5), consumption
(Figure 1.11) and of the trade balance to GDP ratio (Figure 1.12) against real in-
terest rates, identifying the observations for which the estimated crisis probability
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is higher than 50%.13 Consistently with the remarks from the previous paragraphs,
for most of the countries in the sample there is a clear negative (positive) relation-
ship between deviations from trend of GDP or consumption (the trade balance to
GDP ratio) on one side and real interest rates on the other. Two remarks emerge
however. First, for many of the countries in the sample the strong relationship is
mainly due to rare and extreme realizations. That is, during periods identi¯ed as
tranquil times by the Markov switching model (shown as solid dots in the plots),
the negative relationship between interest rates and GDP or consumption seems
less pronounced. Also the positive relationship between trade balance and interest
rates is less pronounced during tranquil times. Second and as it was the case in
the evidence reported in Table 1.2, there is a clear heterogeneity in the sample:
the mentioned correlations cannot be found in the plots of Brazil and Peru, the
two countries which do not show a clear low probability Crisis regime in their real
interest rates.
This empirical evidence suggests that what drives some of the stylized facts for
emerging markets documented in the literature is mainly the occasional disrup-
tions in access to foreign markets that the empirical model for interest rates in
section 1.2.3 identi¯es as Crisis regimes.
A second observation is that the asymmetry found on interest rate data is also
broadly found in macroeconomic aggregates. Table 1.3 reports the average skew-
ness of macro aggregates in this sample and also in the sample of 13 emerging and
13 developed economies included in the database of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
The comparison suggests that there are clear di®erences between emerging and de-
veloped economies in terms of the asymmetry of macro aggregates. Consumption
displays negative skewness on average for emerging economies while it is moder-
ately positive for developed ones. The average skewness of GDP is negative for
the sample of eight emerging countries (although it is almost zero for the sample
in Aguiar and Gopinath 2007) while output deviations from trend are symmetric
on average for developed economies. The trade balance, instead, displays a clear
positive skewness on average for emerging markets, re°ecting the occasional re-
versals in their current accounts, while it shows no asymmetry on average for the
sample of developed economies.
13Figures 1.13 and 1.14 report the results using the Hodrick Prescott ¯lter instead as detrending
method. The results are very similar.
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1.2.5 Concluding Remarks from the Empirical Section
Based on the regime switching estimates for a sample of eight emerging economies
it is possible to conclude that the real interest rates faced by many emerging
economies in international markets can be characterized as alternating between a
more frequent low level/low volatility \Tranquil" regime and an infrequent high
level/high volatility \Crisis" regime. Moreover, the occurrence of the infrequent
Crisis regime is re°ected in business cycle statistics: Some of the well known
stylized facts of business cycles in emerging markets seem to be related to the
presence of Crisis realizations in the sample. Similarly, those countries in the
sample that do not show a clear low probability Crisis regime in their interest
rates, do not show either the features documented in the literature as salient
characteristics of °uctuations in emerging economies.
1.3 The Role of Regime Switching Interest Rates
in Dynamic Models
In this section I use a version of the prototype dynamic small open economy model
in Mendoza (1991) to analyze the implications of the regime-switching pattern of
interest rates in emerging markets documented in previous sections. For clarity,
along the quantitative experiments presented in this chapter the only source of
uncertainty is shocks to the real interest rate.
1.3.1 The Model
The model is that of a small open economy, very similar to Mendoza (1991),
Correia et al. (1995) or Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003). Given that several papers
focusing on interest rate shocks as a source of °uctuations in emerging markets
have emphasized the role of ¯nancial frictions as a propagation mechanism (e.g.
Neumeyer and Perri 2005; Uribe and Yue 2006), I also consider a version of the
model extended to include a working capital friction. Markets are incomplete: the
only ¯nancial asset is non-contingent real discount bond traded with the rest of
the world.
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Households and Preferences. The economy is populated by identical, in¯nitely-















, 0 < ¯ < 1;° > 1;Ã > 0;³ > 0 (1.2)
where ct ¸ 0 denotes consumption and ht ¸ 0 is time spent in the workplace. The
momentary utility function is of the form proposed by Greenwood et al. (1988),
which is a common assumption in small open economies (Correia et al., 1995).
Households are the only owners of the capital stock in the economy kt ¸ 0, supply
labor and capital to ¯rms, receive factor payments and make consumption, saving
and investment decisions. ¡t = g¡t¡1 measures the level of labor-augmenting
technology and enters utility to ensure balanced growth; g ¸ 1 is the economy's
average productivity growth factor. The households' budget constraint in period
t is
ct + xt + dt · R
¡1
t dt+1 + wtht + r
k
t kt , (1.3)
where xt are resources for investment and dt+1 is the households' foreign debt
position in a one-period non-contingent discount bond. Households take as given
the price of the bond 1=Rt < 1, the rental rate of capital rk
t and the real wage
wt. Long-run solvency is enforced by imposing an upper bound on foreign debt,
dt+1 < ¡tD, precluding households from running Ponzi-type schemes.14 The real
interest rate is assumed to be Rt = 1 + rt when dt+1 ¸ 0, where the interest rate
rt is given by Equation 1.1. If instead dt+1 < 0, i.e. if domestic households be-
come creditors in international markets, the interest rate faced by the households
is Rt = minf1 + rt; ¹ Rg where ¹ R > 1. Without this assumption, households have
strong incentives to save and accumulate unrealistic amounts of bonds when the
real interest rate jumps to crisis levels. However, according to the data of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) all the emerging markets in the sample, excluding Russia be-
cause of lack of data, have been net debtors for every yearly observation between
1970 and 2004. Indeed, the net foreign asset to GDP ratio for these economies
has °uctuated between -5% to -125%, with an average value across countries and
periods of -44%.
14In practice, the value of D is set high enough such that this constraint never binds.
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The law of motion for capital, subject to quadratic capital adjustment costs, is









The households' problem is to choose state-contingent sequences of ct, ht, xt,
kt+1 and dt+1 to maximize expected utility (1.2), subject to the nonnegativity
constraints, the budget constraints (1.3), the borrowing constraints and the law
of motion for capital (1.4), for given prices wt, rk
t and Rt and initial values k0 and
d0.
Firms and Technology. At time t a representative ¯rm rents capital kt and,








; 0 < ® < 1, (1.5)
where A is the level of productivity that, for clarity of exposition, is assumed con-
stant throughout this exercise. The ¯rm is entirely owned by domestic households
and all factor markets are perfectly competitive. As in Uribe and Yue (2006), pro-
duction is subject to a ¯nancing constraint requiring ¯nal goods producing ¯rms
to hold an amount ·t of a non-interest bearing asset as collateral in a proportion
' ¸ 0 of the cost of the wage bill at t:
·t ¸ 'wtht (1.6)
The ¯rm's problem is to choose state-contingent sequences for kt, ht, and ·t in








zt ¡ wtht ¡ r
k
tkt ¡ ·t + ·t¡1
¤
, (1.7)
subject to the ¯nancing constraints in (1.6) and taking as given all prices wt, rk
t
and the representative household's marginal utility of consumption, denoted by
¸t. If the working capital parameter is set to zero (' = 0), the problem of the
¯rms corresponds the standard neoclassical setting.
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Equilibrium An equilibrium is a set of in¯nite sequences for prices rk
t, wt and
allocations ct, ht, xt, ·t, kt+1, dt+1 such that households and ¯rms solve their
respective problems given initial conditions k0 and d0 for given sequences of Rt,
and labor, asset and goods markets clear. A balanced growth equilibrium is an
equilibrium where ct=¡t, ht, xt=¡t, kt+1=¡t, dt+1=¡t are stationary variables. Equi-
librium conditions implied by the households' and ¯rms' optimality conditions
include (detrended variables are denoted by a hat):











































































The ¯nancial friction parameter ' appears in equation (1.10), introducing a wedge
between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and
the marginal product of labor. Setting ' = 0 recovers the frictionless neoclassical
small open economy model. For the quantitative analysis I will assume both zero
and positive values for this parameter.
Finally, the resource constraint is
^ ct + ^ xt + ^ nxt = ^ yt (1.13)




t ^ dt+1, and ^ yt is
detrended GDP.15 The household's debt position ^ dt is the economy's net foreign
debt position in period t, and the trade balance, or net exports, are all resources
not used for consumption and investment.
1.3.2 Quantitative Analysis
The purpose of the quantitative exercises in this section is to explore the implica-
tions of the regime switching behavior of interest rates. For a given parametrization
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of the model, the main quantitative experiment consists in introducing a mean-
variance preserving modi¯cation in the stochastic process for interest rates in a
way such that it removes all the asymmetry in its probability distribution. The
model is not calibrated to match data from one economy in particular. Instead,
the objective of the quantitative exercises is to understand the implications of the
fat tails found in interest rate data from emerging economies.
The parameter values used for the quantitative analysis are reported in Table
1.5. Most of the values correspond to the ones used for the model calibrated to
Argentinean data in chapter 2, section 2.5.3.16 The benchmark parametrization
corresponds to the simplest possible model: a neoclassical small open economy
model with no frictions and abstracting from secular growth. Subsequently, the
exercise is repeated for di®erent parameterizations: First, I introduce a ¯nancial
friction in the form of a working capital constraint (by setting ' > 0). Then, I
allow for deterministic growth in the model (i.e. g > 1). Finally, I consider di®er-
ent values for the average interest rate.17 In all of these di®erent calibrations, the
only parameter that is also modi¯ed is the capital depreciation rate ±, in order to
keep the investment-output ratio constant across calibrations.
1.3.2.1 Real Interest Rate Process
The data generating processes (DGP) for the real interest rate in each experiment
are both a Markov switching autoregressive model as in equation (1.1), and a
mean-variance preserving linear AR(1) approximation. The parameters used for
the nonlinear DGP are shown in Table 1.6. The parameter values are not intended
to be fully realistic or to match the interest rate of one given country in the sam-
ple, but they do imply interest rate °uctuations that are qualitatively consistent
with the empirical ¯ndings of the previous section: interest rates switch between
a more frequent low level/low volatility regime and an infrequent high level/high
volatility regime. In this sense, the parameters are such that the mean and the
volatility under the crisis regime is approximately 2 times larger than under the
tranquil regime. The transition matrix is such that, conditional on being on the
16The model used in that section is the same used in this chapter when including ¯nancial
frictions, except that total factor productivity is stochastic and it includes a portfolio adjustment
cost function.
17Assuming di®erent values for the average interest rate is equivalent to modify the discount
factor ¯ while keeping constant the average interest rate.
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Tranquil regime there is a 5% probability of switching to the Crisis regime, while
the probability of remaining in the Crisis regime is 55%.18 These parameters for
the transition matrix imply that the Crisis regime is a rare state: it occurs 10% of
the time. The degree of asymmetry implied by those ratios is in the lower end of
the estimation results reported in the previous section (see Table 1.1): the ratio of
estimates for the unconditional mean across regimes ranges from 1.4 to 20 while
the ratio for the standard deviation of the innovations ranges from 2 to 17.















Figure 1.7: Distribution of the asymmetric and symmetric DGP for the in-
terest rate
To obtain a mean-variance preserving approximation to the nonlinear DGP I pro-
ceed as follows. First, I compute a discrete approximation to the Markov switching
process on a grid of equidistant nodes. Using the transition matrix of this approx-
imation I obtain analytically the moments of its ergodic distribution. Then, I
compute a new approximation that has the same ¯st two moments (mean and
standard deviation), but is symmetric (i.e. zero skewness). The ¯tted densities of
the interest rate from the regime switching process and the linear process are shown
in Figure 1.7: the nonlinear DGP clearly displays a fat tail to the right, re°ecting
the low probability of very high interest rates. Section I of Table 1.4 reports the
analytical moments from their ergodic distributions: the averages and standard
18Both the probabilities of remaining in the Tranquil and in the Crisis regime are lower than
the ones reported in Table 1.1 for the estimations using monthly data. The reason is that the
model in this section is parameterized at a quarterly rather than monthly frequency, borrowing
the parameters used for some of the exercises of chapter 2. Still, the expected duration in each
regime is consistent with the monthly estimates. The expected duration in the crisis regime is
between 2 and 3 quarters. The estimates in Table 1.1 imply, for example, 7 months for Mexico,
8 for Argentina and 12 for Ecuador, the average duration being 10 months (excluding Brazil and
Peru).
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deviation of the two precesses are equal, while the skewness of the nonlinear DGP
is positive and high.
Solution Method. For each parametrization of the model and each discrete
approximation to the interest rate process (i.e. symmetric and asymmetric), the
policy functions for the state variables ^ dt+1 and ^ kt+1 are approximated by piecewise
linear functions over a grid. A global approximation of the equilibrium dynamics
is obtained by iterating over the intertemporal Euler conditions, as suggested
by Coleman (1990). The standard iteration procedure is generally slow and is
therefore combined with the method of endogenous gridpoints, proposed by Carroll
(2006).19
1.3.3 Simulation Results
The ¯rst set of simulation results correspond to the frictionless version of a model
with no deterministic growth (i.e. ' = 0 and g = 1). Table 1.4 displays summary
statistics of the probability distributions of some key variables for interest rate
realizations drawn from both stochastic processes. Even though both processes
have identical ¯rst and second order moments, results in Table 1.4 show that the
probability distribution of the endogenous variables can be substantially di®erent.
A ¯rst observation is the large di®erence in the average external debt to GDP
ratio: it is substantially higher under the nonlinear speci¯cation than under the
linear speci¯cation (see section II.a in Table 1.4). Indeed, while the average of the
ergodic distribution of the debt to GDP ratio when the economy faces a symmetric
shock is 0.74, when the nonlinear shock is feeded the average ratio is 1.12, that
is 52% higher. The shift to the right of the debt to GDP distribution under the
asymmetric shock can be clearly seen in the top plot in Figure 1.8.
The di®erent levels of average debt to GDP ratio illustrate how the nature of
the uncertainty faced by optimizing agents can a®ect precautionary savings be-
havior. Agents self insure in di®erent ways against interest rates that are volatile
all the time, or interest rates that switch between tranquil and rare crisis regimes.
The intuition for this result can be understood by comparing the one-period ahead
19The algorithm is presented in detail in Appendix 1.5.1.
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Table 1.4: Simulation results for benchmark model
Asymmetric Shock Symmetric Shock % dif.
I) REAL INTEREST RATE
I.a) Analytical Moments
Unconditional Mean (%) 15.61% 15.61%





Debt to GDP 1.12 0.74 +52.0%
Capital to GDP 4.23 4.23 +0.01%
Consumption to GDP 0.74 0.75 -1.84%
Net Exports to GDP (%) 3.97% 2.58% +53.9%
II.b) Standard Deviations
Output (%) 0.49% 0.72%
Consumption std(^ c)=std(^ y) 1.98 1.54
Investment std(^ x)=std(^ y) 5.68 4.56





Trade balance to GDP 1.80 -0.13
II.d) Cross-Correlations with Output
Consumption 0.38 0.36
Investment 0.22 0.29
Trade balance to GDP 0:07 0:14




Trade balance to GDP 0.93 0.93
GDP, consumption and investment series have been linearly detrended. The trade balance
corresponds to the trade balance to GDP ratio.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of model simulated series under the di®erent processes
for the interest rates. In both cases the model is solved using a global nonlinear
solution method.
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conditional expectation and forecast variance for the interest rate under the linear
and nonlinear speci¯cation, conditional on the current interest rate being equal to
the unconditional mean, 15.61%. Figure 1.9 depicts the probability distributions
of forecasts under the linear and nonlinear DGP, conditional on each regime for
the latter. Under the nonlinear DGP and conditional on being on the Tranquil
regime, the one period ahead forecast is 15.40%, lower than the unconditional
mean, and its standard deviation is only 1.47%. Instead, under the symmetric
DGP, the point estimate for next period interest rate is higher (it coincides with
the actual level) and the standard deviation of the forecast is also higher: 1.69%.
Both a higher point estimate and a higher uncertainty about next period's inter-
est rate would be associated with a lower demand for foreign debt than under the
nonlinear DGP at the Tranquil regime. Of course, conditional on being on the
Crisis regime instead the point forecast would be higher than the long run level
(17.4%) and much less precise (the standard deviation of forecast would be 2.7%).
However the asymmetric frequency across regimes implies that the economy is only
10% of the time in the Crisis regime, which determines that even if the long run
level and volatility of interest rates and all structural parameters (including the
discount factor) are the same under both speci¯cations, the demand for foreign
debt is higher when the cost of borrowing shows tail risk.







Real Int Rate (%, annual basis)








Figure 1.9: Distribution of Interest Rate Forecasts
Distribution of forecasts for Rt+1 conditional on Rt being equal to the long-run
mean, 15.61%. The solid line corresponds to the symmetric DGP, the dashed and
dotted line correspond to the nonlinear DGP, conditional on st = T and st = C
respectively.
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The di®erences in ¯rst moments of distributions have important implications. In
terms of calibrating models, it is well understood that the presence of uncertainty
might imply the ergodic distribution of endogenous variables to shift away from the
deterministic steady state of a model. This exercise shows that also the pattern of
the uncertainty processes, in particular its asymmetry, can have large implications
in terms of ¯rst moments of some endogenous variables. In other words, ignoring
the nonlinearity of the interest rate found in data for emerging economies might
lead to important mistakes in calibration exercises.
A second result that stands out is that the presence of tails in the interest rate dis-
tribution also a®ects some of the second moments of the endogenous variables. For
example, the relative standard deviation of consumption, a statistic that typically
receives much attention in emerging market business cycle studies, is signi¯cantly
greater under the nonlinear speci¯cation.
Finally, both speci¯cations have di®erent implications for the skewness of the vari-
ables, as it is clear from section II.c) in Table 1.4. Whereas the model with symmet-
rically distributed shocks implies fairly symmetric distributions for the equilibrium
values, the simulations with asymmetrically distributed interest rates produces im-
portant asymmetries in the distributions of the endogenous variables. The ¯tted
densities of simulated output, consumption, investment and trade balance-to-GDP
series shown in Figure 1.8 re°ect these di®erences. For example, the sample skew-
ness of consumption in the model with asymmetrically distributed shocks is ¡1:35
while it is 0:08 when the distribution of the shock is symmetric. In the case if
investment the sample skewness is -1.53 when the shock is asymmetric and 0.10
otherwise. The sample skewness of GDP in this frictionless version of the model is
mainly related to the skewness of investment: it is also negative in the model with
an asymmetric pattern for the uncertainty process while almost zero for the sym-
metric case. The presence of a tail to the right in interest rates gets also re°ected
in occasional reversals in the trade balance: the skewness of the trade balance to
GDP ratio is positive and high (1.80) under the asymmetric interest rate shocks,
while slightly negative (-0.13) when the distribution of interest rates is symmetric.
The properties of higher order moments are particularly relevant when analyzing
°uctuations in emerging markets. The empirical evidence in Section 1.2.4 sug-
gests that business cycle °uctuations in emerging economies and more developed
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small open economies also di®er in terms of the sample skewness of their main
macroeconomic aggregates. In this sense, models predicting symmetric distribu-
tions of its endogenous variables would be missing a very de¯ning characteristic
of °uctuations in emerging economies.
Model with Financial Frictions. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.7 show the
results for the same exercise but for the model with ¯nancial frictions. More pre-
cisely, the only di®erence with the benchmark parametrization is that ' = 1. In
this model and as pointed out by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue
(2006), interest rate shocks a®ect the marginal productivity of labor inputs, and
consequently output contemporaneously. The e®ect of the ¯nancial friction in la-
bor productivity gets re°ected in the volatility of simulated output: the standard
deviation of GDP is 0.67% in the model with frictions while it is 0.49% in the
benchmark model, when considering asymmetric shocks in both cases (moments
for the benchmark parametrization are repeated for convenience in columns 1 and
2 of Table 1.7).
The main di®erence in the model with frictions regarding the e®ects of asym-
metries in interest rates is re°ected in higher order moments of the distribution of
output. The probability distribution of output is more asymmetric in the presence
of ¯nancial frictions, re°ecting occasional severe drops in GDP. The skewness of
GDP is -0.32 while it is -0.16 in the frictionless model. Another relevant e®ect
of the asymmetry of the shock in the model with ¯nancial frictions is that the
countercyclicality of the trade balance, a key moment for emerging economies,
is signi¯cantly greater with asymmetric shocks: it is ¡0:28 under the symmetric
shock while it is ¡0:49 under the nonlinear speci¯cation (not reported in Table 1.7
to save space).
Higher Average Real Interest Rate. The results for a third set of simula-
tions considering a higher average real interest rate are reported in columns 5 and
6 of Table 1.7. The purpose of this alternative process is to analyze the e®ect
of narrowing the gap between the (average) interest rate and the inverse of the
discount factor. The annual rate implied by ¯ is 15.66% while in the benchmark
parametrization the average interest rate is 15.61%. Alternative, for the exercise
in this section the average real interest rate interest rate is 15.64%. The degree of
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asymmetry of the interest rate processes are unchanged though.
The main e®ect of a higher average interest rate (a lower gap with the rate implied
by the discount factor) is re°ected in the ¯rst moment of the endogenous variables.
With a lower gap, the average debt to GDP ratio is lower than in the benchmark
case for both the symmetric and asymmetric shocks. However, also the distance
between the two ratios is smaller: it is 43% bigger under the nonlinear speci¯cation
than under the linear speci¯cation, while under the benchmark parametrization
it was 52% higher instead. The lower average trade balance to GDP ratios under
this parametrization re°ect lower amounts of interest payments due to lower levels
of debt on average.
Deterministic Growth In all the sets of simulations reported before I have
abstracted from growth (g = 1). However, calibration exercises typically take into
account secular growth in the economy. The set of simulations in this section ex-
plore whether allowing for deterministic growth has any in°uence in the way the
asymmetry of interest rate shocks a®ects the model's endogenous variables. The
value used for g corresponds to the average growth rate of output in Argentina used
for the calibration exercise in Chapter 2.20 The results are reported in columns 7
and 8 of Table 1.7.
Positive productivity growth is re°ected in a higher capital to GDP ratio on aver-
age, irrespective of the pattern of the interest rate shock. Nonetheless, the main
result from the numerical exercise in this section is that none of the e®ects of the
asymmetry of interest rates distributions depends on the presence of deterministic
growth.
1.4 Conclusion
The empirical evidence in this chapter shows that the most salient feature of ¯-
nancial conditions for emerging markets is not that they are volatile but rather
that they show a rare disaster pattern. These countries occasionally experience
large and abrupt deteriorations in conditions of access to foreign borrowing. This
20When adjusting g also ¯ is adjusted to keep the degree of impatience as in the benchmark
parametrization (see Table 1.5).
Gruss, Bertrand (2010), Financial Factors, Rare Disasters and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/21960Chapter 1. Rare Disasters in Emerging Market Financial Conditions 35
pattern is re°ected in the real interest rate they face in international markets, that
can be characterized as alternating between periods of low level and volatility and
rare periods in which the interest rate jumps to a higher level and displays higher
volatility than outside those episodes. This chapter shows that a Markov switch-
ing autoregressive model can capture many of these features and that it provides
a better characterization of the process than either a linear model or a stochastic
volatility one.
The chapter also provides evidence that the occurrence of the crisis regime iden-
ti¯ed by the empirical model for interest rates is associated with some of the well
known stylized facts of business cycles in emerging markets for many of the coun-
tries in the sample. In the same vein, the countries in the sample that do not show
rare disaster risk in their ¯nancial conditions do not show either the characteristics
that have been pointed out in the literature as typical of °uctuations in emerging
economies.
The asymmetries in interest rates found for many of the countries in the sam-
ple have important implications for the canonical small open economy model used
in the literature. The presence of asymmetries in the exogenous state a®ects sig-
ni¯cantly the ergodic distributions of the endogenous variables a®ecting both their
¯rst, second and higher order moments. The e®ects in terms of second (volatil-
ity) and third (asymmetry) moments are signi¯cant and can potentially help to
bring small open economy models closer to data from emerging economies along
several dimensions. The e®ects in terms of the ¯rst moment suggest that the
regime switching nature of the shock leads to a weaker precautionary motive for
savings which, to my knowledge, is a novel result. The shift in the distribution
of endogenous variables is signi¯cant and can have serious implications for model
calibration exercises. Overall, the results in this chapter highlight the importance
of specifying the exogenous processes in dynamic models for emerging economies
in a consistent manner, taking due account of the nonlinearities they face in ex-
ternal conditions. Models fed with linear and symmetric processes and solved
using linear approximation methods might miss several features relevant for these
economies.
While this is not the ¯rst study to use a small open economy assumption for
interest rates in emerging economies, a caveat is of order. Some of the external
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conditions in emerging economies that show a rare disaster pattern are fully exoge-
nous (e.g. the terms of trade for some commodity exporters). However, the country
spread component of interest rates arguably includes an endogenous default risk
element. In this sense, the exogenous regime switching modeling approach in this
chapter would represent a shortcoming. The reason for this assumption is, ¯rst,
that it allows to feed the model with a process for interest rates that is consistent
with the pattern found in data, re°ecting the occasional disruptions in emerging
economies' access to foreign lending, while keeping the structure of the model sim-
ple and tractable. Moreover, what country spreads capture is the foreign investors'
perceived probability of default rather than the objective probability, and hence
might not be necessarily driven by changes in domestic fundamentals. In that
sense, the regime switching nature of interest rates we ¯nd in data might respond
to abrupt shifts in investors' expectations about, for instance, the willingness of
other investors to rollover short term debt, or about the future path of domestic
policy, elements which might also respond to developments in other economies. To
the extent that these phenomena play an important role in the pricing of emerging
markets' debt as many empirical studies suggest, treating these shifts in investors
perceptions as triggered by exogenous regime switches seems a reasonable ¯rst
approximation.
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1.5 Appendix Chapter 1
1.5.1 Numerical Algorithm
The algorithm seeks an approximate solution to the system of stochastic di®erence
equations comprising Equation 1.8 to Equation 1.13. Denoting the vector of state
variables by St =
h
^ kt; ^ dt;Rt;st
i
, the policy functions for the state variables ^ dt+1 =
d(St) and ^ kt+1 = k(St) is approximated by piecewise linear functions over a grid,
denoted by S, of 21 £ 61 £ 51 £ 2 = 130;662 nodes each and the approximate
solution is computed by iterating over the policy functions (Coleman 1990). The
procedure is combined with the method of endogenous gridpoints in Carroll (2006)
to speed up the algorithm. More speci¯cally, the algorithm is:
Step 1 Postulate an initial guess k0(S) and d0(S).
Step 2 Given the last guess kj¡1(S) and dj¡1(S), calculate k00 = kj¡1(S), d00 =









































as well as Equations 1.8-1.13.
Step 4 Using k0, d0 and k;d;R and s, interpolate to obtain k00 = kj(S) and d00 =
dj(S).
Step 5 Repeat step 2 to 4 until convergence.
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Table 1.5: Model Parametrization
a) Preferences Symbol Benchmark Alternative
Discount factor ¯=g 0.9643
Utility curvature ° 2
Labor disutility weight ³ 0.62
Inverse wage elasticity of labor supply Ã 0.6
b) Technology
Capital income share ® 0.38
Growth factor g 1.0083 1
Working capital requirement ' 1 0
Capital depreciation parameter ± 0.033 varies1
Capital adjustment cost Ák=2 10
Saving interest rate ceiling ¹ R 1:021=4
Notes: 1In each parametrization ± is adjusted such that the investment-output ratio
is kept constant.
1.5.2 Other Tables and Figures
Table 1.6: Parameters of Real Interest Rate Process.
Nonlinear DGP
Unconditional Mean Autoregressive Standard Deviation
Tranquil Crisis Tranquil Crisis
14.1% 28.2% 0.70 1.06% 2.12%
Transition Matrix Ergodic Probabilities
0.95 0.05 Tranquil Crisis
0.45 0.55 90% 10%
AR(1) approximation
Unconditional Mean Autoregressive Standard Deviation
15.61% 0.85 1.68%
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Figure 1.10: Fitted Densities of Real Interest Rates in Emerging Economies
(monthly data).
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Figure 1.11: Real Interest Rates and linearly detrended Consumption.
The solid dots indicate observations for which the estimated smooth probability for
being in the Crisis regime for interest rates is less than 50%.
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Figure 1.12: Real Interest Rates and Trade Balance.
The solid dots indicate observations for which the estimated smooth probability for
being in the Crisis regime for interest rates is less than 50%.
Gruss, Bertrand (2010), Financial Factors, Rare Disasters and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/21960Chapter 1. Rare Disasters in Emerging Market Financial Conditions 43











































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.13: Real Interest Rate and HP ¯ltered GDP.
The solid dots indicate observations for which the estimated smooth probability for
being in the Crisis regime for interest rates is less than 50%.
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Figure 1.14: Real Interest Rates and HP ¯ltered Consumption.
The solid dots indicate observations for which the estimated smooth probability for
being in the Crisis regime for interest rates is less than 50%.




Regime Switching Interest Rates
and Fluctuations in Emerging
Markets¤
Abstract
Many emerging economies have experienced current account reversals followed
by large declines in economic activity. These sudden stops are re°ected in their
real interest rates, which alternate between tranquil times, when the level is rela-
tively low and stable, and crises, during which interest rates are higher and more
volatile. We embed an estimated regime switching process of interest rates into
a small open economy model with ¯nancial frictions. Our model nests infrequent
dramatic crises within regular business cycles, successfully matches the key second
and higher order moments of the macroeconomic aggregates and produces plau-
sible endogenous dynamics during crises. We ¯nd that the occurrence of sudden
stops can account for the empirical regularities of emerging market business cycles.
Financial frictions are essential for explaining emerging market °uctuations, but
almost exclusively because of their e®ects in crises.
¤ This chapter is joint work with Karel Mertens (Cornell University).
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2.1 Introduction
Many emerging economies' business cycle °uctuations notably di®er from those of
developed small open economies: they are characterized by (1) a higher volatil-
ity of macroeconomic variables, (2) a strongly countercyclical trade balance, (3)
consumption volatility exceeding output volatility, and (4) a real interest rate
that is much more volatile in emerging economies, strongly countercyclical and
leads the cycle.1 Another characteristic of emerging economies is the occurrence
of infrequent but traumatic current account reversals or sudden stops, followed by
unusually large declines in economic activity. Given the prevalence of crises in the
samples typically used in studies of emerging market °uctuations, it is not clear
to what extent they are related to the salient features of the traditional business
cycle moments in these countries.
In this chapter, we present a dynamic small open economy model that integrates
infrequent sudden stops and regular business °uctuations and ¯nd that the poten-
tial for an abrupt and severe disruption in access to foreign lending can account
for the empirical regularities of business cycles in emerging markets. Our analysis
emphasizes the nonlinearities implied by the large but rare macroeconomic °uctu-
ations following ¯nancial crises, and highlights the asymmetries these imply in the
unconditional probability distributions of macroeconomic aggregates. We gener-
ate these asymmetries in the model by imposing a nonlinear exogenous process for
interest rates: A key feature of real interest rate series for emerging economies is
that they alternate between tranquil times, when the level is relatively low and sta-
ble, and more infrequent turbulent periods, during which the interest rate jumps
to much higher and volatile levels. Our speci¯cation for the interest rate process
is therefore based on empirical estimates from a Markov switching model.
The nonlinear nature of interest rates turns out to be important for the quan-
titative properties of otherwise conventional business cycle models. We focus on
a version of the neoclassical small open economy model of Mendoza (1991) or
Correia et al. (1995) with two main extensions: ¯rst, we include an intermediate
input in the production process and assume a working capital constraint associ-
ated to the purchase of intermediate goods. Second, we allow for variable capacity
1For a documentation of these regularities see, for instance, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
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utilization. We calibrate the model to Argentinean data, solve it using a global
solution method and ¯nd it is successful in replicating the empirical regularities of
business cycles in emerging markets. The model performs well not only in terms
of matching the traditional second moments from data but also in terms of ¯tting
the higher order moments of the main macroeconomic aggregates. In addition, the
model produces plausible endogenous dynamics during crises, which are caused by
a switch to a regime of high and volatile interest rates.
The quantitative success of the model relies importantly on three elements. The
¯rst is the nonlinear speci¯cation of the interest rate process. A switch to a regime
of higher and more volatile interest rates is a clear mechanism generating sudden
stops occurring with empirically plausible frequency. In addition, the asymmet-
ric distribution of interest rates translates into skewed distributions for output,
consumption and other macro aggregates that are very much as observed in Ar-
gentinean data. Other e®ects of the nonlinearity are more subtle and operate
by a®ecting agents' precautionary savings motive. The quantitative exercises in
Chapter 1 show that interest rates processes that display rare disaster states, as for
instance discussed by Barro (2006), induce signi¯cantly less precautionary savings
by optimizing agents than processes with symmetric distributions but identical
¯rst and second order unconditional moments. This implies that the speci¯cation
for interest rates in small open economy models matters importantly for the vul-
nerability to unexpected drops in bond prices.
Whereas regime switching behavior is key in matching the second and higher or-
der properties of the Argentinean data, we incorporate two further elements into
the neoclassical model that improve its quantitative performance. Motivated by
the countercyclicality of interest rates in emerging markets, Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), Uribe and Yue (2006) and others have highlighted the role of domestic
¯nancial frictions for understanding their business cycles. Moreover, most of the
literature on the dynamics of sudden stops has focused on credit frictions as prop-
agation mechanisms (see for instance Calvo 1998, Christiano et al. 2004, Cook
and Devereux 2006b,a, Gertler et al. 2007, Braggion et al. 2009). Given the im-
portance of credit from suppliers as a source of short-term ¯nance for ¯rms, we
assume a working capital friction linked to the purchase of intermediate inputs.
Thus, changes in interest rates have direct e®ects on factor demands and produc-
tion. Finally, we allow for variable capital utilization as an additional propagation
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mechanism that, together with credit frictions, can account for the large drop in
capacity utilization and the Solow residual during crises (see for instance Mendoza
2006 and Meza and Quintin 2007).
We use our calibrated model for Argentina to conduct a number of counterfac-
tual experiments, which identify interest rate °uctuations as a major source of
volatility. In our benchmark model, shutting down all interest rate shocks lowers
volatility of output growth by more than half. However, it is almost exclusively
the crises episodes that are responsible for this large e®ect. When we eliminate
crises, but allow interest rate °uctuations as observed during tranquil times, the
contribution of interest rate shocks to output growth volatility is an order of mag-
nitude smaller. Other stylized facts of business cycles in emerging economies, such
as the high relative volatility of consumption and countercyclicality of the trade
balance, largely disappear when crises do not occur. Another implication regards
the importance of domestic ¯nancial frictions for emerging markets: their role for
explaining business cycle is limited to crises episodes. An alternative version of our
model in which credit frictions are only active during crises performs at least as
well as the benchmark model, in which strong credit frictions exist in every period.
The model in Mendoza (2010) shares with ours the emphasis on nesting infre-
quent crises within regular business cycle °uctuations and on the role of nonlinear
dynamics. It incorporates many of the same elements, such as a working capital
constraint, intermediate inputs and variable capacity utilization, but in addition
introduces an occasionally binding collateral constraint. Sudden stops arise after
a sequence of small shocks lead the economy to a region in the state space where
this constraint becomes binding, triggering Fisherian debt de°ation dynamics. In
contrast to our analysis, Mendoza (2010) concludes based on a calibration to Mex-
ican data that the occurrence of crises does not alter the business cycle moments
signi¯cantly. The key reason for the divergent conclusions lies in the di®erent
precautionary savings behavior in both models. In Mendoza (2010), agents ac-
cumulate precautionary savings when approaching states in which the collateral
constraint becomes binding. This lowers the vulnerability and decreases the prob-
ability of a severe crisis signi¯cantly. In our model, sudden stops are caused by an
exogenous regime shift and, although agents are always rationally aware of possible
disaster outcomes, crises take them by surprise when they materialize. The fre-
quency and severity of crises follows primarily from the empirical estimates of the
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regime switching model for interest rates. We acknowledge that some movements
in the country risk component of interests rates are driven by changes in domestic
fundamentals. Nevertheless, in many crises the size and speed of the reversal in
capital °ows and the rise in country spreads is largely unanticipated in light of
recent domestic fundamentals.2 Several empirical studies assign a limited role to
innovations to domestic fundamentals in explaining changes in country spreads.3
Also, the literature on early warning systems has found di±culties in identifying
variables with reasonable predictive power for ¯nancial crises and their timing.4
Therefore, viewing ¯nancial crises as being triggered by a (large) exogenous shock
seems not only reasonable in many cases, but perhaps almost inevitable in the
context of modern dynamic models with optimizing forward looking agents with
strong self-insurance motives: Mendoza (2010) acknowledges that, with an en-
dogenously binding collateral constraint, a realistic sudden stop does not occur
in model simulations unless a sequence of favorable interest rate movements is
reversed by a large negative shock, while simultaneously a large negative produc-
tivity shock materializes.
Our work is related to the broader literature on °uctuations in emerging economies,
in particular to Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006) and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007). The main di®erence is that we emphasize nesting infrequent
dramatic crisis events within regular business cycles. As crises in our model are
associated with both a change in the level and the volatility of interest rates,
this chapter is also related to the work of Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al. (2009), who
analyze the e®ect of volatility shocks to the interest rate in small open economy
models. A key di®erence between our speci¯cation of the interest rate process and
theirs is that the regime switching model combines both level and volatility shifts
and captures the asymmetric alternation between tranquil and turbulent times.
2Calvo et al. (2004) provide evidence of periods of sudden stops occurring simultaneously in a
group of countries that were quite heterogenous in terms of fundamentals, suggesting contagion
e®ects. According to the authors, it is hard to argue that there was a common deterioration
of fundamentals driving these episodes, the only common link being that they were all emerg-
ing economies. Similarly, Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) identify several episodes of extreme
movements in ¯nancial markets during the 1997 East Asian crisis that cannot be linked to any
substantial news about fundamentals, but seem to be caused by herding behavior of investors.
3See Uribe and Yue (2006), Longsta® et al. (2007) and Gonz¶ alez-Rozada and Levy Yeyati
(2008).
4For example, Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten (2004) apply a prominent early warning system
approach to the Argentinean experience and ¯nd that it did not give enough evidence for the
2001 crisis. They document that several leading indicators were even misleading during the
immediate pre-crisis period.
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Finally, this chapter is related to the literature that explores the transmission of
sudden stops, such as Cook and Devereux (2006b,a), Gertler et al. (2007) and
Braggion et al. (2009). While sudden stops are also driven by exogenous move-
ments in real interest rates in these papers, the crisis shock is outside the set of
realization that agents consider possible and is therefore not re°ected in their be-
havior ex ante. Agents in our model are fully aware of the probability distribution
of sudden stop events.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we document
the evidence for regime switching interest rates in a sample of emerging market
economies and provide a numerical example that illustrates the e®ects of regime
switching interest rates in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of small
open economies. Section 2.3 describes the model we use for our empirical analysis
and discusses its calibration to Argentinean data. In Section 2.4 we evaluate the
model quantitatively and conduct a number of counterfactual experiments. Section
2.5 presents additional discussion of our modeling assumptions and draws some
comparisons with related models in the literature. Finally, Section 2.6 summarizes
our conclusions.
2.2 Evidence of Regime Switching Interest Rates
We begin by documenting the evidence for the regime switching behavior of in-
terest rates for Argentina. For our purposes, the most relevant interest rate is the
expected real borrowing rate faced by the domestic private sector, for which we
need data on both private sector borrowing rates and expected domestic in°ation.
As Neumeyer and Perri (2005) argue, the high variability of in°ation in emerging
economies makes it extremely di±cult to construct a reliable measure of expected
in°ation. In addition, private sector interest rates are not readily available for
samples of su±cient size. Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008) and Mendoza and
Yue (2008) report that sovereign interest rates and rates faced by ¯rms in emerg-
ing economies are closely related; for Argentina, in particular, these studies report
correlations above 0.8. We therefore follow Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe
and Yue (2006), Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al. (2009) and others by constructing
a domestic rate from a measure of the international risk free rate and data on
sovereign bond spreads. We compute the sovereign bond quarterly average spread
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for Argentina using the EMBI daily data reported by J.P.Morgan since December
1993, and extend the series backward relying on quarterly bond return data used
by Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The international risk free real rate is obtained
by subtracting the average year-on-year gross in°ation of the U.S. GDP Implicit
De°ator over the previous year from the annual yield on 3-month U.S. Treasury
bills. Section 2.7.1 of the Appendix contains further details.

































































Figure 2.1: Real interest rate in Argentina (quarterly data). Grey areas denote
estimated probability of the crisis state.
Figure 2.1 displays the extended quarterly real interest rate for Argentina; sum-
mary statistics and sample coverage are reported in Table 2.1.5 The quarterly real
interest rate for Argentina displays a similar pattern than the monthly sample
of emerging economies analyzed in Chapter 1. It is clear to identify episodes in
which the interest rate jumps to a much higher and more volatile level. These
crisis episodes are also re°ected in the sample statistics: not only is the sample
standard deviations high (15.2%), the sample average is also considerably higher
than the median (the sample mean is 17.6% while the sample median is 12.1%).
Chapter 1 argued that simple linear models seem unlikely to be the best approxi-
mation of the interest rate dynamics faced by emerging economies and postulated
the following Markov switching autoregressive model:
rt = º(st) + ½rrt¡1 + ¾(st)²t , ²t s i.i.d N(0;1) (2.1)
5The data on interest rates is expressed in annual basis.
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where rt is the real interest rate and ²t is white noise. The state st is assumed
to follow an irreducible ergodic two-state Markov process with transition matrix
¦. This speci¯cation allows the intercept, º(st), and the standard deviations of
the statistical innovation, ¾(st), to be regime dependent, but assumes that the
persistence parameter 0 · ½r < 1 is the same across regimes.6 More precisely,
º(st) and ¾(st) are parameter shift functions stating the dependence of the pa-
rameters on the realization of one of two regimes, which we denote by C (crisis)
and T (tranquil). There are therefore seven parameters to be estimated: ºT, ºC,
½r, ¾T, ¾C and two out of the four elements in the transition matrix ¦.7 We refer
to Hamilton (1994) and Krolzig (1997) for details on the estimation of Markov
switching models.
Table 2.1 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of the Markov switching model
for the quarterly real interest rate in Argentina between 1983Q1 and 2008Q4. In
the tranquil regime, the real interest rate averages 10.6% with a 1.7% standard
deviation for the shocks. Instead, in the crisis regime the average is 47.3% and
the standard deviation for the shocks is 12%. The tranquil regime is estimated to
occur on average 77% of the time. Each quarter there is a 9% probability for Ar-
gentina of moving to the crisis regime. Once it enters the crisis regime, on average
it stays there three to four quarters.
The estimated smooth probabilities of the crisis regime are shown as grey ar-
eas in Figure 2.1. The empirical model assigns signi¯cant crisis probabilities in
all of the known turbulent periods in the sample: the end of the exchange rate
stabilization plan in the ¯rst half of 1980s, the crisis-hyperin°ation in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the aftermath of the 1994 Tequila crisis and the end of the
convertibility plan (currency board), sovereign default and subsequent crisis in the
last quarter of 2001. Also, the recent global ¯nancial crisis is re°ected in the last
two observations, 2008Q3 and 2008Q4. As a comparison, crisis indices in Calvo
et al. (2004), Guidotti et al. (2004) and Ranciµ ere et al. (2008), which use data up
to 2001, assign a crisis in Argentina (sudden stops, currency crises and/or banking
6We also allowed for the persistence parameter to be regime dependent. However, based on
results from a formal hypothesis test we could not reject the null hypothesis that the persistence
parameter is the same across regimes. More precisely, we constructed a likelihood ratio test
statistic and, since it has a nonstandard distribution due to a nuisance parameter problem,
computed critical values by performing Monte Carlo simulations (2,000 repetitions). The p-
value for the test statistic is 0.34.
7To be more precise, there is an additional parameter to estimate: the starting period state
probability, which we estimate with the smooth probability for period one; see Hamilton (1990).
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Table 2.1: Argentina Real Interest Rate: Summary Statistics and Markov-









Markov Switching AR Estimation:
Parameters: st = T st = C
Intercept b º(st) 0.39 1.73
[0.4061] [3.2577]
Autoregressive b ½r 0.9634
[0.0356]
Unconditional Mean b º(st)=(1 ¡ b ½r) 10.59 47.30
Standard Deviation b ¾(st) 1.66 12.07
[0.4647] [5.9722]
Transition matrix c Prfst+1 = Tjstg 0.91 0.32
[0.046]
c Prfst+1 = Cjstg 0.09 0.68
[0.3077]




Numbers in brackets are standard errors of estimates, computed with the Newey-West estimator.
The p-value of the likelihood ratio statistic is obtained by Monte Carlo simulations (10,000
repetitions)
crises) in 1983-1984, 1989-1990, 1994-1995, 1999 and 2001. All of these periods
show up in the shaded areas in Figure 2.1.
At the bottom of Table 2.1 we include the results from testing the hypothesis of a
linear AR(1) against the alternative of the Markov switching model using a likeli-
hood ratio test statistic. The value of the likelihood ratio for our sample is 61:35
while the 1% critical value is 22:35, so we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of
linearity. The model in Equation (2.1) assumes that the autoregressive parameter
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is the same across regimes. We have also tested this model against a more general
speci¯cation in which the parameter might be di®erent across regimes. More pre-
cisely, given the Markov switching speci¯cation rt = º(st) + ½r(st)rt¡1 + ¾(st)²t,
the null hypothesis of the test assumes ½r(T) = ½r(C). The p-value for the test
statistic is 0.34, so we can not reject the null hypothesis that the autoregressive
coe±cient is equal across regimes.8
The results for Argentina quarterly real interest rate are reminiscent of the re-
sults shown in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1 for the monthly interest rate for a sam-
ple of emerging economies. Our conclusion is that, as for many other emerging
economies, the quarterly real interest rate faced by Argentina between 1983Q1 and
2008Q4 can be characterized as alternating between a more frequent low level/low
volatility regime and an infrequent high level/high volatility regime.
2.3 Model and Calibration
In this section, we present our benchmark model and discuss its calibration to
Argentinean data. We also present some evidence to support our modeling as-
sumptions of a credit friction associated with purchases of intermediate inputs
and of variable capacity utilization.
2.3.1 The Model Environment
The model is that of a small open economy that faces stochastic shocks to produc-
tivity and the real interest rate, similar to Mendoza (1991), Correia et al. (1995)
or Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003). Both households and domestic ¯rms trade
a noncontingent real discount bond. As in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Mendoza
(2006) and Uribe and Yue (2006), the latter trade in the asset because of the
presence of a working capital constraint: ¯rms need to hold an amount of non-
interest-bearing liquid assets equivalent to a fraction of their intermediate inputs
purchases.
8As pointed out by Hansen (1992) the likelihood ratio test statistic has a nonstandard dis-
tribution in this context due to a nuisance parameters problem. Accordingly, for both tests we
computed critical values relying on Monte Carlo simulations (using 10,000 and 2,000 repetitions
respectively).
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Households and Preferences. The economy is populated by identical, in¯nitely-















, 0 < ¯ < 1;° ¸ 1;Ã ¸ 0;³ > 0 (2.2)
where ct ¸ 0 denotes consumption and ht ¸ 0 is time spent in the workplace. The
momentary utility function is of the form proposed by Greenwood et al. (1988).
With this speci¯cation, labor supply depends only on the contemporaneous real
wage. These preferences are popular in small open economy models because they
generate more realistic business cycles moments (Correia et al., 1995). They also
facilitate our numerical solution procedure by eliminating a root ¯nding operation.
Households supply labor and capital services, receive factor payments and make
consumption, saving and investment decisions. ¡t = g¡t¡1 measures the level of
labor augmenting technology and enters utility to ensure balanced growth; g ¸ 1
is the economy's average productivity growth factor. Households own a stock of
capital kt ¸ 0, and provide capital services ks
t ¸ 0 equal to the product of the
capital stock and the rate of capacity utilization ut ¸ 0. The households' budget
constraint in period t is
ct + xt + dt · R
¡1
t dt+1 + wtht + r
k
tutkt , (2.3)
where xt are resources for investment and dt+1 is the households' foreign debt
position in a one period noncontingent discount bond which is traded at price
1=Rt < 1, rk
t is the rental rate of capital services and wt is the real wage. Long
run solvency is enforced by imposing an upper bound on foreign debt, dt+1 < ¡tD,
precluding households from running Ponzi schemes. In practice, we set the value of
D high enough such that this constraint never binds. We assume that Rt = 1+rt
when dt+1 ¸ 0 where the interest rate rt is given by (2.1). We also assume that
if dt+1 < 0, i.e. if domestic households become creditors in international markets,
the interest rate faced by the households is Rt = minf1 + rt; ¹ Rg where ¹ R > 1.
Without this assumption, households have strong incentives to save and accumu-
late unrealistic amounts of bonds when the real interest rate jumps to crisis levels.
In contrast, Argentina has always been a net debtor in our sample period: accord-
ing to the data of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the net foreign asset to GDP
ratio from 1980 to 2004 has °uctuated between -9% to -72%. Although during
the Argentinean crises domestic agents do increase saving, in practice they do so
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by investing in very safe foreign assets, which pay a much lower interest rate than
the borrowing rate faced by domestic households and ¯rms. The upper bound on
the return to international lending is intended to capture this feature.
The law of motion for capital is
kt+1 = xt +
µ














kt , ´ > 0 , ! > 0(2.4)
There is a quadratic capital adjustment cost and, as in Baxter and Farr (2005),
the rate of capital depreciation depends positively on capital utilization.
The households' problem is to choose state contingent sequences of ct, ht, xt,
ut, kt+1 and dt+1 to maximize expected utility (2.2), subject to the nonnegativity
constraints, the budget constraints (2.3), the borrowing constraints and the law
of motion for capital (2.4), for given prices wt, rk
t and Rt and initial values k0 and



















































Equation (2.5) de¯nes the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (2.6) de-
termines optimal labor supply, requiring that the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption equals the real wage. Equation (2.7) determines
the optimal capital utilization rate by equating the marginal cost of increased uti-
lization due to higher depreciation to the rental rate of capital services. Equations
(2.8) and (2.9) are the intertemporal Euler conditions determining the optimal
portfolio allocation between bonds and capital.
Firms and Technology. At time t a representative ¯rm rents capital services
ks
t and, in combination with labor input ht and an intermediate input mt, produces
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¡t = g¡t¡1 ; 0 < ® < 1 ; 0 · ¹ < 1 ; ½ < 1;º > 0 . (2.11)
where At is the stochastic level of productivity. The ¯rm is entirely owned by
domestic households and all factor markets are perfectly competitive. Both in-
termediate and ¯nal goods are traded internationally. Whether the intermediate
good is being produced domestically or is imported from abroad is irrelevant and,
for simplicity, we assume that the relative price of the intermediate input in terms
of the ¯nal good is unity.9 As in Uribe and Yue (2006), production is subject to a
¯nancing constraint requiring ¯nal goods producing ¯rms to hold an amount ·t of
a non-interest bearing asset as collateral. We assume that ·t must be a proportion
' ¸ 0 of the cost of the intermediate good inputs:
·t ¸ 'mt (2.12)
The representative ¯rm's distribution of pro¯ts at period t is ¼t = zt ¡ wtht ¡
rk
t ks
t ¡mt ¡·t +·t¡1. The ¯rm's problem is to choose state contingent sequences
for ks
t, ht, mt and ·t in order to maximize the present discounted value of expected






subject to the ¯nancing constraints in (2.12) and taking as given all prices wt, rk
t
and the representative household's marginal utility of consumption, ¸t in (2.5).






































where ft = º(ks
t)®(¡tht)1¡®. Equations (2.14) to (2.16) determine the ¯rms' factor
demands. It is clear from equation (2.16) that the working capital constraint
9An alternative assumption is that the relative price is an exogenous random variable. In
that case, °uctuations in this price are isomorphic to °uctuations in At.
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introduces a wedge between the marginal product of intermediate inputs and its
relative price (which is constant and equal to one). This distortion increases in
the opportunity cost of working capital for ¯rms, (Rt ¡1)=Rt, and in the strength
of the ¯nancial friction, '.
Equilibrium An equilibrium is a set of in¯nite sequences for prices rk
t, wt and
allocations ct, ht, xt, ut, mt, ·t, kt+1, dt+1 such that households and ¯rms solve
their respective problems given initial conditions k0 and d0 for given sequences
of At and Rt, and labor, asset and goods markets clear. A balanced growth
equilibrium is an equilibrium where ct=¡t, ht, xt=¡t, ut, mt=¡t, kt+1=¡t, dt+1=¡t
are stationary variables. Henceforth, we denote the detrended variables by a hat
(optimality conditions expressed in terms of the detrended variables are shown
in Appendix 2.7.3). Using equations (2.14) to (2.16), Appendix 2.7.2 shows how
detrended GDP (^ yt = rk
t ut^ kt + ^ wtht) in equilibrium can be expressed as:





















where qt = (Rt ¡ 1)=Rt > 0. We denote the term At(At;qt) as \measured" TFP
, which corrects for capital utilization but is still a®ected by the distortion intro-
duced by the working capital constraint. An increase in Rt raises qt, the oppor-
tunity cost of funds for the ¯rm, and lowers At(At;qt). A smaller elasticity of
substitution 1=(1 ¡ ½) between intermediate inputs and value added and a higher
value of ' both magnify the negative e®ect of interest rates on total factor pro-
ductivity. The market clearing conditions are
^ zt ¡ ^ mt (1 + 'qt) = ^ yt (2.19)
^ ct + ^ xt + ^ nxt = ^ yt (2.20)
where ^ nxt are (detrended) net exports, given by ^ nxt = ^ dt=g ¡ R
¡1
t ^ dt+1. The
household's debt position ^ dt is the economy's net foreign debt position in period t,
and the trade balance, or net exports, are all resources not used for consumption
and investment.
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2.3.2 Evidence on Modeling Assumptions
This section discusses the empirical motivation for two features of the model: the
credit friction associated with intermediate inputs and variable capacity utiliza-
tion. We assume that ¯rms need intermediate inputs for production and that a
fraction of its payment entails a ¯nancial cost.10 There is broad evidence indi-
cating that the trade of intermediate inputs between ¯rms often entails some sort
of ¯nancial arrangement, both when it refers to domestic or to foreign suppliers.
Petersen and Rajan (1997), for example, signal trade credit as the single most
important source of short-term funding for ¯rms in the US, and that its impor-
tance is greater for ¯rms that have less access to ¯nancial institutions. Reliance
on credit from suppliers might be even more important in developing economies,
given the lower development of the ¯nancial sector.11 Regarding the relationship
with providers across borders, the existence of ¯nancial costs linked to the pur-
chase of inputs is even more common: Auboin (2009) signals that 80% to 90% of
world trade relies on trade ¯nance (trade credit and insurance/guarantees), mostly
of a short-term nature.
Evidence from periods of ¯nancial instability in emerging markets suggests that
reductions in trade credit are an important transmission mechanism through which
¯nancial shocks a®ect the real economy.12 Figure 2.2 shows a very close correlation
between the drop in total loans to the private sector, imported intermediate inputs
and GDP during the 2001 crisis in Argentina. Energy consumption, an indirect
measure of materials use, shows a sharp drop around the crisis. According to the
International Monetary Fund (2003), trade credit declined 30%-50% in Brazil and
Argentina during the 2001-2002 crisis and 50% in Korea in 1997-1998, maturities
were drastically reduced and the ¯nancial cost of these credits increased signif-
icantly. Auboin and Meier-Ewert (2003) argue that the credit crunch in trade
¯nance also a®ected \domestic" trade credit in general in Argentina and other
countries.
10Other examples in the literature of this assumption include Christiano et al. (2004), Mendoza
and Yue (2008), Braggion et al. (2009) and Mendoza (2010).
11In Mexico, for example, more than 65% of ¯rms have stated credit from suppliers as the
main source of credit on average from 1998 to 2009 (survey results, \Encuesta de Evaluaci¶ on
Coyuntural del Mercado Crediticio", Central Bank of Mexico).
12See Auboin and Meier-Ewert (2003), International Chamber of Commerce (2008), Braggion
et al. (2009) and International Monetary Fund (2003, 2009a,b) for further reference.
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Figure 2.2: Main macroeconomic variables for Argentina.
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Finally, some evidence suggests that there is a shift from open account arrange-
ments between trade partners to cash-in-advance or to bank intermediated trans-
actions during ¯nancial crises and that there is an increase in the fraction of trade
credit backed up by collateral; see International Chamber of Commerce (2008) and
Braggion et al. (2009). This motivates a later extension of the model in Section
2.5.1.
As in Meza and Quintin (2007), we allow for variable capital utilization in our
model. The utilization rate in Argentina shows important variations over time
and seems to have played a relevant role in the adjustment of the Argentinean
economy during the major crises. Figure 2.2 shows that the utilization rate fell
signi¯cantly during the 2001 crisis. Available data starts only on 1990Q1, but the
low utilization rate at the beginning of the sample suggests that it also played a
relevant role during the 1989 crisis.
2.3.3 Calibration and Solution Method
We calibrate the model to Argentinean quarterly data from 1980Q1-2008Q2. Ap-
pendix 2.7.1 provides more detail on data sources and transformations. Besides
the parameters of the interest rate shock process, there are 17 parameters in the
model. For 11 of those parameters (®, ¯, ±, ´, ³, º, ¹, Ák, ¹ R, g, ¾a), we calibrate
the values to match data on the basis of moments of the ergodic distribution im-
plied by the nonlinear solution of the model. In the case of trending variables,
the moments used for calibration are from year on year growth rates. For 5 pa-
rameters (°;Ã;!;½A;½), the values are harder to pin down directly from the data,
and we chose values we believe are most common in the literature. The remain-
ing parameter, ', which determines the strength of the ¯nancial friction, is very
important for the empirical success of the model as pointed out by Neumeyer and
Perri (2005). For now we set ' = 1, such that the required working capital equals
the total cost of intermediate good purchases, and we will devote Section 5.1 to a
discussion of this assumption.
Preference parameters The moment utility and labor curvature parameters
are ¯xed to ° = 2 and Ã = 0:6, which are the values in Mendoza (1991), Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007) and others. The discount factor ¯ is set to match the average
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trade balance to GDP ratio in Argentina of 1:1% during 1981Q1 to 2008Q2. The
implied average debt to GDP ratio is about 50%.13 The labor weight ³ matters
only for scaling and normalizes the average labor input to approximately one.
Table 2.2: Calibration, Benchmark Model
a) Preferences Symbol Value Target
Discount factor ¯=g 0.9598 Trade balance to GDP ratio
Utility curvature ° 2 Mendoza (1991), ...
Labor disutility weight ³ 0.62 Normalized labor input
Inverse wage elasticity of labor supply Ã 0.6 Mendoza (1991), ...
b) Technology
Capital income share ® 0.38 Labor income share
Scaling parameter º 0.57 normalized GDP
Intermediate inputs weight ¹ 0.44 IO table
Growth factor g 1.0083 Average output growth
Production substitution elasticity 1=(1 ¡ ½) 0.0001 Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)
Working capital requirement ' 1 See Section 5.1
Capital depreciation parameter 1 ± -0.017 I-Y ratio, normalized utilization rate
Capital depreciation parameter 2 ´ 0.081 I-Y ratio, normalized utilization rate
Capital depreciation parameter 3 ! 0.44 Meza and Quintin (2007), utiliz. rate
Capital adjustment cost Ák=2 19.3 Relative investment volatility
Saving interest rate ceiling ¹ R 1:020:25 International riskless rate
c) Technology Shock Process
Persistence of TFP shock ½A 0.95 Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
Standard deviation of TFP shock ¾A 0.0027 Output volatility
d) Interest Rate Shock Process
See Table 2.1.
Technology parameters. The quarterly growth rate g¡1 is 0:83%, the average
quarterly growth rate of output in Argentina in the sample, excluding the crises
after 1989Q1 and 2001Q2 (see Appendix 2.7.1). The parameter ® is set to obtain
a labor income share of 0:62 as in Mendoza (1991), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) or
13Expressed in terms of annual GDP, the average debt to GDP ratio in the model is 12.5%.
The average net foreign asset to GDP ratio between 1980 and 2004 in the data of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) is ¡36:5%. In the model the only asset is a one-period bond and there
is no default, which makes it impossible to match both the average trade balance to GDP and
debt to GDP ratios in the data at the same time.
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Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The value of ¹ matches the 44:2% share of intermedi-
ate goods consumption in gross output in Argentina's 1997 input-output matrix.
We assume very little possibility to substitute away from material inputs and set
the elasticity of substitution 1=(1 ¡ ½) to a very low number, as in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1996). There is no evidence on this elasticity for Argentina. Esti-
mates for the US surveyed in Bruno (1984) suggest a range between 0.3 and 0.4,
but Basu (1996) considers this an upper bound. In Section 4.2 we do a sensitivity
check that suggests the low elasticity we assume is not too essential for our results.
The depreciation parameters ± and ´ are set to normalize the rate of capital utiliza-
tion and to match the average investment-output ratio in Argentina of 18:2%. The
resulting quarterly depreciation rate is about 3:7% on average. The parameter !,
which determines the elasticity of the depreciation rate with respect to variations
in capital utilization, is set to 0:44, the value in Meza and Quintin (2007).14 For
this value of !, the volatility of the utilization rate happens to coincide with the
volatility of the quarterly series of capacity utilization rate in Argentina (avail-
able only from 1990 onwards). The capital adjustment cost parameter Ák matches
the volatility of investment in the data. We posit an autoregressive process for
technology:
ln(At) = ½A ln(At¡1) + ¾A²A;t , ²A;t s i.i.d N(0;1) (2.21)
with ½A = 0:95, as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and ¾A matching the volatility
of output.15
Real Interest Rates The interest rate process is the estimated regime switching
model for Argentina, with parameters given in Table 2.1 and ¹ R set to 1:020:25, the
average real rate on a US 3-month Treasury-bill.
Numerical Solution We compute discrete approximations to the stochastic
processes for technology and the interest rate. The technology process in (2.21) is
14The value is not entirely comparable to Meza and Quintin (2007) because of slightly dif-
ferent parametrization of the depreciation function. Our speci¯cation allows us to match the
investment-output ratio, but the depreciation elasticity is not constant and depends on ut.
15This is also the procedure adopted in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), among others, since labor
statistics in Argentina do not allow to estimate a reliable series for Argentina's Solow residuals
with quarterly frequency.
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approximated using the quadrature-based method of Tauchen and Hussey (1991)
on a grid of 11 nodes. We approximate the Markov switching process for the in-
terest rate in (2.1) on a grid of 51 equidistant nodes. To facilitate the numerical
solution procedure, our approximation of the interest rate process imposes that
innovations are drawn from normal distributions that are truncated to ensure that
the annualized net interest rate has a support bounded between 0% and 100%. To
guarantee a satisfactory approximation to the Markov switching model estimated
from the data, we follow a simulated method of moments procedure: For given
parameters £ = [º(st), ¾(st), vec(¦), ½r], we obtain the discrete approximation,
simulate 52,000 observations and construct ~ ª(£) = [~ º(st), ~ ¾(st), vec(~ ¦), ~ ½r, ~ ¹r,
~ ¾r]
0 where ~ º(st), ~ ¾(st), vec(~ ¦) and ~ ½r are the Markov switching model estimates
and ~ ¹r and ~ ¾r are the average unconditional sample mean and standard deviation
over samples of the same length as the data. Finally, we ¯nd £ that minimizes the
loss function
h




~ ª(£) ¡ ^ ª
i
where ^ ª is a vector stacking the param-
eters estimated from the data and W is a diagonal weighting matrix containing
the inverses of the variances of the parameter estimates. Figure 2.3 depicts the
density of the Argentinean interest rate and the density implied by our discrete
approximation to the process.












Figure 2.3: Distribution of the real interest rate in data and implied by the
discrete approximation used in the model.
We approximate the policy functions for the state variables ^ dt+1 and ^ kt+1 by piece-
wise linear functions over a grid and compute the approximate solution by iterat-
ing over the intertemporal Euler conditions, as suggested by Coleman (1990). The
standard iteration procedure is generally slow and therefore we combine it with
the method of endogenous gridpoints, proposed by Carroll (2006). The lack of
any wealth e®ects on labor supply implies that there are no numerical root¯nding
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operations required in the algorithm. The details are presented in Appendix 2.7.3
and Matlab programs are available on the authors' websites.
2.4 Quantitative Model Analysis
Before turning to the numerical results, it is instructive to give some intuition
behind the model response to the exogenous disturbances driving aggregate °uc-
tuations: technology shocks, interest rate shocks and shifts in the volatility of
interest rates.
The e®ects of technology and interest rate shocks in the standard small open
economy model are relatively well understood. A positive and transitory shock
to technology increases labor demand which, depending on the elasticity of labor
supply, induces an increase in employment and production; see for instance Men-
doza (1991) or Correia et al. (1995). The increase in current and future expected
real income raises consumption, but as the productivity boom is transitory, house-
holds also respond by saving more. The increase in saving boosts investment in
domestic capital and lowers debt to foreigners. On the other hand, households
take advantage of higher productivity in domestic production and shift resources
towards domestic investment, increasing foreign borrowing. The net e®ect on the
trade balance depends on the model speci¯cs and calibration. In our case with
variable capital utilization and persistent technology shocks, the net e®ect is a
positive comovement between output and the trade balance.
The main e®ect of an interest rate increase in the standard model is a shift away
from domestic investment and a reduction of foreign debt. A reduction in wealth
induces a drop of consumption, but there is generally little contemporaneous e®ect
on output or labor supply. Because of the ¯nancial constraint in our model, how-
ever, there are additional e®ects through an increase in the ¯nancing distortion.
Higher interest rates cause a rise in the relative cost of intermediate inputs which
in turn lowers the marginal product of both labor and capital services. From
equation (2.18), it is clear that this additional e®ect is isomorphic to a negative
technology shock. The regime switching nature of the interest rate, however, im-
plies very persistent drops in the marginal product of labor and capital when the
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economy moves to the crisis regime. Given the variable rate of capacity utiliza-
tion, capital services respond immediately to the drop in marginal productivity,
which, together with a reduction in labor input, contributes to an immediate drop
in production. As a result, interest rate shocks yield comovement between out-
put, investment and consumption, but unlike technology shocks, they also yield
consumption responses that exceed those of output and a negative comovement
between output and the trade balance.
The dynamics in the model are governed not only by shocks to the levels of tech-
nology and interest rates, but also by shifts across tranquil and crisis regimes. A
transition to a crisis is characterized by increases in the level as well as the volatility
of interest rates. As shown by Fern¶ andez-Villaverde et al. (2009), these volatility
shifts have important distinct e®ects. An increase in the relative risk of foreign
bonds induces households to reduce foreign indebtness, which requires a reduction
in consumption. During crises, the returns on capital investment and bonds are
more highly correlated as interest rate °uctuations become more dominant in de-
termining factor productivities. The increased risk discourages investment and a
lower capital stock in turn decreases labor input and production. Shifts in interest
rate volatility contribute to a negative comovement between output and the trade
balance.
2.4.1 Business Cycle Statistics
All three sources of °uctuations generate comovement between output, consump-
tion, investment and hours worked, and are therefore candidates for explaining a
substantial fraction of aggregate °uctuations. However, the relative importance
of technology shocks, interest rate shocks as well as the frequency of crises deter-
mines the relative volatility of consumption, the correlation of the trade balance
with output as well as the unconditional correlations of interest rates with output.
Table 2.3 contains simulated moments based on the benchmark calibration of the
model. The ¯rst column contains the key business cycle statistics in the 1980Q1-
2008Q2 sample of Argentinean quarterly data. The second column contains the
corresponding moments in model simulated data, obtained by generating 1000
samples of the same size as the actual data, each with a burn-in of 1000 quarters.
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Table 2.3: Simulation Results: Year on Year Growth Rates
Data Benchmark No Crises Tech Shocks Only
a) Standard Deviations
Output (T) std(gy) 0.065 0.065 0.032 0.028
(0.044,0.086)
Consumption std(gc)=std(gy) 1.14 1.10 0.83 0.75
(0.94,1.25)
Investment (T) std(gx)=std(gy) 3.14 3.14 2.59 1.75
(2.68,3.62)
Trade balance to GDP std(nx=y) 0.029 0.032 0.010 0.003
(0.021,0.042)
b) Cross-Correlations with gy
Consumption corr(gc;gy) 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.99
(0.92,0.97)
Investment corr(gx;gy) 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.99
(0.91,0.96)
Trade balance to GDP corr(nx=y;gy) ¡0:30 ¡0:52¤ ¡0:12 0.70
(-0.66,-0.36)
c) Cross-Correlations with R
Output corr(gy;R) ¡0:21 ¡0:45¤ ¡0:28 0
(-0.59,-0.31)
Consumption corr(gc;R) ¡0:26 ¡0:40 ¡0:36 0
(-0.56,-0.25)
Investment corr(gx;R) ¡0:07 ¡0:32¤ ¡0:32 0
(-0.47,-0.17)
Trade balance to GDP corr(nx=y;R) 0.71 0.68 0.91 0
(0.37,0.88)
(T) denotes that the statistic was targeted in the calibration. Numbers in parenthesis are 10%
and 90% quantiles. An asterisk in the second column denotes that the corresponding data
moment does not lie within these quantiles.
The table also reports the 10% and 90% quantiles of the simulated sample mo-
ments. The moments are for the year on year growth rates of output, consumption
and investment as well as the trade balance to GDP ratio. As a reference, a table
in the appendix reports the moments when either a linear trend or the HP ¯lter
is used.16
16The data moments targeted in the calibration are always in terms of annual growth rates of
the variables. Some moments in the data are sensitive to the detrending method.
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Consumption Volatility Recalling that the volatility of the growth rates of
output and investment are matched by construction in the calibration, we ¯rst
highlight the fact that the model is successful in producing a relative volatility of
consumption that is in line with the data. The model moment averages 1.10, very
close to value in data, which lies comfortably within the 10% and 90% quantiles of
simulated moments. As suggested before, the nonlinearity in interest rates tends
to magnify consumption volatility: On the one hand, the self-insurance motive is
less strong compared to models where interest rates are relatively volatile all the
time. On the other hand, unexpected movements in wealth induced by changes in
interest rate are more infrequent, but at the same time much larger and therefore
generate stronger consumption responses. In addition, changes in the volatility of
interest rates also translate into higher consumption volatility.
Countercyclical Trade Balance The model does very well in reproducing a
strongly countercyclical trade balance: the correlation between output growth and
the trade balance to GDP ratio is ¡0:53 in the model, whereas in the data it is
¡0:30 which is slightly above the 90% quantile of simulated moments. Even though
the precise number in the data is somewhat sensitive to the detrending method,
the negative correlation produced by our model is nevertheless high. For compar-
ison, the correlation is much more pronounced than in the model speci¯cation of
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) that, as in our model, assumes independent interest
rate and productivity shocks.17 Again, the di®erence depends importantly on the
regime switching behavior of interest rates, as suggested by our earlier example
and as evidenced further below.
Cyclicality of Interest Rates The correlations between output and consump-
tion on the one hand, and real interest rates on the other hand are all negative in
the data. The correlation between investment and interest rates is close to zero
when we use growth rates. The model is successful in reproducing the counter-
cyclical properties of real interest rates: the average sample correlation is ¡0:45. It
17The model speci¯cation in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) with independent processes for interest
rates and productivity shocks is the closest to our model. Their preferred speci¯cation, instead,
assumes that interest rates (or their spread component) is a function of expected productivity. We
have no evidence to assume such a structural dependence. Moreover, some empirical estimations
suggest that the role of innovations to domestic fundamentals in explaining °uctuations in spreads
is limited (see, for example, Uribe and Yue (2006), Longsta® et al. (2007) and Gonz¶ alez-Rozada
and Levy Yeyati (2008)). Accordingly, we assume both processes to be independent.
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somewhat overstates the negative contemporaneous correlation between the real
interest rate and output: the moment in the data lies above the 90% quantile.
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show not only that interest rates are countercyclical in
emerging markets, but also that interest rates lead the cycle. Figure 2.4 plots the
cross-correlations between interest rates and output growth at di®erent leads and
lags for Argentinean data: The model accurately matches the inverse S-shape of
the cross correlations between output growth and real interest rates. The average
sample correlation between consumption and interest rates is ¡0:40. The moment
in the data is somewhat higher but lies within the 10% and 90% quantiles of sim-
ulated sample moments. In the case of investment the average sample correlation
with the interest rate is somewhat below the data counterpart (the moment in the
data is, however, strongly negative when using alternative detrending methods).
The model performs well in matching the correlation of the trade balance with
interest rates. The sample average of the correlation is 0.68, very close to the 0.71
correlation in the data.














Figure 2.4: Cross-correlations be-
tween GDP growth at various leads
and lags, and interest rates. The
grey area indicates the region in
which 80% of the simulated sample
moments lie.














Figure 2.5: Autocorrelation func-
tion of the trade balance to GDP
ratio. The grey area indicates the
region in which 80% of the simu-
lated sample moments lie.
The Persistence of the Trade Balance Figure 2.5 depicts the autocorrela-
tion function of the trade balance to GDP ratio, both in Argentinean data and
the model generated samples. Garc¶ ³a-Cicco et al. (2010) show how the standard
small open economy RBC model with only temporary and permanent technology
shocks predicts a nearly °at autocorrelation function for the trade balance. From
the empirical evidence in their paper, as well as from Figure 2.5, it is clear that
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this prediction is strongly counterfactual for Argentina: the autocorrelations are
all signi¯cantly below one and converge to zero relatively quickly as the number
of lags increases. Figure 2.5 shows that the model with interest rate shocks is
successful in replicating the autocorrelation function.
2.4.2 Crisis Dynamics
In terms of the second order moments the model is relatively successful in matching
the Argentinean experience. We now explore the ability of the model to account for
the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates in Argentina during times of ¯nancial
crisis. First, we present the responses of macro-aggregates in the model around
sudden stop episodes and compare them with two actual episodes. Second, we
investigate the predictions of the model conditional on the observed series for the
real interest rate. Finally, we look at the higher order moments.
Sudden Stops Figure 2.6 plots the model response of output, consumption, in-
vestment and the trade balance during a sudden stop.18 The graph also depicts
the path of the variables during two crises in the sample, which we date using the
estimated crisis probabilities from the regime switching model. The ¯rst crisis has
a zero date of 1989Q1 after which, as is clear from Figure 2.1, the estimated crisis
probabilities is elevated for around 6 quarters. The second crisis has a zero date of
2001Q2 after which the estimated crisis probabilities remain very high for almost
four years. In the graph, the economy enters the crisis regime in period 1 and the
responses are the averages over the simulated samples for crises that last between
6 and 16 quarters. The grey area shows where 80% of the simulated paths are
situated, all of which have been normalized by their period 0 value.
On average, output falls 10% below its pre-crisis level in the model, consump-
tion drops more than output and investment contracts by more than one fourth a
few periods after the transition. The average response of the trade balance shows
every characteristic of a sudden stop, with the trade surplus quickly rising to 7%
of GDP on average. One important feature of the responses is the persistence of
18See Appendix 2.7.4 for more details.
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Figure 2.6: Response to a Crisis.
Variables are in levels. For output, consumption and investment the period 0 value
is normalized to one. The grey area indicates the region in which 80% of the
simulated sample moments lie. Broken lines are Argentinean data with period 0
equal to 1989Q1 and 2001Q2 respectively. See Appendix 2.7.4 for more details.
the crisis induced dynamics: it takes very long for output, consumption and in-
vestment to return to their trend values. We believe this result can be reconciled
with the ¯ndings of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) who, in the context of a stan-
dard frictionless model, assign a predominant role to permanent shocks to account
for °uctuations in emerging economies. Using a longer sample for Argentina and
Mexico, however, Garc¶ ³a-Cicco et al. (2010) argue that there is not much sup-
port in data for the predominance of permanent shocks. In our model technology
shocks are stationary, but the speci¯cation of the ¯nancial friction and the regime
switching nature of the ¯nancial shock imply on average persistent deviations in
measured TFP. The average response of the trade balance is much less persistent,
which is in line with the arguments made by Garc¶ ³a-Cicco et al. (2010). Judging
by Argentina's experience in the 1989 and 2001 crises, the model produces cri-
sis dynamics that are overall empirically plausible. One potential discrepancy is
the speed of the recovery of investment: in both instances it has posted a higher
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growth rate onwards from 2 or 3 years after the start of the crisis than the rate
predicted on average by the model. This could be a failure of the model, but it
could also be due to positive realizations of shocks.






































Figure 2.7: Response to a Crisis of Utilization Rate and Intermediate Inputs.
Left Panel: The solid line is the response of capacity utilization rate in the model.
The broken line corresponds to Argentinean data on industrial capacity utilization
rate with period 0 equal to 2001Q2. Right Panel: The solid line is the response of
intermediate inputs in the model. The other series correspond to Argentinean data
on imported intermediate inputs, on electricity demand and on the synthetic energy
index, with period 0 equal to 2001Q2. For all series in both panels the period 0
value is normalized to one. See Appendix 2.7.4 for more details.
In Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 we repeat this exercise for alternative speci¯cations of
the model and show that both intermediate inputs and variable capacity utiliza-
tion matter for the quantitative success of the model in terms of crisis dynamics.
Here we provide evidence that these modeling assumptions are, overall, empirically
plausible by comparing the model response to a crisis of the utilization rate and
intermediate inputs with some data counterparts.19 Figure 2.7 shows that capacity
utilization decreased substantially during the 2001 crisis, and Figure 2.2 suggests
this was also the case in the 1989 crisis. The model captures this fact; if anything,
it somewhat understates the decrease in utilization in the data. Although there
is no aggregate series on the use of intermediate inputs in Argentina, there are
three series that we can use as indirect evidence for samples that include the 2001
crisis: (1) imports of intermediate inputs (which account for around 40% of total
imports); (2) demand of electricity; and (3) a synthetic energy production index.
Figure 2.7 compares the average evolution of intermediate inputs in the model
19The details of the data used are reported in the Appendix 2.7.1. The limited sample for the
series on capacity utilization and intermediate inputs precludes us from including them among
the series for which we compare second moments from simulations.
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during crises and the path of those three series around the 2001 crisis. All vari-
ables show a signi¯cant decrease. The magnitude of the average drop of material
inputs in the model is consistent with the paths of the energy index and electricity
demand in data. The fall in imported intermediate inputs during the 2001 crisis is
larger than what the model predicts. However, in reality the imported inputs are
only a fraction of the total. It is likely that during crises ¯rms substitute imported
inputs for domestic inputs, such that the actual decrease is smaller. Also, the data
is on °ows of imports and does not consider changes in inventories that might have
taken place at the onset of the crisis.
The role played by the credit friction in producing the abrupt drop in output
during crises depends on the assumed elasticity of substitution between material
inputs and value added. Unfortunately, there is no data from Argentina to esti-
mate this elasticity. Equation (2.17) implies that the output response to a shift
to the crisis regime is determined by the induced change in measured TFP. We
can assess the sensitivity of our results to di®erent elasticities by looking at how
measured TFP responds for alternative values of the elasticity 1=(1 ¡ ½). Figure
2.8 plots the average response of At(At;qt) to a crisis under di®erent elasticity
values: 0.0001 (our benchmark calibration value), 1, and 100 (in¯nite elasticity).
According to Bruno (1984) and Basu (1996), a unitary elasticity is most likely an
upper bound for the US. Fortunately, the di®erence in the reaction of measured
TFP between a very low elasticity and a unitary elasticity is very small. With
in¯nite elasticity of substitution the drop in measured TFP is obviously much
smaller, and in that case the model would fail to match the drop in output in the
data. However, a low elasticity seems more realistic.
Dynamics in Response to the Actual Interest Rate Series Figure 2.9 plots
detrended output, consumption, investment and the trade balance to GDP ratio
predicted by the model when we embed the observed series for the interest rate in
Argentina depicted in Figure 2.1. For this exercise we keep the level of technology
equal to its long run average. The ¯gure also depicts the corresponding variables
for Argentinean data. The model series generated only by interest rate movements
track the observed series remarkably well. The ¯t for the trade balance to GDP
ratio is particulary good. The main discrepancy is that the model overstates the
downward reaction of investment in the 2001 crisis. Again, it might be that the
simple structure of the model misses some dimensions of the adjustment in the
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Figure 2.8: Response to a Crisis of measured TFP in the benchmark model,
equation (2.18), for di®erent values for the production elasticity of substitution
1=(1 ¡ ½).
data, or it might be simply due to positive realizations of shocks in data after the
crisis (e.g. the boom in commodity prices).
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Figure 2.9: Model Predictions to Actual Real Interest Rate Series.
Simulated (solid lines) and actual (broken lines) macroeconomic aggregates when
the actual series for the real interest rete is fed into the benchmark model. Output,
consumption and investment variables are linearly detrended.
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Higher Order Properties. The nonlinear nature of interest rates is re°ected
in the unconditional probability distributions of the variables. Model evaluation in
terms of higher order properties complements the evidence on plausible dynamics
during crises: if the model response to a crisis were in line with data but crises
were too frequent or too rare, the model would fail in terms of its predicted un-
conditional probability distributions. Figure 2.10 reports ¯tted densities for both
model and Argentinean data series. The distributions of output, consumption
and investment in data show a clear tail to the left, re°ecting the large declines
that follow current account reversals. The latter are re°ected in the right tail for
the trade balance. Figure 2.10 shows that the model variables display the same
pattern of asymmetry. The sample skewness of data and model series is reported
in Table 2.4: Although there are some di®erences in values, the direction of the
asymmetry is always correct. Another check of model performance is a compari-
son of outcomes in crises and booms. We compute the average of each detrended
series in the lower tail of the distribution (5% quantile) and their average in the
upper (95% quantile) tail of the distribution. We then construct the ratio of the
distance to trend of crises outcomes over the distance to trend of booms outcomes.
These crisis-to-booms ratios both for data and the model series are reported in
Table 2.4. The asymmetry between good and bad times in the model is in line
with the data, notwithstanding a signi¯cant discrepancy for the investment series.
The relative success in ¯tting the higher order moments of the macro variables is
in the ¯rst place due to the asymmetric distribution of interest rates. However,
how these translate quantitatively into asymmetries in the distribution of output
and other variables depends on su±ciently strong propagation caused by model
features such as credit frictions and variable capacity utilization.
Overall, the evidence provided in this section shows that the model succeeds in
producing plausible sudden stop dynamics and in generating asymmetries in the
probability distributions of macro variables that are similar to Argentinean data.
2.4.3 The Relative Importance of Shocks and the Role of
Crises
We now turn to the quantitative importance of interest rate shocks and crises
for understanding the properties of the Argentinean business cycle. The last two
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Figure 2.10: Probability Distribution of Data and Model Macro-Aggregates.
Fitted kernel densities to data (areas), benchmark model (solid lines) and wage-
bill model macroeconomic aggregates (broken lines). Output, consumption and
investment correspond to linear detrended series.
Table 2.4: Asymmetry in Macro-Aggregates: Data, Benchmark and Wage-Bill
Model.
Skewness Crises-to-Booms ratio
Data Benchmark Wage-Bill Data Benchmark Wage-Bill
Output ¡0:5 ¡0:62 ¡0:03 1.3 1.4 1.0
Consumption ¡0:68 ¡0:92 ¡0:42 1.5 1.6 1.2
Investment ¡0:53 ¡1:02 ¡1:03 1.3 1.7 1.4
Trade Balance to GDP +0:37 +1:56 +1:13 0.7 0.4 0.5
Output, consumption and investment series for Argentina have been linearly detrended. The
crises-to-booms ratio for each macro-aggregate is computed as the distance from outcomes during
crises to trend over the distance from outcomes during booms to trend. Outcomes during crises
(booms) for each variable correspond to the average of the realizations smaller (bigger) than the
5% (95%) quantile of the distribution.
columns in Table 2.3 contain the results of two simulation experiments aimed at
quantifying the role of interest rate shocks. In the ¯rst experiment, we isolate
the role of crises by computing the moments for 1000 samples in which the cri-
sis regime does not occur. When simulating the data, we use the same policy
functions as before but force the realized interest rate process to be generated by
an AR(1) process, the parameters of which are those of the estimated tranquil
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regime. In the second experiment, we compute the moments when interest rate
shocks are absent and there are only technology shocks. In both experiments, we
do not change any of the parameter values of the model.
The ¯rst observation is that the presence of crises is the main reason why interest
rate shocks are important in accounting for business cycle volatility in Argentina.
The standard deviation of output growth is 6.5% in the data. Without crises oc-
curring, the standard deviation drops to 3:2%, or 51% lower than the value in the
data. Removing the interest rate shocks altogether further reduces the standard
deviation, but only by 0:4% or another 6%. Therefore, it is almost exclusively the
crisis episodes that comprise the contribution of interest rate shocks to business
cycle volatility.
The second main result from our experiments is that the ability of the model to
match the data along several important dimensions also depends to a large extent
on the presence of crises. Without crises, the relative volatility of consumption
drops from 1:10 to 0:83, which is much lower than in the data and closer to values
from developed small open economies. The correlation of the trade balance with
output growth drops from ¡0:52 to ¡0:12, such that the trade balance is much less
strongly countercyclical. When interest rate shocks are removed altogether, the
relative volatility of consumption drops further to 0:75, and the trade balance be-
comes strongly procyclical with a correlation of 0:70. These ¯ndings are of course
reminiscent of Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Garc¶ ³a-Cicco et al. (2010) and others,
who show that the standard RBC model with only technology shocks fails along
these important dimensions. Our results suggest that while we need to incorpo-
rate ¯nancial frictions to bring the model closer to the data, quantitatively it is
the combination with the occurrence of crises that matters most for the improved
performance.
These results contrast with those of Mendoza (2010), who ¯nds in model sim-
ulations based on a calibration to Mexican data that the occurrence of crises
does not in°uence the properties of regular business cycle °uctuations very much.
The key di®erence with our analysis is that the model in Mendoza (2010) has the
appealing property that sudden stop events are triggered endogenously. Crises dy-
namics are explained by a suddenly binding collateral constraint producing debt
de°ation dynamics. We believe the main reason for the discrepancy is that self
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insurance tends to make severe crises more unlikely in models of optimizing agents
with rational expectations. In Mendoza (2010), only when a particular history of
favorable shocks leading to increased borrowing is followed by a sudden reversal
of fortune including an adverse interest rate shock as well as a negative technol-
ogy shock, does the model produces dynamics that are quantitatively as observed
during emerging market crises. In our approach, sudden stops are exogenously
generated by regime shifts at a frequency that is determined by the empirical es-
timates of the regime switching model of interest rates. If we de¯ne a sudden stop
as Mendoza (2010) as a situation in which the economy is in the crisis regime and
the trade balance to GDP ratio is at least one standard deviation above the sam-
ple mean, the ergodic probability of sudden stops in the model is 12%.20 In the
Argentinean sample this probability is about 9%. An advantage of our approach
is that it generates empirically more plausible probabilities of tail events, which is
one of the reasons we emphasize model evaluation on the basis of the higher order
properties of the macroeconomic variables.
2.5 Exploring Alternative Modeling Assump-
tions
In this section we present some alternative models in order to gain further insight
into the quantitative contribution of the main features of our benchmark model. In
the ¯rst exercise, we allow for the domestic credit friction to be regime dependent.
A second experiment evaluates the role of variable rate of capacity utilization.
Finally, we compare our model with a basic small open economy model with a
¯nancial friction linked to the wage bill instead of intermediate inputs. This last
exercise employs a framework that is very similar to Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
or Uribe and Yue (2006) but with nonlinear shocks to the interest rate.
20Mendoza (2010) de¯nes sudden stop states as those in which the collateral constraint binds
and the trade balance to GDP ratio is at least one standard deviation above the mean. The
frequency of sudden stops in his calibrated model is 3.3%.
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2.5.1 A Model with Regime Dependent Financial Fric-
tions
Before, we demonstrated that it is the combination of ¯nancial frictions and crises
that accounts for virtually all of the contribution of interest shocks to business
cycle volatility. This suggests that what matters most quantitatively is the tight-
ness of the ¯nancing constraint around crisis episodes, but not necessarily during
tranquil times. To capture this idea, we modify the model by allowing the pa-
rameter ' to take on di®erent values across the di®erent regimes. Our motivation
is twofold. First, although there are no direct aggregate empirical measures of '
or the value of working capital, a criticism of models with working capital fric-
tions has been that, to be successful, an implausible large stock of working capital
or collateral needs to be assumed. However, the model in this section implies a
much smaller average value for the working capital parameter while leaving the
results unchanged or even improved. Second, there is wide consensus that dur-
ing times of ¯nancial stress, access to inter¯rm credit or trade ¯nance is reduced
and ¯rms are forced to adopt cash-in-advance or bank-intermediated ¯nancial ar-
rangements. This has important consequences on trade of intermediate inputs and
production.21
We capture the time varying nature of credit frictions by assuming ' = 0 in
the tranquil regime and ' = 0:80 during the crisis regime.22 Given our estimated
regime switching process for Argentina, where the ergodic probability of the tran-
quil regime is 77%, the average value of ' is around 0.22, almost 80% lower than
the value under the benchmark model. This implies that the average stock of work-
ing capital is 6.3% of GDP in this model, while this ratio is 27% in the benchmark
model. In order to be consistent with the same target statistics as the benchmark
calibration, only very minor changes in the other parameter values were required
(see the footnote in Table 2.5).
21See Auboin and Meier-Ewert (2003), International Chamber of Commerce (2008) and Inter-
national Monetary Fund (2003).
22We assume ' = 0:8 in the crisis regime since we found that, when setting ' = 1, the combined
e®ect of movements in ' and the interest rate shocks yielded excessive output volatility: the
standard deviation of output growth in the simulations exceeded the value in the data, even
when setting the standard deviation of the technology shock to zero. To make the results
more comparable, we therefore chose to keep the volatility of technology shocks the same as in
the benchmark calibration, and instead adjust the value of ' to match the observed standard
deviation of output growth.
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Figure 2.11: Response to a Crisis: Comparison of Alternative Models.
Switching friction denotes the model with regime dependent ¯nancial frictions in
Section 2.5.1; Fixed utilization refers to the model in Section 2.5.2; and Wage-Bill
corresponds to the model in Section 2.5.3. Thin broken lines are Argentinean data
with period 0 equal to 1989Q1 and 2001Q2 respectively. See Appendix 2.7.4 for
more details.
The third column in Table 2.5 displays the relevant business cycle moments of
the model with a regime dependent ¯nancing friction. The results are remark-
ably similar to the benchmark model and, in some aspects, even more in line with
the Argentinean data. The relative standard deviation of consumption is almost
identical to the benchmark model value. The trade balance remains strongly coun-
tercyclical, but the value of -0.45 is closer to the observed value of -0.30, which is
now also within 10%-90% quantiles of the simulated moments. Since now interest
rate shocks directly a®ect labor and capital productivity only in the crisis state,
the cross correlations of output, consumption and investment with the interest
rate are considerably lower. This brings these numbers closer to the values in the
data, which, except for investment, are now within the 10%-90% quantiles of the
simulated moments. Removing the crises lowers the volatility of output by 59%,
as opposed to 51% in the benchmark. Removing all interest rate shocks (as well
as keeping ' = 0) does not further reduce output volatility signi¯cantly. This
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con¯rms the result of the benchmark model that it is crises episodes that are key
for the empirical success of the model. Outside of crises episodes, the ¯nancing
friction is by and large inconsequential as movements in interest rates are far too
small. Figure 2.11 compares the paths of the main macro-aggregates during sud-
den stops in the modi¯ed model. Because of the simultaneous tightening of credit
conditions, the average drops in output, consumption and investment are more
pronounced than in the benchmark model.
All of this suggests, ¯rst, that a lack of evidence of sizeable ¯nancial constraints in
a sample dominated by tranquil episodes does not automatically imply that these
frictions are irrelevant for understanding emerging market °uctuations. This has
important implications in terms of validating models with working capital fric-
tions empirically. It also suggests that the assumption of tightening domestic
credit conditions occurring in conjunction with rises in interest rates and interest
rate volatility is empirically plausible. This extension is particularly appealing
in the light of evidence that trade credit is an important channel through which
¯nancial shocks a®ected real outcomes during recent ¯nancial turmoils.
2.5.2 A Model with Fixed Capacity Utilization
Before, we pointed to the role of variable capital utilization as an ampli¯cation
mechanism of interest rate shocks in the benchmark model, and we showed that
the model predictions for the utilization rate during crises is not contradicted by
available data. To further assess the relative contribution of this feature, in this
section we solve a di®erent version of the model in which utilization is kept con-
stant. The parameters are recalibrated to remain consistent with the moments
of the ergodic distribution. The fourth column of Table 2.5 presents business cy-
cle moments for this alternative model. In terms of second moments, the model
still performs relatively well. Smaller ampli¯cation of interest rate shocks means
technology shocks must account for a larger share of output volatility than in the
benchmark model. As a result, the model with ¯xed utilization yields lower con-
sumption volatility: the relative standard deviation of consumption is now 1:03,
but the moment in data still lies within the 10%-90% quantiles of simulated mo-
ments. The smaller propagation of interest rate shocks weakens the countercyclical
nature of interest rates and lowers the negative correlation of the trade balance
with output relative to the benchmark model: both moments in the data now lie
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within the 10%-90% quantiles of the simulated moments. Overall, the correlations
of consumption, investment and the trade balance with output growth, as well as
the correlations of all variables with interest rates are consistent with the data.
However, Figure 2.11 shows that the speci¯cation with ¯xed capacity utilization
is unable to explain the magnitude of the response of output and consumption to
crises and consequently fails to match the higher order properties of the data (e.g.
the skewness of output and consumption is -0.13 and -0.29 respectively, while it
was -0.62 and -0.92 in the benchmark model). This ¯nding is consistent with the
arguments in Meza and Quintin (2007). The main discrepancy with the Argen-
tinean crises is in the size of the drop in economic activity and in the speed of the
adjustment. When a rise in the interest rate reduces measured TFP, this a®ects
directly the marginal productivity of capital. In the benchmark model, variable
capacity utilization allows households to adjust the amount of capital services
supplied, leading to an immediate reduction in output. The volatility of output
growth is reduced by 18% when we remove the crises, as opposed to 51% in the
benchmark model. Eliminating interest rate shocks altogether, the additional drop
in output volatility is quantitatively very small. Therefore, the volatility contribu-
tion of interest rate shocks depends on the feature of varying capacity utilization,
but it is still almost exclusively the presence of crises that comprises the e®ect of
interest rate °uctuations.
2.5.3 A Model With a Working Capital Constraint Linked
to the Wage Bill
In this section we wish to clarify further the quantitative contribution of linking
the working capital friction to intermediate inputs rather than the wage bill, and
its interaction with the nonlinearity of interest rates. The model we use for com-
parison has ¯xed utilization, only capital and labor are used in production and the
working capital friction is linked to the wage bill (the details are given in Appendix
2.7.5). The model is thus very similar to Neumeyer and Perri (2005) or in Uribe
and Yue (2006). The key di®erence is that we embed into the model the same
nonlinear process for the interest rate as in our benchmark model and employ a
nonlinear global solution method. Business cycle moments for the wage bill model
are reported in the ¯fth column of Table 2.5. Overall it is relatively consistent with
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the data in terms of the second order properties of simulated series. One short-
coming of the wage bill model is that the trade balance to GDP ratio becomes
acyclical: the average correlation with output growth is only ¡0:03, while in the
data is ¡0:30 which is outside the 10% and 90% quantiles of the simulated sample
moments. The absence of a countercyclical trade balance is very similar to the
simulation results in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) for the model with independent
interest rate and technology processes.
More relevant implications of linking the friction to material inputs and its in-
teraction with nonlinear interest rates become clear when we analyze higher order
moments and dynamics around crises episodes. Figure 2.10 compares the proba-
bility distribution of endogenous variables from the wage bill and the benchmark
model and Table 2.4 reports sample skewness and the crises-to-booms statistic.
The degree of asymmetry of consumption, investment and the trade balance to
GDP ratio in both the benchmark and the wage bill model is very much in line
with data. As argued before, this success is due to the regime switching nature of
the interest rate we estimate from data. However, the distribution of output im-
plied by the wage bill model is almost symmetric: the skewness of detrended GDP
is only ¡0:03 while in data it is ¡0:50. This lack of asymmetry suggests an impor-
tant failure in the propagation mechanism of ¯nancial shocks to output when the
friction is linked to the wage bill. This speci¯cation implies that an interest rate
shock a®ects directly only the marginal productivity of labor (see equation (2.41)
in the Appendix 2.7.5), while when the friction is linked to material inputs the
shock a®ects directly the marginal productivity of both labor and capital. The
comparison between the wage bill model and the ¯xed utilization model shown
in the upper left panel of Figure 2.11 is particularly illustrative: Although the
only speci¯cation di®erence is linking the friction to the wage bill rather than to
intermediate inputs, the response of output to a crisis in the wage bill model is
much milder and further away from the reaction in data. These results are con-
sistent with the fact that our benchmark model assigns a larger role for interest
rate shocks in accounting for output volatility in Argentina in comparison with
Neumeyer and Perri (2005): Our counterfactual experiments suggested a reduction
of output volatility of more than half once interest shocks are eliminated, while in
their paper the reduction is around 30%.
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2.6 Conclusion
The occurrence of dramatic crises in many emerging markets raises the question of
their role in determining the distinctive features of emerging market °uctuations
such as the high volatility of consumption and the strong countercyclicality of the
trade balance. Our analysis suggests that these may be driven to a large extent
by the nonlinear behavior of interest rates that is typical of emerging markets.
Interest rates are well characterized by a regime switching process alternating be-
tween a low level/low volatility regime and an infrequent high level/high volatility
regime. We embed a nonlinear process estimated for Argentina into a neoclassical
small open economy model with ¯nancial frictions and variable capacity utiliza-
tion. The nonlinearities turn out to be important for the quantitative properties
of small open economy models in terms of determining precautionary savings and
consumption smoothing behavior. Our model performs well not only in terms of
matching the traditional second moments of the data but also in terms of ¯tting
the higher order moments of the main macroeconomic aggregates and in producing
plausible endogenous dynamics during crises episodes. We emphasize the empirical
evaluation of the model in terms of higher order moments of endogenous variables
and their dynamics during crises episodes. Our sensitivity exercises indicate that
these can be very informative for discriminating between business cycle models
for emerging markets. For instance, the inclusion of variable capacity utilization
and linking credit frictions to the purchase of intermediate inputs prove important
in generating empirically plausible asymmetries in the probability distributions of
key macroeconomic variables.
Our counterfactual experiments indicate that interest rate °uctuations associated
with ¯nancial crises can explain a large part of the output volatility observed
in Argentina. We also argue that ¯nancial frictions are essential for explaining
emerging market °uctuations, but almost exclusively because of their e®ects in
crisis episodes. This outcome supports the modeling approach of Mendoza (2010),
who shares with us the emphasis on nesting infrequent dramatic crises with regular
°uctuations and views crises as times when ¯nancing constraints become particu-
larly stringent.
An important challenge for future research employing dynamic models with ra-
tional forward looking agents is to reconcile the occurrence of severe crises with
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the incentive for households to engage in precautionary savings behavior in antic-
ipation of the possibility of future crises. Modeling crises as rare exogenous shifts
to a regime of high and volatile interest rates greatly reduces the agents' ability
and incentives to self insure relative to models where crises arise endogenously,
such as in Mendoza (2010). This di®erence in modeling approach has important
consequences for the incidence of crises and consequently for their impact on the
properties of business cycles in emerging economies. We acknowledge nevertheless
that the small open economy assumption for interest rates neglects an endogenous
default risk component that a®ects the country spread, which is a shortcoming of
the modeling approach. However, what this spread captures is rather the foreign
investors' perceived probability of default, which might not be necessarily driven
by changes in domestic fundamentals. In that sense, the regime switching nature
of interest rates we ¯nd in data might respond to abrupt shifts in investors' expec-
tations about, for instance, the willingness of other investors to rollover maturing
debt, or about the future path of domestic policy in light of developments in other
economies. To the extent that these phenomena play an important role in the pric-
ing of emerging markets' debt as many empirical studies suggest, viewing ¯nancial
crises as being triggered by exogenous switches in regime seems a reasonable ¯rst
approximation.
Although we targeted the calibration and empirical evaluation of the model to
Argentina, we believe the main results in this chapter extend broadly to other
emerging economies. The regime switching estimation shown in Chapter 1 for a
sample of emerging markets revealed that the asymmetric distribution of interest
rates is similar in other countries. Moreover, the skewed distributions of some
macroeconomic aggregates, re°ecting the occasional occurrence of severe crises,
is a common feature for these economies. It is these asymmetries, rather than
just higher volatility, that seem to constitute a key di®erence with most developed
small open economies.
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2.7 Appendix Chapter 2
2.7.1 Data Sources and Transformations
We use data for Argentina from 1980Q1 to 2008Q2 for GDP, consumption, in-
vestment, exports and imports, and from 1983Q1 to 2008Q4 for the real interest
rate. The data used are plotted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The series from the Na-
tional Accounts are in constant prices (millions of pesos, prices of 1993). GDP is
obtained from the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos (INDEC) for the
whole period. Consumption corresponds to private plus public consumption. Se-
ries on consumption, investment, imports and exports are obtained from INDEC
for the period 1993Q1 to 2008Q2 and extended backwards until 1980Q1 by splicing
with the data in Neumeyer and Perri (2005). To compute the average quarterly
growth rate of GDP we excluded the rates corresponding to quarters 1989Q2 to
1990Q2 and 2001Q3 to 2004Q1, corresponding to crises periods. The beginning
of the crises were dated using the estimated crisis probabilities from the regime
switching model. The end of each crisis was dated at the period at which output
reached its pre-crisis level.
The data on capacity utilization rate, imported intermediate inputs, energy in-
dex, electricity demand, employment and total loans to the private sector shown
in Figure 2.2 was obtained from CEIC database (http://www.ceicdata.com/). The
utilization rate corresponds to the quarterly average of the industrial capacity uti-
lization rate series constructed by the Fundaci¶ on de Investigaciones Econ¶ omicas
Latinoamericanas (FIEL) since 1990M01. The electricity demand series is in phys-
ical units (GWh), available since 1999M01, and is constructed by the Wholesale
Electricity Market Regulatory Company; we report the quarterly average. The
synthetic energy index (2003=100) is reported by the INDEC from 1993M01 on-
wards. The imported intermediate inputs series is constructed by the INDEC,
corresponds to millions of US dollars and is available since 1992M01. We take
the quarterly average and convert it to millions of pesos, prices of 1993, using the
GDP implicit price de°ator for imports (INDEC, available from 1993Q1). The
total loans to the private sector series (1993Q1-2008Q4) corresponds to the sum
of loans to the non-¯nancial private sector in foreign and in domestic currency,
constructed by the Central Bank, expressed both in real pesos (millions of pesos,
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1993 prices). The employment series correspond to the quarterly average of em-
ployed workers (thousands of people) reported by the INDEC as registered in the
social security system (SIJP), available since 1995M01.
The real interest rate is constructed as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The nomi-
nal interest rate in US dollars correspond, each quarter, to the average daily yield
for the 90-day U.S. T-bill in the secondary market plus the average J.P. Morgan
EMBI+ Stripped Spread. The real rate is obtained by de°ating the nominal rate
by the U.S. GDP De°ator expected in°ation. Quarterly expected in°ation is com-
puted as the average of the actual GDP De°ator in°ation in that quarter and
in the three preceding ones. From December 1993 onwards we use the country
spread calculated by J.P. Morgan. We extend the series backwards at quarterly
frequency until 1983Q1 by splicing with the data in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
For the last observation in our sample, 2008Q4, we used preliminary values. For
the country spread we used values available until November 11th, 2008, while for
the U.S. T-bill yield we used values until November 13th, 2008. Regarding the
U.S. GDP de°ator in°ation, we ¯tted an AR(1) model to its growth rate with data
from 1980Q1 to 2008Q3 and projected the value for the last quarter: 2008Q4.
2.7.2 Measured TFP
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Finally, the resulting expressions for rk
t and wt are used in the de¯nition of GDP,
yt = rk
tutkt + wtht, to obtain:
















The algorithm seeks an approximate solution to the following system of stochastic
di®erence equations
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where ^ yt is given in (2.17). Denoting the vector of state variables by St = h
^ kt; ^ dt;Rt;st;At
i
, we approximate the policy functions for the state variables
^ dt+1 = d(St) and ^ kt+1 = k(St) by piecewise linear functions over a grid, denoted
by S, of 21£21£51£2£11 = 494;802 nodes each and compute the approximate
solution by iterating over the policy functions (Coleman (1990)). We combine the
procedure with the method of endogenous gridpoints in Carroll (2006) to speed
up the algorithm. More speci¯cally, the algorithm is:
Step 1 Obtain an initial guess k0(S) and d0(S) from a loglinear approximation
around the deterministic steady state.
Step 2 Given the last guess kj¡1(S) and dj¡1(S), calculate k00 = kj¡1(S), d00 =
dj¡1(S) and ¯nd c0;y0;h0;u0;¸0 using the budget constraint and equations
(2.17) and (2.27)-(2.30).
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as well as equations (2.17) and (2.27)-(2.30).
Step 4 Using k0, d0 and k;d;R;s and A, interpolate to obtain k00 = kj(S) and
d00 = dj(S).
Step 5 Repeat step 2 to 4 until convergence.
2.7.4 Response to a Crisis in Simulations
Model simulated data is obtained by generating 1000 samples of the same size as
the actual data, each with a burn-in of 1000 quarters. The model response to
a crisis of the di®erent macro aggregates, reported in Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7 and
Figure 2.11, is computed in the following way: First, we identify all the subperiods
among the simulated series in which the economy was in the crisis regime for at
least 6 quarters and not more than 16 quarters. Second, we construct a crisis
sample for each of these subperiods including from 5 quarters before to 25 quarters
after entering the crisis. We denote the period in which the economy enters the
crisis regime as period 1. Third, for each sample we re-scale all the series to the
value of the series in period 0 (i.e. the period before entering the crisis regime).
Fourth, for each series, we compute the average and the 10% and 90% quantiles
across samples.
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2.7.5 Model In Section 2.5.3
The models we use in Section 2.5.3 is a version of the model proposed in Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006). The main di®erence with Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) is the timing we assume for the opportunity cost of funds for ¯rms.
They assume that at the beginning of each period ¯rms issue a within-period bond
but at the interest rate of the previous period (even if at the beginning of periods
all shocks are known). In our model, as in Uribe and Yue (2006), the opportunity
cost of funds for the ¯rm at t is related to the interest rate of that same period.
Finally, Uribe and Yue (2006) assume three additional features that we do not
include here: they assume that real decisions are made prior to the realization
of that period ¯nancial shocks, they include habits in consumption and gestation
lags in capital accumulation.
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; Ád > 0 (2.36)
where all parameters and variables correspond to the benchmark model descrip-
tion in the main text. As in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), a portfolio adjustment
cost function was introduced in (2.34) and it was calibrated so that the volatility
of the trade balance to GDP ratio remained close to the data counterpart (in the
benchmark model Ád = 0). The parameter ¹ d is the average debt level from the
ergodic distribution.
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The only factors of production are capital and labor, and a working capital con-
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The level of productivity At is stochastic and is given by equation (2.21) in the
main text. The interest rates are realizations of the Markov switching autore-
gressive process used for the benchmark model and consistent with estimations
for Argentina. The other parameter values are set to remain consistent with the
moments of the ergodic distribution and are reported in Table 2.6.
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Table 2.6: Calibration, Wage-Bill Model in Section 2.5.3.
a) Preferences Symbol Value Target
Discount factor ¯=g 0.9608 Trade balance to GDP ratio
Utility curvature ° 2 Mendoza (1991), ...
Labor disutility weight ³ 0.62 Normalized labor input
Inverse wage elasticity of labor supply Ã 0.6 Mendoza (1991), ...
b) Technology
Capital income share ® 0.38 Labor income share
Growth factor g 1.0083 Average output growth
Working capital requirement ' 1 Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
Capital depreciation parameter 1 ± 0.022 I-Y ratio
Capital adjustment cost Ák=2 10 Relative investment volatility
Portfolio adjustment cost Ád=2 0.09 Trade balance volatility
Saving interest rate ceiling ¹ R 1:020:25 International riskless rate
c) Technology Shock Process
Persistence of TFP shock ½A 0.95 Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
Standard deviation of TFP shock ¾A 0.022 Output volatility
d) Interest Rate Shock Process
See Table 2.1 of the main text.
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2.7.6 Other Tables and Figures
Table 2.7: Simulation Results in Benchmark Model: Alternative Detrending
Methods
Linear Trend HP-Filter
Data Model Data Model
a) Standard Deviations
Output std(^ y) 0.086 0.068 0.042 0:041
(0.040,0.100) (0.027,0.055)
Consumption std(^ c)=std(^ y) 1.07 1.03 1.17 1.11
(0.87,1.18) (0.96,1.26)
Investment std(^ x)=std(^ y) 3.15 2.85 3.26 3:08
(2.44,3.29) (2.68,3.50)
b) Cross-Correlations with ^ y
Consumption corr(^ c; ^ y) 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95
(0.92,0.97) (0.92,0.97)
Investment corr(^ x; ^ y) 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.95
(0.90,0.97) (0.92,0.97)
Trade balance to GDP corr(nx=y; ^ y) ¡0:76 ¡0:50¤ ¡0:67 ¡0:51
(-0.73,-0.24) (-0.70,0.15)
c) Cross-Correlations with R
Output corr(^ y;R) ¡0:65 ¡0:79 ¡0:55 ¡0:65
(-0.93,-0.62) (-0.80,-0.47)
Consumption corr(^ c;R) ¡0:68 ¡0:84 ¡0:54 ¡0:67
(-0.95,-0.68) (-0.84,-0.48)
Investment corr(^ x;R) ¡0:63 ¡0:85¤ ¡0:50 ¡0:68
(-0.95,-0.71) (-0.84,-0.48)
For the HP ¯lter, a smoothing parameter of 1600 was used. Numbers in parenthesis are 10%
and 90% quantiles. An asterisk denotes that the corresponding data moment does not lie within
these quantiles.







This chapter uses a dynamic small open economy model of business cycles with
¯nancial frictions to explore how macroeconomic °uctuations are ampli¯ed and
transmitted across borders when frictions in ¯nancial intermediation entail pro-
cyclicality in credit conditions. I ¯nd that the procyclical behavior of lending
standards ampli¯es shocks to fundamentals beyond the e®ect attributable to the
¯nancial accelerator mechanism. I interpret this extra ampli¯cation in the model
as resulting from the interaction of ¯nancial constraints in the lending and in the
borrowing side of ¯nancial intermediation. Asset prices play a crucial role in the
propagation mechanism as procyclical lending standards reinforce their \overreac-
tion" to shocks signaled by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999). Simulation results suggest
the potential for sizeable stabilization gains from \macro-prudential" regulation
aimed at containing the procyclical behavior of credit conditions.
95
Gruss, Bertrand (2010), Financial Factors, Rare Disasters and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/21960Chapter 3. Procyclical Lending Standards and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 96
3.1 Introduction
The global ¯nancial crisis triggered by creditworthiness problems in the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage market in mid-2007 has unveiled pervasive interlinkings between
the ¯nancial system and the real economy, both within and across borders. The
large bill due to the crisis in terms of employment, investment and output around
the globe has opened the debate on the need to adjust ¯nancial regulation, in par-
ticular in its macro-prudential dimension. Changes in measured risk, the spread
use of mark-to-market valuation in risk management practices and the fast inno-
vation in ¯nancial instruments have been signaled as important factors behind the
procyclical behavior of lending standards, and in particular for the relaxation of
standards and the acceleration of credit growth in the period leading up to the
crisis. This chapter uses a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE
hereafter) of business cycles with ¯nancial frictions to explore how the procyclical
behavior of lending standards gets transmitted to asset prices and the real econ-
omy, how it a®ects the propagation of shocks and what are its implications in
terms of macroeconomic volatility.
Asset price dynamics are placed at the core of credit cycles and macro-¯nancial
linkages. The rise in asset prices in the upturn of cycles (e.g. due an increase in
productivity and pro¯ts) gets translated into increases in the net worth of borrow-
ers. In the presence of frictions between ¯nancial intermediaries and borrowers,
this also implies the rise in the value of collateral and the possibility to expand
credit, resulting in procyclical lending. The role of borrowers' balance sheets (or
their \creditworthiness") in amplifying or generating cycles in macro models has
been amply studied in the literature (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Kiyotaki
and Moore 1997 and Aiyagari and Gertler 1999). However, °uctuations in asset
prices also a®ect the asset side of ¯nancial intermediaries' balance sheets, and
hence their creditworthiness. Although the ¯nancial dynamics of their balance
sheet expansions and contractions, the implication in terms of lending standards
and the link with the business cycle have been receiving increasing attention in the
empirical literature,1 the role of leverage cycles in macro models has been much
less explored. The main contribution of this chapter is to explore how business
cycles are ampli¯ed and transmitted within the economy and across borders when
1See for example Bayoumi and Melander (2008), Adrian and Shin (2010) and Adrian et al.
(2010a).
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frictions in ¯nancial intermediation entail procyclicality in lending standards.2
The macroeconomic implications of changes in the value of assets held by ¯nancial
intermediaries depend on whether they adjust the liabilities side of their balance
sheets and on the reaction of their creditors. Under a passive attitude, a negative
relationship between the market value of their assets and the leverage ratio (i.e.
the ratio of assets to own capital) would emerge, as it is the traditional ¯nding
for households, and there would be little e®ects in terms of aggregate credit or
other macro variables. However, this seems not to be the usual behavior of ¯-
nancial intermediaries. According to evidence in Adrian and Shin (2010) ¯nancial
institutions manage actively their balance sheets in response to changes in prices
and measured risk: commercial banks show almost constant leverage ratios over
the cycle and market-based ¯nancial institutions (e.g. investment banks, hedge
funds, etc.) display \procyclical" leverage, in the sense that during expansions
both assets and leverage rise. This is consistent with the extended use of value-
at-risk rules (VaR hereafter) by institutions and regulators, and with maximizing
the return on equity in the context of an implicit maximum leverage permitted
by creditors.3 In this context, when asset prices are rising and measured risk is
decreasing, ¯nancial intermediaries ¯nd themselves with excess capital. The way
of adjusting, consistent with maximizing return on equity and VaR rules, is by
expanding their balance sheets: on their liabilities side, issuing more sort-term
debt and, on the assets side, expanding credit, that is, searching for potential
borrowers. With good borrowers already served, the expansion of balance sheets
of the ¯nancial sector as a whole is only possible by relaxing lending standards
(e.g. requiring less collateral) and extending credit to projects that were previ-
ously denied access. In the downswing, the opposite happens.4. On aggregate,
this balance sheet management by individual ¯nancial institutions contributes to
the procyclical behavior of lending standards and credit. Other factors signaled
in the literature as inducing procyclicality in lending standards include incentive
2Along this chapter, \lending standards" refer to any of the various non-price terms speci-
¯ed in a line of credit or loan, such as collateral requirements, covenants, loan limits, etc. In
the models outlined later, lending standards refer more precisely to the degree pledgeability of
collateral (or \collateral price" as referred in Kiyotaki and Moore 2002).
3See Adrian and Shin (2008b) for a theory of ¯nancial leverage as a function of the shift in
the risks inherent un the underlying environment.
4The same cyclical behavior emerges as creditors of ¯nancial intermediaries change the im-
plicit maximum leverage permitted due to, for example, changes in measured risk. As creditors
reduce \haircuts" on instruments such as repurchase agreements (\repos"), ¯nancial institu-
tions face a rise in the implicit maximum leverage permitted in collateralized borrowing (among
institutions or with ultimate non-¯nancial creditors).
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problems, herd behavior, accounting rules, etc.5 In turn, this cyclical behavior of
credit standards has aggregate e®ects on asset prices and on macroeconomic ag-
gregates (Brunnermeier et al. 2009 and Adrian et al. 2010a), and on international
capital °ows (Shin 2009).
To explore the implications of cycles in lending standards I use a dynamic one-
good small open economy model in which domestic agents face time-varying col-
lateral constraints that limit their ability to leverage foreign debt on domestic
asset holdings. The presence of ¯nancial frictions is a crucial ingredient: In a
Modigliani-Miller world leverage would be irrelevant. Although I do not model
the ¯nancial intermediation sector explicitly, the constraint linking borrowers and
creditors in the model suggests frictions at both ends of ¯nancial intermediation:
As in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Aiyagari and
Gertler (1999), limited enforcement caps the amount that intermediaries are will-
ing to lend to a fraction of the market value of borrowers's assets. But di®erently
from those models, the fraction imposing a ceiling on the leverage ratio of ulti-
mate borrowers is not ¯xed but varies over the cycle. I interpret those variations as
tightening (easing) in lending standards due for instance to contractions (expan-
sions) of aggregate balance sheets of ¯nancial intermediaries, that is, to variations
in ¯nancial market liquidity. The purpose of allowing the tightness of collateral
constraints to vary over time is to combine, in a simple way, a credit supply channel
as sketched in Adrian and Shin (2009) with the borrower's creditworthiness chan-
nel in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). I ¯nd that
the procyclical behavior of lending standards ampli¯es shocks to fundamentals
beyond the e®ect attributable to the ¯nancial accelerator mechanism. I interpret
this extra ampli¯cation as resulting from the interaction of ¯nancial constraints
in the lending and in the borrowing side of ¯nancial intermediation. The prop-
agation mechanism operates through asset prices: procyclical lending standards
reinforce the \overreaction" of asset prices to shocks signaled by Aiyagari and
Gertler (1999). Moreover, the ampli¯cation e®ect is found to be bigger the more
leveraged the economy is on average.
While there seems to be a consensus on the fact that ¯nancial systems are in-
herently subject to cycles, it is not yet clear how policymakers and regulators
should intervene to mitigate these cyclical e®ects. In policy circles, the main focus
5See for instance Borio et al. (2001) and Jim¶ enez and Saurina (2006).
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is placed on reforming ¯nancial regulation and on coordinating micro-prudential
(i.e. institution-level) regulation with macro-prudential (i.e. system-wide) regu-
lation.6 Some of the proposed modi¯cations include changes to mark-to-market
procedures, the implementation of countercyclical capital charges and longer hori-
zons for loan loss provisions. Understanding better the macro-¯nancial linkages in
the economy, within and across countries, is crucial for this discussion. Although
the model used in this chapter is highly stylized, it contributes to the policy debate
by exploring what can be the stabilizing e®ects of implementing policies aimed at
lowering the degree of procyclicality in lending standards. In this sense, the re-
sults from the model simulations suggest the potential for sizable gains in terms
of macroeconomic volatility from introducing some \macro-prudential" regulation
that reduces the procyclicality of credit standards. For instance, a reduction in the
correlation of the loan-to-value ratio with output from 0.45 to 0.25 in the model is
associated with a drop in the volatility or real consumption of approximately one
fourth. Also, the procyclical behavior of lending standards is found to contribute
signi¯cantly to the persistence of business °uctuations.
This chapter is related to a recent macroeconomic literature with ¯nancial frictions
incorporating perturbations that originate in the ¯nancial sector of the economy.
Benk et al. (2005) introduce credit shocks in a monetary business cycle model
with a cash-in-advance constraint and suggest that these shocks contributed sig-
ni¯cantly to US GDP movements. Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) interpret variations
to the amount of equity holdings that entrepreneurs can resell as liquidity shocks
and study how these a®ect aggregate output and asset prices in a monetary model.
Focusing on the cyclical properties of ¯rms' equity and debt payouts, Jermann and
Quadrini (2009) use a model in which the ¯rms' ability to borrow is limited by
enforcement constraints and the tightness of the friction is subject to random dis-
turbances, which are interpreted as shocks a®ecting directly the ¯nancial sector of
the economy. Gruss and Sgherri (2009) also introduce °uctuations in the tightness
of borrowing limits but on households debt and in the context of a two-country
two-good model. Similar to this chapter, the focus is on the procyclical behavior
of leverage limits and its e®ect on the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and
external imbalances. In this chapter the model is kept very parsimonious as it
is meant mainly to explore the transmission mechanism. As in all the mentioned
6See for example Borio et al. (2001) and Brunnermeier et al. (2009).
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studies, the model treats ¯nancial intermediaries largely as a veil. Gertler and Kiy-
otaki (2010), instead, incorporate ¯nancial intermediaries explicitly and assumes
that the quality of their assets follows an exogenous process to introduce °uctu-
ations in their balance sheets. The model assumes a ¯nancial friction between
intermediaries (inter-bank market) and with depositors, but the relationship with
ultimate non-¯nancial borrowers is frictionless. Instead, I interpret the presence of
collateral constraints with cyclical tightening of margins in the model as deriving
form frictions at both ends of ¯nancial intermediation, as suggested in Adrian and
Shin (2010).
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the empirical ev-
idence on the cyclical behavior of lending standards and the link with business
cycles. Section 3.3 develops a small open economy model with procyclical lend-
ing standards and Section 3.4 shows the results of several numerical experiments
aimed at exploring the implications of such behavior of lending standards on asset
prices and real variables. Section 3.5 draws conclusions and highlights lines for
future research.
3.2 Empirical Evidence on Lending Standards
In this section I review evidence from the empirical literature on the procyclical
behavior of credit conditions and its implications for asst prices and macroeco-
nomic variables, for di®erent countries and periods. Several empirical studies have
been looking into the cyclical behavior of capital bu®ers of ¯nancial institutions,
aggregate liquidity and lending standards, and their relationship with aggregate
°uctuations. There seems to be conclusive evidence that credit conditions not
only vary over the cycle but also behave procyclically and that this behavior
has aggregate implications for asset prices and real activity. One explanation for
that cyclical behavior relies on information asymmetries between borrowers and
lenders.7 Other many studies identify changes in aggregate credit conditions with
balance sheet management by ¯nancial intermediaries, due for instance to the pre-
scriptions of internal risk-management models, to risk-sensitive capital regulations
7In a setting where banks obtain private information about their clients' creditworthiness,
Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) show that banks may loosen lending standards when informa-
tion asymmetries vis-µ a-vis other banks are low.
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(e.g. prescriptions in Basel II) or to the use of backward-looking loan-loss provi-
sion practices.8
Adrian and Shin (2009) make emphasis on the fact that a substantial fraction
of the ¯nancial system is composed of highly leveraged intermediaries that fund
themselves using market instruments, such as repurchase agreements (\repos" and
\reverse repos") and that hold assets that are marked-to-market and are then very
sensitive to variations in asset prices and in measured risk. They argue that the
procyclical behavior of the ¯nancial system is then due to frictions in the supply
of credit. Adrian and Shin (2010) document that ¯nancial intermediaries manage
their balance sheets actively in such a way that their leverage ratio is procyclical,
i.e. high during booms and low during busts. Speci¯cally, instead of adjusting
equity, they react to changes in asset prices that a®ect their net worth and to
changes in measured risk by issuing more short-term debt and accumulating more
assets. This is consistent with their models of risk and in particular with the use
of VaR rules, which dictate adjusting exposures continuously so that the proba-
bility of default is kept constant. Indeed, Adrian and Shin (2010) show evidence
suggesting that measures of VaR explain shifts in total assets, leverage and key
components on the liability side of the balance sheet, such as stock of repos. Adrian
and Shin (2008a, 2009) ¯nd that the procyclicality of leverage is much clearer for
market-based intermediaries (such as security dealers and brokers) than for the
case of commercial banks and highlight the importance of those institutions and,
more broadly, of the \shadow banking" (including asset-backed securities issuers,
¯nance companies and funding corporations), in conveying information on the
credit conditions ruling in the economy.
Ayuso et al. (2004) ¯nd a signi¯cant negative relationship between business cycle
and banks' capital bu®ers in Spain from 1986 to 2000. Given that they focus their
attention on voluntary capital bu®ers, they argue that the cyclical pattern is due
to factors which are beyond the inherent features of risk-sensitive bank capital
regulation, such as Basel II. Also for the Spanish economy but using loan-by-loan
information from 1984 to 2002, Jim¶ enez and Saurina (2006) show that collateral
requirements are relaxed during boom periods while the opposite happens during
recessions. Asea and Blomberg (1998) look at the contract terms of loans granted
8See Borio et al. (2001) for a discussion of the role of risk measurement by individual insti-
tutions and its implications for systemic risk and aggregate conditions.
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by U.S. banks from 1977 to 1993 and ¯nd that there is a systematic tendency
for lending standards to vary over the business cycle: during the upswing of the
cycle the risk premia banks charge on loans decreases, loan size increases and the
probability of requiring higher collateral decreases; the opposite occurs during the
downswing of the cycle.
Adrian and Shin (2008a) and Adrian et al. (2010a) provide evidence that the
procyclical behavior of ¯nancial intermediaries' leverage has an impact on aggre-
gate ¯nancial conditions and in real economic outcomes, especially on components
of GDP that are particularly sensitive to credit supply. Adrian et al. (2010a) high-
light the relevance of asset prices and the market risk premia in the transmission
mechanism. Consistent with this evidence and using data from the U.S., Bayoumi
and Melander (2008) document that during periods when the capital-asset ratio
is increasing there is a net easing of lending standards (i.e. an increase in credit
supply given borrower characteristics). They also ¯nd that a tightening of loan
standards causes the quantity of credit e®ectively to decline. Lown and Morgan
(2006) use survey data on credit standards from U.S. banks and ¯nd that commer-
cial credit standards are highly signi¯cant in predicting commercial bank loans,
real GDP and inventory investment. Their variance decomposition results indi-
cate that innovations in lending standards account for nearly a third of the error
variance in output at 1 year horizon, more than the fraction attributable directly
to the federal funds rate.
There is evidence of procyclicality in ¯nancial conditions also in studies using
cross country data. For example, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) have examined the
dynamics of both macro aggregates and ¯rm-speci¯c ¯nancial indicators during
\credit boom" episodes. Using cross-country data for 48 industrial and emerg-
ing countries from 1960 to 2006, they ¯nd that credit booms are associated with
periods of economic expansion, rising equity and housing prices, and widening ex-
ternal de¯cits. Evidence of procyclicality also shows up from ¯rm level data: the
credit boom|and the macroeconomic upswing that accompany them|coincide
with higher leverage, ¯rm value and use of external ¯nancing by ¯rms. Bank data
too appear consistent with procyclical lending standards: ratios of capital ade-
quacy and non-performing loans seem to decrease during credit booms.
Gruss and Sgherri (2009) also present evidence on the behavior of ¯rms' leverage,
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using data from 16 advanced and 12 emerging European economies over the pe-
riod from January 1999 until April 2008. The evidence from that sample con¯rms,
¯rst, that ¯rms' leverage ratios vary substantially over the cycle. Next, and rely-
ing on ¯nancial condition indices constructed by means of country-speci¯c vector
autoregression models and corresponding impulse responses functions, they ¯nd
that changes in ¯nancial conditions account for a large fraction of the variation in
GDP growth, especially in the emerging countries in the sample. Also, a higher
degree of procyclicality in ¯rms' leverage is found to be associated with higher
volatility in private investment. Finally, evidence in Gruss and Sgherri (2009)
suggest that changes in ¯rms' borrowing tend to be more sensitive to changes in
asset prices in those economies where ¯rms leverage co-moves more closely with
the business cycle, which can be interpreted as economies where the ¯nancial fric-
tions are stronger.
Although evidence of procyclicality on lending conditions is also found for periods
excluding the recent ¯nancial crisis,9 the explosive growth in securitization that
modi¯ed the model of ¯nancial intermediaries from \risk warehousing" to \orig-
inating and distributing" has been signaled as a factor accentuating relaxation
of standards in the last credit cycle. Keys et al. (2010) ¯nd that securitization
practices in the U.S. subprime market did adversely a®ect the screening standards
of lenders: loans more likely to be securitized default 20% more than similar risk
pro¯le loans with lower likelihood of securitization. Mian and Su¯ (2009) use de-
tailed ZIP code-level data from the U.S. and argue that the rise in securitization
of subprime mortgages represented an outward shift in mortgage credit by lenders,
which came along with the relaxation of earlier credit-rationing constraints.
Regarding the international implications of ¯nancial factors, some authors claim
that the expansion of ¯nancial intermediaries' balance sheets and the growing
use of securitization had a signi¯cant impact on international capital °ows. Shin
(2009) argue that the increased leverage of the ¯nancial system in the U.S., fu-
eled by securitization, exacerbated global imbalances. He shows evidence that
foreign central banks have been a particularly important funding source for resi-
dential mortgage lending in the United States. Shin (2009) argues that the fact
that the greatest increase in foreign holdings of U.S. debt securities has been on
9For example Adrian et al. (2010a) repeat their estimations with data up to the crisis and the
results are similar. Other studies, such as Bayoumi and Melander (2008) and Lown and Morgan
(2006), use data prior to the crisis.
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asset-backed securities issued by private label securitization vehicles suggests an
alternative \supply push" perspective to global imbalance that complements the
\savings glut" hypothesis.10
3.3 A Small Open Economy Model
In this section I use a production small open economy model with ¯nancial fric-
tions, similar to the one in Kocherlakota (2000), to analyze how the ampli¯cation
of business cycles is a®ected when lending standards vary over the cycle. Output
is produced using a constant returns to scale technology, using a durable good in
¯x supply (for example, land or real estate) and a durable good in variable sup-
ply (that I call capital). The economy is populated by a continuum of identical,





t lnct , 0 < ¯ < 1 (3.1)
where ct denotes consumption and ¯ is the subjective discount factor. The budget
constraint faced by the representative agent is:
ct + qt (Lt+1 ¡ Lt) + (1 + r)dt + kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt = dt+1 + yt , (3.2)
where Lt denotes the individual holdings of the asset in ¯xed supply (land), qt is
its relative price in terms of the consumption good, kt denotes holdings of capital




where At is stochastic total factor productivity (TFP) and 0 < ® < 1. Financial
markets are incomplete: dt+1 is the amount of non-contingent debt issued at t and
r is the real interest rate the economy faces in international markets, taken as
given by individual agents and assumed constant for simplicity. As will be clear
later, the values assumed for ¯ and r will imply that the small open economy is
relatively impatient in comparison to international markets.
In the production function land is combined with another durable good (capi-
tal) instead of labor, so that agents have an additional instrument, besides debt,
10See, for example, Caballero et al. (2008).
Gruss, Bertrand (2010), Financial Factors, Rare Disasters and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/21960Chapter 3. Procyclical Lending Standards and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 105
that is subject to ¯nancial frictions, to transfer resources across periods.11 How-
ever and in order to focus on the main transmission mechanisms, the model is kept
as parsimonious as possible, so it does not include capital adjustment costs.
Financial frictions. The world credit market is assumed to be imperfect: Due
to an inability to commit to repayment, agents in the small open economy need to
guarantee their debt by o®ering the domestic assets as collateral. The collateral
credit constraint takes the form of the margin requirement proposed by Aiyagari
and Gertler (1999) and used in a small open economy context by Kocherlakota
(2000) and Mendoza (2010), among others. As in Kocherlakota (2000), Iacoviello
(2005) and Mendoza and Smith (2006), the asset used for collateral is in ¯x supply.
Speci¯cally, the endogenous credit constraint that agents face is given by:
dt+1 · 'tqtLt+1 (3.3)
where 't determines the maximum amount that can be borrowed for a given value
of collateral at time t, imposing a ceiling on the loan-to-value ratio (\LTV ratio"
hereafter). The maximum leverage of the borrower, that is, the ratio of assets to
net worth, is given by 1=(1 ¡ 't). The \collateral price" of the asset is a fraction
of the market price of the asset, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2002), but here
it is assumed to be time varying.
Evidence in Adrian and Shin (2010) and Adrian et al. (2010a) suggests the pres-
ence of ¯nancial frictions in the funding side of ¯nancial intermediation; that is,
between ¯nancial intermediaries and between ¯nancial institutions and ultimate
non-¯nancial lenders. According to the authors, changes in underlying conditions
such as measured risk, asset prices, the opportunity cost of funds, etc. translate
into variations in their ability to leverage their liabilities into assets and ultimately
into changes in the aggregate supply of credit. Shifts in the size of ¯nancial inter-
mediaries' balance sheets and in aggregate credit supply come along with changes
in the quality of the marginal credits, implying variations in lending standards
(Bayoumi and Melander 2008).
I integrate this friction in the model, in an admittedly crude way, by allowing
11Production is similar then to Kocherlakota (2000) but relaxing the full depreciation assump-
tion.
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the ceiling on the leverage ratio of borrowers 1=(1 ¡ 't) to vary over time. In
this sense, an increase in 't implies a higher allowed leverage for the borrower:
lenders would allow more borrowing for any given value of collateral. What I am
trying to capture in a simple way is an exogenous force, possibly correlated with
the business cycle, that a®ects credit supply for any given level of net worth of
borrowers. As a starting point, I simply assume that TFP and the LTV ratio
jointly follow a ¯rst-order bivariate autoregressive process in the neighborhood of
the constant unconditional mean ( ¹ A and ¹ '). In this sense, the approach is similar
to other models that introduce shocks that are interpreted as originated in the
¯nancial sector, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) and Jermann and Quadrini
(2009), among others. More precisely, I assume:
Ã
ln(At) ¡ ln( ¹ A)







ln(At¡1) ¡ ln( ¹ A)








where the vector of shocks ²t = (²A;t;²';t)0 follows a bivariate normal distribution









Equilibrium Given initial values of debt, capital and land holdings, the rep-
resentative Household-Firm problem is to choose sequences fct;kt+1;dt+1;Lt+1g,
taking qt;'t;At and r as given, in order to maximize (3.1), subject to equations
(3.2) and (3.3). Land is assumed to be in aggregate ¯xed supply and normalized
to one. Imposing this market clearing condition and letting ¹t be the multiplier on
the borrowing constraint, the optimality conditions for the representative agent's
problem include:





t+1 + (1 ¡ ±)
¤
(3.7)
qt [Uc;t ¡ 't¹t] = ¯EtUc;t+1
£





If the borrowing constraint were not binding, ¹t would be zero and Equation (3.6)
would be a standard Euler equation for debt. However, given the assumptions on
the subjective discount factor ¯ and the international interest rate r, in a deter-
ministic steady state ¹ is strictly greater than zero and, hence, (3.3) holds with
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equality. The extent to which this is also the case in a stochastic equilibrium (i.e.
outside the steady state) mainly depends on the size of the gap between ¯ and
1 + r and the variance of the shocks hitting the economy. In this chapter, as in
Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Jermann and Quadrini (2009)
among others, the variability of shocks is kept \small enough" relative to the de-
gree of impatience and the model is solved by linearizing around the steady state
with a binding collateral constraint.12
The presence of the ¯nancial friction implies, from Equation (3.6), that agents
in the domestic economy always face an endogenous external ¯nancing premium
on the e®ective (i.e. shadow) real interest rate at which they borrow. This can be








As long as the economy is constrained (i.e. ¹t > 0), the e®ective interest rate
(1+r)
1¡¹t=Uc;t is higher than (1 + r). The higher e®ective interest rate re°ects the fact
that, at the prevailing interest rate (1+r), agents in the domestic economy would
like to borrow more than they are actually allowed to.













where ¤t;t+1 = ¯Uc;t+1=(Uc;t ¡ 't¹t) is the stochastic discount factor and rL
t =
(1¡®)Atk®
t is the marginal product of land. The valuation of the asset corresponds
to the discounted °ow of future returns.13
12In the quantitative exercises in the next sections I check that indeed the value of the multiplier
¹t is always positive.
13Note that ¤t;t+1 includes both the multiplier ¹t and the LTV ratio 't, none of which would
appear in a frictionless model.
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3.3.1 The Role of Asset Prices and Excess Returns
To understand the role of asset prices in shaping equilibrium dynamics, it is useful
to derive an expression for excess returns (i.e. risk premium) in this model and
explore how it is a®ected by the fact that the economy is ¯nancially constrained
and that the tightness of the constraint (i.e. the LTV ratio) varies over time. The







. Using the Euler equations
for bonds and land we can express the excess return on land holdings (relative to
the real interest rate on international debt) as:
Et(R
L





¹t (1 ¡ 't)
¯EtUc;t+1
(3.10)
If the collateral constraint is binding (¹t > 0), then there is a positive wedge
between the equity premium in this economy and the \fundamental" one|that
is, the one that would prevail in a frictionless environment. Indeed, if the col-
lateral constraint is not binding (¹t = 0), then Equation (3.10) would reduce to
¡cov(Uc;t+1;RL
t+1)
EtUc;t+1 , which is the standard excess return corresponding to a frictionless
asset-pricing model, the \fundamental" risk premium (Aiyagari and Gertler 1999).
In turn, the behavior of excess returns, and of the wedge to its \fundamental"
expression, a®ects asset prices. Taking expectations on the return on land hold-
ings RL














where the sequence fEt(RL
t+1+j)g1
j=0 is given by (3.10). It should thus be clear
that an increase of excess returns at period t (or at any other time in the future)
would increase the rate at which future dividends are discounted, thereby lowering
the price of the asset at period t.
The behavior of excess returns (as well as the one of the wedge between the actual
and the \fundamental" risk premium) plays an important role in the dynamics of
the model. As Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Mendoza and Smith (2006) point
out, the behavior of the equity premium is a®ected both directly and indirectly
by the presence of ¯nancial market frictions. A binding collateral constraint in
the current period a®ects directly the wedge between the \fundamental" and the
Gruss, Bertrand (2010), Financial Factors, Rare Disasters and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/21960Chapter 3. Procyclical Lending Standards and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 109
actual equity premium, as indicated by the second term of equation (3.10). For
example, a tighter borrowing constraint (higher ¹t) in period t originated by a
drop in productivity that lowers asset prices would reinforce such a drop by push-
ing up the risk premium. Regarding the indirect e®ect, the probability that the
constraint will be binding in the future a®ects the covariance expression in the
¯rst term of equation (3.10). The possibility of a tighter borrowing constraint in
period t + 1 is likely to reduce (i.e., make more negative) the covariance with the
marginal utility of consumption in t + 1. In other words, the more stringent the
borrowing constraint, the bigger the drop in consumption at t+1 (i.e., the rise in
Uc;t+1) associated with a given fall in the ex-post return on equity.
The presence of e®ects due to ¯nancial frictions can hence amplify °uctuations
of the equity premium and, thereby, of equity prices, as it was shown by Aiyagari
and Gertler (1999). What is new in this model is that this phenomenon may be
potentially a®ected by °uctuations in lending standards (i.e. in 't). In the fol-
lowing sections I analyze how time-varying lending standards a®ect the reaction
of asset prices and the ampli¯cation of shocks relying on numerical experiments.
3.3.2 Parameter Values and Solution Method
To perform numerical experiments with the model it is necessary to assign values
to 10 parameters. Most of them are standard preference and technology param-
eters for which I use reasonably conventional values, reported in Table 3.5. The
period in the model is a year. The parameter ¹ A is set to normalize output to one
in the non-stochastic steady state. The rate of time preference is assumed to be
bigger than the gross international real interest rate (1+ r < 1=¯). Given this as-
sumption, in a deterministic steady state ¹ is strictly greater than zero and, hence,
Equation 3.3 holds with equality and the economy is a net debtor in international
markets.
The only parameters speci¯c to my model are the ones related to the law of mo-
tion of the LTV ratio: ¹ ', ½', ¾' and cov(A;')|or, equivalently, the correlation
between innovations to TFP and the LTV ratio, that I denote ½(A;'). Regarding
the long-run mean of the LTV ratio (¹ '), I use a range of values from 0.3 to 0.7 (see
Table 3.5) that imply a ceiling on the leverage ratio of ultimate borrowers ranging
from 1.4 to 3.3. As a reference, Calza et al. (2007) consider LTV ratios ranging
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from 50% to 90% to analyze the e®ect of di®erent institutional characteristics of
mortgage markets, 50% being the LTV ratio estimated for the Italian market.
Jermann and Quadrini (2009) report that the average LTV ratio for non¯nancial
companies over the period 1984 to 2008 is 0.46. Mendoza (2010) uses values of 0.2
and 0.3 for the LTV ratio.
The persistence parameter of the LTV ratio ½' is set to 0.6, the same than for
productivity shocks. I also report the results when shocks to TFP and to lend-
ing standards are iid. The standard deviation of innovations to the LTV ratio
(¾') is set to 5%, 2.5 times bigger than the standard deviation of innovations to
productivity. The correlation of innovations to TFP and the LTV ratio, ½(A;'), is
a key parameter for the policy experiment explained later in Section 3.4.3. For
this parameter I use a range of values from 0.8 to 0. These parameter values are
overall consistent with the empirical evidence in Section 3.2 and with estimates in
Jermann and Quadrini (2009).14
Numerical solution technique. The methods are familiar: The model is
solved by log-linearizing the equations characterizing the equilibrium around the
deterministic steady state (with Equation 3.3 holding with equality) and by solv-
ing the resulting system of linear di®erence equations to obtain the policy func-
tions. As explained above, the parameters imply that the collateral constraint is
assumed to be binding in the steady state. This implies that the ampli¯cation
created by the ¯nancial friction is symmetric and is always present (like, for ex-
ample, in Iacoviello 2005, Iacoviello and Neri 2010, Calza et al. 2007 and Jermann
and Quadrini 2009).15
14Jermann and Quadrini (2009) estimate a ¯rst-order bivariate autoregressive process for pro-
ductivity and ¯nancial shocks, where the ¯nancial shock series is constructed using a model's
optimality conditions. Using quarterly data, the estimated autocorrelation parameters of the
shocks are 0.93 and 0.97 respectively, the o®-diagonal elements are found to be close to zero, the
estimated standard deviation of ¯nancial innovations are 2.5 bigger than the one of productivity
innovations and the estimated correlation of shock innovations is 0.36.
15Note that if the focus were on the e®ect of occasionally-binding constraints, as it is the case
in Mendoza (2010), this solution technique would probably lead to a poor approximation, as it
would fail to capture the non-linear dynamics produced when the economy switches from a state
in which the constraint does not bind to a state in which it binds.
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3.4 Quantitative Analysis
3.4.1 The Usual Financial Accelerator Mechanism
Before introducing °uctuations in lending standards, this section shows the re-
sponse of the model when the leverage ratio does not vary over time. The ampli-
¯cation of shocks due to ¯nancial frictions such as in (3.3) when the LTV ratio
is a ¯xed parameter has been widely analyzed in the literature (some examples
include Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997, 2002 and Kocher-
lakota 2000). In this section I analyze the workings of the ¯nancial accelerator
mechanism in the context of this model.
Figure 3.1 shows the reaction of consumption, investment, output, debt, net
exports-to-GDP and asset prices to a negative 1% productivity shock. The di®er-
ent lines in each plot correspond to di®erent ¹ ' values, that is, di®erent long-run
averages for the LTV ratio, ranging from 0.3 to 0.7. The ¯rst result to notice
is that the more leveraged the economy is (i.e. the higher ¹ '), the stronger the
response of asset prices and real variables to the shock. The drop in debt in the
period following the shock re°ects the decreased ability to rollover debt due to the
drop in the market value of the collateral after the productivity decline. While ^ dt
is slightly higher than ¡0:2% when ¹ ' = 0:3, it drops by almost 0.6%, three times
more, when ¹ ' = 0:7.16 The counterpart of the sudden inability to rollover debt
is the capital out°ows captured by the reaction of net exports-to-GDP: The trade
balance jumps up by 1% when the long-run leverage is low (¹ ' = 0:3), while the
same shock to productivity triggers a 5% increase in net experts-to-GDP when the
economy is highly leveraged (¹ ' = 0:7). The response on impact of consumption is
of slightly less than 0.8% when the long-run LTV ratio is 0.3, but it is twice as big
(1.6%) when ¹ ' is 0.7. The greater out°ows under a high leverage setting are rela-
tively more absorbed by investment in physical capital than by consumption: the
drop in investment is around four times bigger when ¹ ' = 0:7 than when ¹ ' = 0:3,
while this ratio for consumption is only two.17 The drop in output re°ects ¯rst
the drop in productivity and then the decrease in the capital stock; ^ yt reaches a
minimum of ¡1% when ¹ ' = 0:3 and of ¡1:6% when ¹ ' = 0:7.
16Variables with hat denote log deviations from their steady state value.
17The model does not include capital adjustment costs. The presence of such costs would
have implied a higher cost for smoothing consumption, leading to a bigger relative drop in
consumption.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Responses to Productivity Shock.
Responses to a 1% negative shock to TFP under di®erent values for the long-run
LTV ratio (¹ '). All the responses are expressed in percentage deviation from the
steady state value, except for the net exports-to-GDP ratio that is in percentage
points.
Excess Returns and Asset Prices. In the model the negative shock to income
cannot be smoothed out by borrowing because the drop in the asset price implies
a reduction in the market value of the collateral and the consequent reduction
in the borrowing capacity of the constrained economy. The drop in productivity
a®ects the asset price directly because it a®ects actual dividends and the expected
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Figure 3.2: Excess Returns and Asset prices
Response of excess returns (equity premium) and asset prices to a 1% negative
shock to TFP under di®erent values for the long-run LTV ratio (¹ ').
°ow of future dividends (given that the shock is persistent).18 But the shock also
a®ects the asset price because of the ¯nancial friction in the economy. This e®ect,
described as \overreaction" of asset prices to shocks in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999)
and explained in Section 3.3.1, can in principle have di®erent intensities for low
and high leveraged economies. Table 3.1 reports the steady state values of excess
Table 3.1: Steady State Values
Loan-to-Value (¹ ') 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Excess Returns (%) 3.29 2.82 2.35 1.88 1.41
Asset Price 6.87 7.33 7.88 8.51 9.24
returns and the asset price for di®erent values of the long-run LTV ratio (¹ '). The
steady state level of excess returns is lower the higher ¹ ', while the opposite is
the case for asset prices. Figure 3.2 instead depicts the reaction of excess returns
and asset prices starting from the steady state when the economy is hit by a
1% negative productivity shock. The risk premium drops on impact for the two
lowest values of ¹ ' considered, 0.3 and 0.4, while it increases for the rest. In all
cases the dynamics of the risk premium lay above the steady state level after the
¯rst period. While the steady state level of excess returns is decreasing in ¹ ', its
response to productivity shocks is stronger for higher average LTV levels. For all
the values of ¹ ' considered, the asset price decreases on impact when productivity
18In Section 3.4.4 I repeat the exercise assuming iid shocks. Interestingly, the response of asset
prices to productivity shocks is very persistent even when the shock is iid.
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declines. The size of the decrease is increasing in ¹ ', implying that in this model
the \overreaction" of asset prices is bigger the more leveraged the economy is.
Given the 1% shock to TFP, the asset price drops less than 0.6% from its steady
state value when LTV is 0.3 on average but it drops by 0.8% when ¹ ' = 0:7.
3.4.2 The E®ect of Shifts in Lending Standards
Along the previous section the LTV ratio was introduced as a constant. In this
section instead I explore the response of the model to °uctuations in the LTV ratio.
The empirical evidence cited in Section 3.2 suggests that expansions (contractions)
of ¯nancial intermediaries' balance sheets lead to the easing (tightening) of lending
standards. Although the model is not su±ciently rich to capture precisely this
phenomenon, I interpret shocks to ^ 't as relaxation/tightening in lending standards
due to frictions between the ¯nancial sector and ultimate lenders, as discussed in
Adrian and Shin (2010). Fluctuations in ^ 't can also be interpreted as shocks to
balance sheets of ¯nancial intermediaries due, for example, to changes in measured
risk or to changes in the risk-appetite of investors and in the maximum leverage
they allow to ¯nancial intermediaries.
Figure 3.3 shows impulse responses to a 1% decrease in the LTV ratio, that is,
a tightening in lending standards. The di®erent lines in each plot correspond to
di®erent ¹ ' values. As it was the case for shocks to productivity, the responses
of asset prices and real variables to the shock are stronger when the LTV ratio
°uctuates around a higher long-run level. The drop in debt issued re°ects the
combination of a lower leverage allowed by creditors (the drop in ^ 't) and the drop
in the asset price triggered by the tightening of lending standards. When ¹ ' = 0:3,
the asset price drops to around 0.2% below its steady state value and ^ dt decreases
by 0.4%. Instead, in a highly leveraged economy (¹ ' = 0:7) these drops are ¡0:6%
and ¡1:2% respectively. The tightening in credit conditions forces agents to cut
strongly on investment (between ¡9% and ¡35% depending on the mean leverage
ratio) in order to smooth partly the drop in consumption (between ¡0:2% and
¡1%). The reduction in the capital stock implies a decrease in the marginal
productivity of land and then a lower market value for the collateral, reinforcing
the tightening of the borrowing constraint. Output is not a®ected on impact but
only one period later, due to the reduction in the capital stock induced by a lower
Gruss, Bertrand (2010), Financial Factors, Rare Disasters and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/21960Chapter 3. Procyclical Lending Standards and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 115










































































































































































































































Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to Lending Standards Shock.
Responses to a 1% negative shock to the LTV ratio under di®erent values for the
long-run LTV ratio (¹ '). All the responses are expressed in percentage deviation
from the steady state value, except for the net exports-to-GDP ratio that is in
percentage points.
borrowing limit; under ¹ ' = 0:7 GDP decreases by almost 2% with respect to its
steady state value, one period after the shock.
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Figure 3.4: Excess Returns and Asset Prices
Response of excess returns (risk premium) and asset prices to a 1% negative shock
to the LTV ratio under di®erent values for the long-run LTV ratio (¹ ').
Excess Returns and Asset Prices. Figure 3.4 reports the reaction of excess
returns and the asset price to the shock to lending standards. When 't drops, the
risk premium required by investors goes up and asset prices drop. The response of
both excess returns and the asset price is bigger the higher the long-run leverage
ratio of the economy: The rise in excess returns when ¹ ' = 0:3 is 2%, but it is almost
¯ve times bigger, 10%, when ¹ ' = 0:7. The associated drops in qt are approximately
0.2% and 0.6% respectively. The responses in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show that
the predictions of this simple model to changes in lending conditions attributable
to credit supply shocks is consistent with the evidence put forward by Adrian and
Shin (2010) and reviewed in section 3.2.
Procyclical Lending Standards. What would happen then if lending stan-
dards behaved \procyclically"? We can obtain an intuitive answer by comparing
the responses of the same variables to a productivity shock on one side, and to a
combination of both the productivity shock and the lending standards shock (e.g.
a case in which the innovations to productivity and lending standards are perfectly
correlated) on the other side. The exercise is carried for a middle value of long-run
leverage: ¹ ' is set at 0.5, implying a leverage ratio equal to two. Figure 3.5 reports
the responses of consumption, investment, debt and output under a \¯xed LTV"
ratio (i.e. only productivity shock) and \procyclical LTV" (i.e. under simultane-
ous productivity and lending standards shocks). The fourth graph in Figure 3.5
also depicts the path of ^ At and ^ 't under the \procyclical LTV" case. Both shocks
are assumed to have the same persistence, so under this case lending standards are
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses, Procyclical Lending Standards.
The line labeled \Fixed LTV" corresponds to the responses to a 1% negative pro-
ductivity shock, with 't constant at ¹ ' = 0:5. The \procyclical LTV" corresponds
to the responses to 1% negative shock to both TFP and the LTV ratio.
below its steady state level for exactly as long as productivity is below its long-run
level.19 Interestingly, when lending standards get tightened as productivity drops,
the contraction in debt is almost three times bigger than when the LTV ratio is
unchanged. Consequently, the drops in consumption and investment are much
more accentuated under the procyclical LTV scenario: the decrease in investment
on impact is between two and three times bigger under procyclical standards while
that of consumption is about 50% bigger (¡1:6% versus ¡1:1% under ¯xed LTV).
Figure 3.6 makes clear that the reaction of the risk premium and of asset prices
is bigger under the procyclical LTV case. Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) showed
that the presence of ¯nancial frictions entails an \overreaction" of asset prices to
shocks to fundamentals. The results in Figure 3.6 show that frictions implying
a procyclical behavior of the LTV ratio can further reinforce that overreaction.
19As a robustness exercise, in Section 3.4.4 I report the results under iid shocks.
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Indeed, the reaction of asset prices is almost twice as big under the procyclical
LTV experiment than when the LTV ratio is constant. The procyclical behavior of
lending standards can potentially have important consequences for the volatility
of asset prices and real variables; I explore these implications in the next section.





































































Figure 3.6: Ampli¯ed \Overreaction" of Asset Prices.
The line labeled \Fixed LTV" corresponds to the responses to a 1% negative pro-
ductivity shock, with 't constant at ¹ ' = 0:5. The \procyclical LTV" corresponds
to the responses to 1% negative shock to both TFP and the LTV ratio.
3.4.3 Lending Standards and Macroeconomic Volatility
In this section I analyze the impact of reducing the degree of correlation of lending
standards with the business cycle on the second moments of simulated macroe-
conomic aggregates. The reduction in correlation can be interpreted as the im-
plementation of macro-prudential regulation aimed at reducing procyclicality in
lending standards. The nature of the experiment in this section is the following.
For each combination of the ¯ve values considered for ½(A;') and ¹ ' I simulate 1000
samples of 100 periods, each with a burn-in of 500 periods, and I compute average
unconditional moments across samples.
In Table 3.2 I report moments for a benchmark parametrization ¯xing ¹ ' = 0:5 and
considering values of ½(A;') = f0;0:4;0:8g. Although the model has no growth, the
simulated series are ¯ltered using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter to focus the attention
on the business cycle frequency.20 The volatility of lending standards is 2.32% ir-
respectively of the value of ½(A;'), roughly between 1/3 and 1/2 of the volatility of
20As a robustness check, Table 3.6 reports the results corresponding to un¯ltered data.
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Table 3.2: Simulation Results, HP Filtered Series.
Correlation TFP and LTV: ½(A;') 0 0.4 0.8
a) Standard Deviations
Lending Standards std(') 2.32% 2.32% 2.32%
Output std(y) 5.10% 5.68% 6.16%
Consumption std(c) 3.07% 3.58% 4.01%
Investment std(i) 106% 114% 122%
Asset Price std(q) 2.35% 2.74% 3.06%
b) Cross-Correlations with Output
Lending Standards corr(';y) 0.25 0.36 0.45
Asset Price corr(q;y) 0.47 0.55 0.60
Consumption corr(c;y) 0.50 0.58 0.63
Trade balance to GDP corr(nx=y;y) 0.38 0.31 0.26
c) Cross-Correlations with Asset Prices
Lending Standards corr(';q) 0.81 0.88 0.94
Consumption corr(c;q) 0.99 0.99 0.99
Trade balance to GDP corr(nx=y;q) ¡0:44 ¡0:42 ¡0:41
Notes: All parameters as shown in Table 3.5. The long-run LTV ratio ¹ ' is 0.5.
The series are ¯ltered using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter and a smoothing parameter
equal to 100.
output. Although the correlation of innovations ½(A;') ranges from 0 to 0.8, it is
worth noting that the corresponding correlation of the LTV ratio with output goes
only from 0.25 to 0.45. Fluctuations in 't have important e®ects in asset prices,
as it was clear from the previous section. This is re°ected in simulated series: The
correlation of the LTV ratio with the asset price is 0.81 when ½(A;') = 0 and 0.94
when ½(A;') = 0:8.
What is the gain in terms of macro volatility from reducing ½(A;') gradually from
0.8 to 0? Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.13 provide a visual summary of this experiment.
Figure 3.7 presents the decrease in volatility for consumption, investment, out-
put, foreign debt and net exports-to-GDP ratio, each relative to its own volatility
when the correlation is 0.8, for a given long-run mean of the LTV ratio (¹ ' = 0:5,
implying a leverage ratio of borrowers of 2). The ¯gure shows potential sizeable
gains in terms of volatility of macroeconomic aggregates from reducing the pro-
cyclicality of lending standards. In this sense, reducing the correlation of lending
standards with productivity from 0.8 to 0 leads to a reduction in the volatility of
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consumption of almost 1/4: the volatility of consumption under acyclical lending
standards is about 25% lower than when ½(A;') = 0:8. The same exercise leads
to a reduction in the volatility of output of around 17%. The biggest drop in
volatility is achieved for the net export-to-GDP series, of around 30%. The gains
in terms of macroeconomic volatility are signi¯cant, especially taking into account
that reducing the correlation of the innovations from 0.8 to 0 implies a relatively
modest reduction in the correlation between the LTV ratio and output, from 0.45
to 0.25 (see Table 3.2).21 As a reference, removing the shocks to lending standards
altogether reduces the standard deviation of consumption and output relative to
the 0.8 correlation case by 53% and 36% respectively.





































Figure 3.7: Stabilization Gains from Reducing Procyclicality of 't.
Each plot corresponds to the volatility of the series under di®erent degrees of cor-
relation (½(A;')), relative to its own volatility when ½(A;') = 0:8. The long-run
mean of the LTV ratio (¹ ') is 0.5 in all cases. All series have been ¯ltered using the
Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.
Figure 3.13 reports the results for the same exercise but over a range of values
for ¹ '. For each series the value on the vertical axis corresponds to its uncondi-
tional volatility relative to the one corresponding to ½(A;') = 0:8 and ¹ ' = 0:7. The
¯rst thing to note is that, for all the variables, the volatility is higher the bigger
the long-run leverage is. For example, the volatility of consumption is around
70% lower when the long-run leverage ratio is 1.4 (¹ ' = 0:3) than when it is 3.3
21In the case of un¯ltered series the correlation between the LTV ratio and output decreases
from 0.65 to 0.45 when ½(A;') is lowered from 0.8 to 0.
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(¹ ' = 0:7). Approximately the same ratio holds for output. In the case of asset
prices, the unconditional volatility when (¹ ' = 0:3) is about half of the one under
(¹ ' = 0:7). The most sensible variable in terms of unconditional volatility under
di®erent long-run leverage ratios is the trade balance: the volatility is several times
higher when ¹ ' takes the maximum value.
The second result is that, for all the variables and for all long-run values of LTV
(¹ '), a reduction of the correlation ½(A;') always entails a reduction in volatility.
Whether the slope is steeper for di®erent cuts over the ¹ ' dimension is hard to assess
in the surface graphs. Figure 3.8 makes this comparison clearer for two variables:
consumption and the trade balance to output ratio. The result is mixed: While
for the case of consumption the gain in volatility from reducing the procyclicality
of lending standards is roughly equivalent for di®erent values of ¹ ', in the case of
the trade balance the reduction is much more accentuated the higher the mean
leverage of the economy.








































































Figure 3.8: Stabilization Gains Under Di®erent ¹ ' Values.
Each plot corresponds to the volatility of the series for a given long-run leverage (¹ ')
under di®erent degrees of correlation (½(A;')), relative to its own volatility when
½(A;') = 0:8. All series have been ¯ltered using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that policies aimed at smoothing the
procyclicality in lending standards can have seizable results in terms of volatility
of macroeconomic aggregates. Although the model is highly stylized and abstracts
from several elements that can be relevant for policy analysis, it can provide much
of the insight into how the procyclical behavior of the ¯nancial frictions can af-
fect macroeconomic volatility. Some caveats are of course in order. First, the
simulations presented in this section are based on ¯rst order approximations of
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the dynamic system under the conjecture that the collateral constraint is always
binding. I do check that the Lagrange multiplier ¹t is always positive along the
simulated paths. However, although a negative value of ¹t for some period would
question the solution approach, a positive multiplier is not a proof that the col-
lateral constraint has always been binding. A nonlinear approximation method
would constitute a more robust alternative.22 My guess though is that the pres-
ence of nonlinearities associated with occasionally binding constraints would, if
any, amplify the e®ects of procyclical lending standards on macroeconomic volatil-
ity. Second, the model in this chapter abstracts completely from nominal issues,
among which the presence of nominal frictions and of monetary policy, that might
a®ect the transmission of ¯nancial shocks. Finally, the small open economy nature
of the model implies that the real interest rate does not react to ¯nancial shocks
that a®ect credit supply. Also, the model assumes that the ¯nancial friction a®ects
the whole population in the economy. Exploring the quantitative implications of
procyclical lending standards in a closed economy model with two groups of agents
or in a two country model{where relative prices may also play a relevant role{are
interesting avenues for future research.23
3.4.4 Persistence of Shocks and Business Cycles
In this section I repeat the numerical experiments under the alternative assump-
tion of iid shocks, both for productivity and the LTV ratio. Figure 3.9 depicts
the responses of the main macro-aggregates under both a ¯xed LTV ratio and
procyclical lending standards when shocks to TFP and to the LTV ratio are iid
instead of persistent as in the previous sections. Besides con¯rming the ampli¯ed
overreaction of asset prices when 't behaves procyclically, the remarkable result in
Figure 3.9 is the strong persistence of deviations from trend of asset prices despite
the iid nature of the shocks. This persistent deviation of qt gets re°ected in the
persistent responses of debt and consumption.
22Although the model details di®er, it is worth noting that some studies have found linear
approximations relatively accurate in contexts similar to the one in this chapter. In a model
using an asset in ¯xed supply as collateral, Iacoviello (2005) presents evidence suggesting that
only for extreme parameterizations the accuracy of the linear approximation becomes questioned.
Also Jermann and Quadrini (2009) solve a model with collateral constraints under both linear
and nonlinear approximations and ¯nd that the solution based on a linear approximation is
quite accurate. Nonetheless, the extent to which model details and parameter values might
imply accuracy problems is an open question for future research.
23See Gruss and Sgherri (2009) for a model that introduces cycles in lending standards in a
two-country two-good model, with endogenous °uctuations in the terms of trade.
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Figure 3.9: Impulse Responses, Procyclical Lending Standards, iid Shocks.
The line labeled \Fixed LTV" corresponds to the responses to a 1% negative produc-
tivity shock, with 't constant and equal to ¹ '. The \procyclical LTV" corresponds
to the responses to 1% negative shock to both TFP and the LTV ratio.
Figure 3.10 shows the volatility results from simulations assuming iid shocks. The
main results on volatility of reducing procyclicality of lending standards does not
depend on the persistence of the shocks. In particular, the volatility of consump-
tion, the only argument in the utility function of the representative agent, drops
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Figure 3.10: Stabilization Gains Assuming iid Shocks.
Each plot corresponds to the volatility of the series under di®erent degrees of corre-
lation (½(A;')), relative to its own volatility when ½(A;') = 0:8. The long-run mean
of the LTV ratio (¹ ') is 0.5 in all cases. Shocks to TFP and to LTV ratio are iid.
All series have been ¯ltered using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.
by almost 1/4 when the correlation ½(A;') is reduced from 0.8 to 0, similarly to
the result with persistent shocks. The main di®erence between the exercise with
persistent shocks refers to the volatility of output: with iid shocks the volatility
of GDP gets reduced much less than when shocks are persistent.
Table 3.3: Persistence of Business Cycles
Procyclicality of Lending Standards (½(A;')) 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Autocorrelation of Output 0.16 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.44
Credit constraints have been signaled as a key mechanism transforming shocks
into persistent movements in output (e.g. Kocherlakota 2000). This model con-
¯rms this result. The ¯rst column in Table 3.3 reports the autocorrelation of
output when shocks to TFP and to 't are iid and ½(A;') = 0, ¯xing ¹ ' = 0:5. Even
if shocks are iid, output displays positive autocorrelation (0.16). Interestingly,
however, procyclicality in lending standards implies higher persistence of business
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cycles relative to the shocks hitting the economy: When the simulations are re-
peated for positive ½(A;') under iid shocks, the autocorrelation of output increases
substantially. Indeed, when ½(A;') = 0:8 the autocorrelation of output is 0.44,
three times higher than when ½(A;') = 0.24 In sum, the procyclicality of lending
standards also introduces a signi¯cant source of persistence of output.
3.4.5 An Endogenous Function for Lending Standards
Fully endogenizing the procyclical behavior of lending standards in a DSGE model
is beyond the scope of this chapter.25 However, in this section and as a robustness
exercise I replace the stochastic process for 't in Equation 3.3 postulating an
endogenous functions that links lending standards with the cyclical stance of the
economy. Adrian and Shin (2010) suggest that ¯nancial intermediaries adjust
their balance sheets to changes is asset prices in a way that implies an aggregate
increase/reduction in credit supply. There is evidence suggesting that this behavior
entails relaxation/tightening in lending standards (see Bayoumi and Melander
2008 for example). Motivated by this evidence I assume an ad-hoc functional
form for 't that links lending standards to the cyclical stance of asset prices in
the economy. More precisely, I postulate:
't =
exp(a(qt ¡ ¹ q) + b)
1 + exp(a(qt ¡ ¹ q) + b)
, (3.12)
where b is a parameter determining the LTV ratio in the non-stochastic steady
state and a determines the sensibility of 't to deviations of qt from its steady state
value.26 Figure 3.11 shows the response of the LTV ratio to a negative 1% pro-
ductivity shock for a = 0 and a > 0. The parameter b was set to 0 such that the
long-run LTV ratio is 0.5, the intermediate value in the exercises in the previous
sections. In the procyclical lending standards case, the parameter a was set to
160 so that the unconditional standard deviation of the LTV ratio is similar than
under the speci¯cation of lending standards in Equation 3.3 used in the previous
sections. With these parameter values, a 1% negative TFP shock leads to a drop
of ^ 't on impact of around 2.5% (see Figure 3.11).
24These results correspond to un¯ltered series. The same result holds for HP ¯ltered series.
25Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) model the tightening of margins explicitly, but in a ¯nite-
horizon model with limited rationality.
26Under the speci¯cation of 't in Equation 3.12, its long-run level is ¹ ' =
exp(b)
1+exp(b).
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Figure 3.11: Response of LTV Ratio in Equation 3.12 to a ¡1% TFP Shock.
Figure 3.12 shows the response of consumption, investment, debt, output, excess
returns and asset prices to a negative productivity shock assuming alternatively
a = 0 (i.e. a ¯xed LTV ratio) and a > 0 (procyclical lending standards). When
lending standards get eased as asset prices are above trend and tightened when
they are below trend, the responses of all the variables are much more accentuated
than when the LTV ratio is a constant. The last two graphs show the ampli¯ed
\overreaction" of asset prices due to procyclical lending standards: Excess returns
rise on impact by 15% above their steady state level when a = 160. Instead,
when a = 0 they only rise gradually, reaching a maximum deviation from trend of
around 2% ¯ve periods after the shock. The asset price drops to only 0:7% below
its steady state level when a = 0 while it decreases almost 3% when lending stan-
dards are procyclical. Due to the higher drop in the value of the collateral under
procyclical lending standards, ^ dt drops by ¯ve times more than when the LTV
is ¯xed. Consequently, the drops in consumption and in investment in response
to a negative productivity shock is much more pronounced when the LTV ratio
behaves procyclically: the drop in consumption is more than 3 times bigger and,
in the case of investment, the decrease is around 7 times bigger. The latter gets
re°ected in the much higher drop in output under procyclical lending standards:
^ yt reaches a bottom of ¡1:2% when the LTV is ¯xed but of almost ¡4:5% when
the LTV ratio behaves procyclically.
Table 3.4 reports the second moments of simulated macroeconomic aggregates
assuming alternatively a = 0 and a = 160. When a = 0 the LTV ratio is a
constant; when a = 160 the LTV ratio reacts to deviations of asset prices from
trend and its standard deviation is 2.44%. The volatility of qt is more than 3.5
Gruss, Bertrand (2010), Financial Factors, Rare Disasters and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/21960Chapter 3. Procyclical Lending Standards and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 127
times higher when lending standards are assumed to be procyclical. In the case of
consumption this ratio is 3 times and for investment it is more than 6 times. The
standard deviation of output is 7.64% when a = 160 but it is only 2.23% when
the LTV ratio is ¯xed.






















































































































































































































Figure 3.12: Alternative Speci¯cation for Lending Standards in Equation 3.12.
The line labeled \Fixed LTV" corresponds to the responses to a 1% negative pro-
ductivity shock, with 't as in Equation 3.12 with a = 0 while the \procyclical LTV"
responses correspond to the case with a > 0.
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Table 3.4: Simulation Results, LTV Ratio in Equation 3.12.
Standard Deviations a: 0 160
Lending Standards std(') 0% 2.44%
Output std(y) 2.23% 7.64%
Consumption std(c) 2.11% 6.38%
Investment std(i) 22.7% 145.1%
Asset Price std(q) 1.37% 5.05%
Notes: a takes 2 alternative values: 0 (¯xed LTV) and 160 (procyclical LTV);
b = 0; the other parameter values are as in Table 3.5. The series are ¯ltered using
the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter and a smoothing parameter equal to 100.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Recent contributions in the empirical literature suggest the existence of ¯nancing
frictions in the relationship between ¯nancial intermediaries and their creditors,
introducing a credit supply channel that ampli¯es business cycle °uctuations. In-
deed, several studies show that, consistently with the extended use of risk-measures
like Value-at-Risk, leveraged ¯nancial institutions manage actively their balance
sheets in response to changes in the price of assets they hold and in measured
risk in the economy, and that this behavior a®ects in turn the tightness of credit
standards, the volume of aggregate credit, asset prices and real activity. Although
the role of non-¯nancial borrowers' \creditworthiness" in amplifying or generating
cycles in macro models has been amply studied in the literature, the presence
of frictions in the funding side of ¯nancial intermediaries has been much less ex-
plored. This chapter develops a small open economy model that, while keeping
¯nancial intermediaries as a veil, incorporates the dynamics of their balance sheets
documented in the empirical literature in a reduced form. Agents in the domestic
economy trade a non-contingent bond with the rest of the world and face an en-
dogenous collateral constraint where the maximum leverage ratio varies with the
business cycle, mimicking the procyclical behavior of lending standards. What I
am trying to explore, in a simple way, is the macroeconomic e®ect of ¯nancial
intermediaries easing/tightening credit standards along the cycle, for some reason
not modeled explicitly but consistently with the empirical evidence.
Despite the highly stylized nature of the model, it predicts reactions of the risk
premium, asset prices and macroeconomic activity to innovations in productivity
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or to ¯nancial shocks consistent with the empirical evidence documented for in-
stance in Adrian et al. (2010b). The tightening of lending standards leads to a
sharp increase in the risk premium and a drop in asset prices. The drop in the
market value of the collateral decreases the possibility of rolling over debt and
forces agents to cut spending in consumption and investment, the latter leading
to a drop in output after one period. When I consider shifts in the loan-to-value
ratio that are correlated with the business cycle, I ¯nd that the \overreaction" of
asset prices documented in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) gets further ampli¯ed and
this leads to a bigger reaction of real variables. In my quantitative experiments
the response of asset prices is twice as big when lending standards get tightened
as productivity drops than when the loan-to-value ratio is constant. Also the drop
in output is around twice as big, while for the case of consumption the drop is
50% bigger under a procyclical reaction of lending standards.
Regarding the destabilizing e®ect of procyclicality in lending standards mentioned
in the literature, my simulations suggest that introducing some \macro-prudential"
regulation to reduce the degree of correlation of credit standards with the cycle
can lead to sizable gains in terms of macroeconomic volatility. In this sense, in
my model reducing the correlation of the loan-to-value ratio with output from
0.45 to 0.25 is associated with a reduction in the volatility of real consumption of
approximately one fourth. The procyclical behavior of lending standards is also
found to contribute signi¯cantly to the persistence of business cycles relative to
the shocks. Although the model is highly stylized, it contributes to the policy
debate on macro-prudential regulation by exploring what can be the stabilizing
e®ects of implementing policies aimed at lowering the degree of procyclicality in
lending standards.
Assessing the quantitative implications of extending the model to include more
realistic features represents a potential avenue for future research. The parsimo-
nious nature of the model in this chapter helped to focus on the main aspects of the
propagation mechanism. However, a richer model might be needed to explore pol-
icy instruments and to evaluate the potential bene¯t of concrete policies targeting
the procyclicality of credit standards. Modeling explicitly ¯nancial intermediaries
to endogenize the procyclical behavior of lending standards is of course another
interesting direction for future research.
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3.6 Appendix Chapter 3
3.6.1 Other Tables and Figures
Table 3.5: Model Parametrization
a) Preferences and Technology Symbol Value
Discount factor ¯ 0.92
Capital income share ® 0.5
Capital depreciation parameter ± 0.1
Unconditional mean of TFP ¹ A 0.61
Persistence of TFP shock ½A 0.6
Standard deviation of TFP shock ¾A 0.02
b) Credit Standards
b.1) Stochastic Speci¯cation (Equation 3.4)
Average LTV ratio ¹ ' f:3;:4;:5;:6;:7g
Persistence of LTV shock ½' 0.6
Standard deviation of LTV shock ¾' 0.05
Correlation of At and 't shock innovations ½(A;') f0;:2;:4;:6;:8g
b.2) Endogenous Function (Equation 3.12)
Average LTV ratio exp(b)=(1 + exp(b)) .5
LTV function parameter a 160
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Figure 3.13: Stabilization Gains from Reducing Procyclicality of 't.
Each plot reports the volatility of the series under di®erent degrees of correlation
(½(A;')) and long-run LTV ratio (¹ '), relative to its own volatility when ½(A;') = 0:8
and ¹ ' = 0:7. All series have been ¯ltered using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.
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Figure 3.14: Stabilization Gains from Reducing Procyclicality of 't, Un¯l-
tered Series, Persistent and iid Shocks.
Each plot corresponds to the volatility of the series under di®erent degrees of corre-
lation (½(A;')), relative to its own volatility when ½(A;') = 0:8. The long-run mean
of the LTV ratio (¹ ') is 0.5 in all cases. The series are un¯ltered. The left panel
corresponds to persistent shocks (½A = ½' = 0:6) while the right panel corresponds
to iid shocks.
Table 3.6: Simulation Results, Un¯ltered Series.
Correlation TFP and LTV: ½(A;') 0 0.4 0.8
a) Standard Deviations
Lending Standards std(') 3.05% 3.05% 3.05%
Output std(y) 7.84% 9.04% 9.98%
Consumption std(c) 6.00% 6.87% 7.55%
Investment std(i) 110% 119% 127%
Asset Price std(q) 4.13% 4.78% 5.29%
b) Cross-Correlations with Output
Lending Standards corr(';y) 0.45 0.56 0.65
Asset Price corr(q;y) 0.76 0.81 0.84
Consumption corr(c;y) 0.76 0.82 0.85
Trade balance to GDP corr(nx=y;y) 0.22 0.17 0.14
c) Cross-Correlations with Asset Prices
Lending Standards corr(';q) 0.64 0.76 0.86
Consumption corr(c;q) 0.99 0.99 0.99
Trade balance to GDP corr(nx=y;q) ¡0:28 ¡0:26 ¡0:25
Notes: All parameters as shown in Table 3.5. The series are un¯ltered.
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